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Abstract 
 
This thesis establishes a new reading of Adorno‟s theory of truth. I argue that Adorno 
posits truth as being mutually constituted by dialectical philosophical texts, and the 
agent‟s cognitive engagement and „performance‟ of these texts. This reading is 
founded on an interpretation of Adorno as a transcendental philosopher, who grounds 
the transcendental necessity of concepts in the requirements of self-preservation. The 
agent‟s performative interaction with the text is held to provide access to truth by virtue 
of interfering with the conceptual mediation of the agent‟s experience. 
 I go on to argue that this conception of truth is also at play in Adorno‟s 
philosophy of art. I claim that the artwork, for Adorno, presents a dialectically 
constituted whole which, when performatively engaged with by the agent, disrupts the 
conceptual mediation of his or her experience, and provides access to the truth. While I 
show that Adorno considers his theory of truth content for art and philosophy to be 
unified, I also demonstrate that Adorno nonetheless maintains the differentiation 
between art and philosophy. I do this by providing a new interpretation of the 
relationship which Adorno draws between aesthetic autonomy and heteronomy. 
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7 
Introduction 
 
Theodor Adorno was a German philosopher. He was also a Marxist, Jew, aesthetician 
and sociologist, among other things. It is perhaps a measure of the confusion that 
reigns in Adorno scholarship that these latter labels are often each held to be 
standpoints, from which Adorno's philosophy can either be explained and criticized 
(most notably as a form of Marxism), or disregarded entirely (most notably as a 
contribution to aesthetics). The central commitment of this thesis is to the centrality of 
Adorno's being a philosopher. I take Adorno to be engaged in asking certain 
determinate philosophical questions, and engaged in the pursuit of certain determinate 
answers to those questions. This pursuit comes before any putative commitments 
Adorno may have – be they Marxist or not. Adorno's project is, I contend, an 
epistemological one, and is assessable only insofar as it succeeds or fails in this 
endeavor.1 
 No less important than Adorno's being a philosopher, is his being a German 
philosopher. German not only by birth, but by the intellectual tradition with which he 
deals. As has been demonstrated by O'Connor in Adorno's Negative Dialectics, Adorno 
is a recognizably transcendental philosopher who, drawing heavily on Kant and Hegel, 
produces an account of the transcendental grounds of experience. In what I believe to 
be an addition to O'Connor's account (or at least a change in emphasis), I demonstrate 
that Adorno also draws heavily on another German philosopher in developing this 
account of experience – namely, Karl Marx.  
 However, this engagement with Marx is not a commitment to any political 
programme of Marxism (if Marx can be taken to have had such a thing). Nor is it a 
position which can be criticized from the point of view of concrete political praxis.  
Rather, it is Adorno's materialism which represents his fidelity to Marx's legacy. 
Concealed by the uniformly Kantian-cum-Hegelian tenor  of Adorno's work is the fact 
that Adorno's theory of experience is not transcendental simpliciter. Rather it is a theory 
of experience according to which the conditions of the possibility of experience are 
contingent on material practices. Concepts are simultaneously transcendentally 
                                                 
1
 This assertion may seem odd in light of Adorno's Against Epistemology, the title of which 
implies Adorno's rejection of epistemology. However, Against Epistemology is an argument 
against undialectical epistemologies which contain 'first philosophy' in the form of 
explanatorily basic foundations, and which presume concepts are adequate to objects. I do 
not take Adorno to be opposed to epistemological questions (of what there is to know, what it 
means to know something, etc.), only to undialectical ways of answering these questions. 
Adorno himself asserts this – 'Epistemology is true as long as it accounts for the impossibility 
of its own beginning and lets itself be driven at every stage by its inadequacy to the things 
themselves.' (Adorno 1985: 25). Adorno's project is epistemology, then, insofar as it 
addresses epistemological questions. 
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necessary for, contingent on, and pragmatically engaged with the agent's form of life.  
 The aim of this thesis will be to explain and develop Adorno's theory of truth. I 
will concern myself with both what Adorno takes the true to be and, more significantly, 
how he takes the true to be accessible. I will attempt to demonstrate that Adorno's 
understanding of the nature of philosophical truth is highly idiosyncratic and unusual. In 
a novel reading, I will show that Adorno does not understand the true as being captured 
by the kind of dialectical analysis one finds in Negative Dialectics or Aesthetic Theory. 
Rather, the true is accessed by virtue of the agent's internalization of and performative 
engagement with these dialectical texts.2 The truth is reducible neither to the text, nor 
to the agent – but rather to the product of a dialectical interplay of the two. I term this 
position 'texturalism'. 
 To my knowledge, outside of O'Connor's recognition that false consciousness 
cannot be subverted merely by theoretical knowledge, but also a praxis or 'movement 
of consciousness' (O'Connor 2000: 91), and Menke's (1998)  treatment of Adorno's 
aesthetics as providing an experiential critique of reason, this feature of Adorno's 
general philosophical account has not been properly recognized nor thoroughly 
elaborated. Nor have the full consequences of this feature of Adorno's account been 
displayed: through examining the grounds of the possibility of Adorno's texturalism, a 
good deal of the subterranean structure of Adorno's account is revealed. Moreover, it 
also sharpens Adorno's critique of conventional theories of truth, and the differentiation 
between Adorno's position and conventional theories of truth.  
 This done, I will then move to establish a second new reading of Adorno. This 
will consist in taking Adorno's theory of philosophical truth content to apply also to 
Adorno's theory of aesthetic truth content. As is well known, Adorno took art to be 
cognitive, and claimed that the criterion of art's authenticity was its being true. I will 
demonstrate that this conception of art's truth must in fact be seen as unified with 
Adorno's conception of philosophical truth. There will, however, be important points of 
differentiation which prevent Adorno's account, on my interpretation, from merely 
subsuming art under the category of philosophy. 
 I have not intended this dissertation to be wholly a historical account of Adorno's 
views, nor have I intended it to be wholly novel. Quite apart from any flaws we may find 
in Adorno's work, we also find reasonably large blank expanses in his philosophy, 
where Adorno has given little definition to the specific mechanisms, interconnections 
and views he may have posited, drawn or held. This becomes increasingly pronounced 
the deeper, as it were, one delves into Adorno's work. Given Adorno's justified aversion 
                                                 
2
 This 'performativity' is not the Austinian variety – more detail on this will be given in Chapter 
3. 
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to foundational or 'first' philosophy, this is scarcely surprising. However, it is not always 
excusable. Many of these blank expanses both demand and hold out the promise of 
interpretive activity which moves beyond mere exegesis. I have felt the need at several 
points in this dissertation to move beyond adding clarity to, or chancing inferences 
about, Adorno's intended philosophical work. I have felt obliged to add philosophical 
content in areas which Adorno did not address, and about which he gave little 
guidance. I have done this with the intention of remaining true to, or shoring up, 
Adorno's established philosophical practices and positions.  
 I have tried to indicate where my thought has become especially speculative, 
and where Adorno's voice has become sufficiently quiet as to require speculation. 
However, it is worth pointing out that much of Chapter 3 and 4 hovers between 
grounded inference and original work. 
 It is worth pointing out more generally that the reading of Adorno found in this 
dissertation is constructed not with a view to exhaustive fidelity to and inclusion of 
every facet of Adorno's thought. Neither space nor time permit this. As such, there are 
a number of areas of Adorno's work which are not represented. For example, Adorno is 
often happy to lay considerable explanatory weight on Freud's work, particularly in his 
earlier work. I do not find this area of his work particularly relevant to my project, and 
nor do I find it compelling on its own terms. Freud does not appear in this dissertation – 
and psychology in general scarcely at all. I do not doubt that some of my aims, or the 
emphases I choose to lay on the philosophical underpinnings of those aims, may differ 
from Adorno. But my project is not to reiterate Adorno's work, but to illuminate what I 
take to be a central and underappreciated facet of Adorno's thought, and work with his 
philosophy in such a way as to bring it to light and give it an explicit, coherent and 
plausible philosophical foundation. It is in this spirit of 'working with' Adorno's 
philosophy towards its own goals, rather than merely explicating, or dismissively 
moving away from it, that this dissertation should be understood. 
 It is this attempt to work with Adorno, and make explicit and determinate that 
which is often implicit or unsaid which explains the occasionally laborious air of the first 
two Chapters. I have found that the interpretation given in Chapters 3 and 4 is 
sufficiently unusual as to demand an exhaustive outlay of what I take to be the grounds 
for this interpretation. As such, the first two Chapters occasionally take a more long-
winded approach than seems strictly necessary at the time. The incessant stipulations 
and arguments from elimination, however, are intended to pre-emptively close off 
problems which may occur in the later Chapters, as well as make fully explicit the 
various interpretive decisions which underpin my treatment of Adorno.  
 As the endpoint of this dissertation is a consideration of Adorno's aesthetic 
10 
thought  as it relates to Adorno's philosophy of truth, I found taking an interpretive path 
through the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Negative Dialectics and Aesthetic Theory most 
expedient in view of the limited word count. Relatedly, as this consideration of Adorno's 
aesthetics is almost wholly methodological, Adorno's highly accomplished aesthetic 
criticism is almost wholly unconsidered. This omission is at least partly rectified in the 
appendix, where I demonstrate Adorno's application of the theory of aesthetic truth-
content to Beethoven. 
 A final disclaimer. As is well known, Adorno's work has been translated often, 
but not often translated well. While this difficulty can be overstressed, in the case of 
Ashton's treatment of Negative Dialectics it can be quite severe. As a result, all page 
numbers given in reference to Negative Dialectics are doubled, the first being the 
reference in Ashton's translation, the second giving the reference in Adorno's 
Gesammelte Schriften.  All quotations from Negative Dialectics which appear in this 
work in English are from Ashton's translation, adapted with reference to the original 
German where appropriate. 
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1. – Conceptual Mediation and Necessity 
 
1.1 Introductory Stipulations 
Adorno's treatment of truth, on my interpretation across the next four Chapters, is 
idiosyncratic enough to necessitate a number of stipulations, in order to prevent 
misunderstanding. The conventional argot of epistemology does not comfortably map 
onto Adorno's philosophy. This is due in no small part to the holistic theory of falsity 
which I expound in Chapter 2. As a consequence of this holistic theory of falsity, 
Adorno can be understood to have a pluralistic theory of truth, insofar as there a 
number of ways for a sentence to be counted as 'true'. However, with the exception of 
a single privileged standard of truth (access to the non-identical), these other forms of 
truth are posited as being ultimately false.  
 This obviously complicates the picture somewhat. Unless otherwise indicated, 
any reference to 'the true' or 'truth' in this work should be taken to be referring to the 
unqualifiedly true, as opposed to any of the other, ultimately false, forms of truth 
Adorno's philosophy allows. 
 A further stipulation must be made concerning 'the true' and 'truth'. As had 
already been noted, all references to the true will be taken to be references to the 
unqualifiedly true which escapes Adorno's holistic theory of falsity. However, due to an 
ontological quirk of Adorno's position, we must differentiate between 'truth' and 'the 
true'. 'The true' is stipulated to refer to the non-identical, which bears its truth whether 
or not it is expressed. 'Truth', by contrast, is stipulated to refer to the cognitive access 
to the true. The reasons for truth being stipulated to be a property of an agent's 
cognition, rather than propositions or texts, are numerous, and detailed in Chapter 3. 
 
1.2. The status of the true 
As noted, the main focus of this dissertation will be Adorno's theory of the manner in 
which truth is instantiated in philosophy and art. In order for this examination to begin, it 
is important to determine the status of the true itself. In the present case, I will concern 
myself with what Adorno considers the true (in the sense already explained)– namely, 
the non-identical. The non-identical is, according to Adorno, the real object of any 
philosophical investigation or artwork. As will become increasingly clear in the course of 
this dissertation, Adorno takes all other forms of truth (for example, empirical 
assertions) to be problematized by virtue of the falsifying nature of concepts.  
 Adorno takes all experience to be conceptually mediated (proof of this is given 
below). All concepts that mediate experience or that are employed theoretically, 
12 
necessarily result in falsification. The precise reason for this will be explained later on. 
For now, it suffices to note that Adorno takes these concepts to be false by virtue of 
their taking part in what he variously terms 'enlightenment thinking' or 'identity thinking' 
(DE: 23, ND : 154 / 157). The distinctive feature of this 'identity thinking' is that the 
agent takes the concept to exhaust its object, and is thereby ignorant of those 
properties of the object which are not identical with the concept applied to it. 
 The upshot of this is that all epistemological activity is instantly problematized. 
As all theoretical activity (and indeed, all experience, according to Adorno) takes place 
by virtue of concepts, which are inherently falsifying, it would seem that any statement 
of truth is impossible. Adorno endorses this picture, and denies that any positive 
statement of the truth is possible (ND: 145 / 148). 
 The non-identical is the only exception to this gloomy picture. The non-identical 
is taken to be constitutively non-conceptual (begrifflose). Its non-conceptuality is not 
merely a failure to engage with or be germane to concepts. However, it is constitutively 
uncapturable by concepts. Moreover, this non-conceptuality is in fact constituted as a 
critique of conceptuality.3 Rather than simply being non-conceptual nonsense with no 
relevance to conceptuality, it in fact functions as a critique of conceptuality itself. The 
non-conceptual is intended to demonstrate the falsifying nature of conceptuality.  
 All of the above will have to be accommodated by my reading of Adorno's 
theory of the true. It will be the aim of this dissertation to both accommodate and 
theoretically ground these assertions of Adorno's concerning truth and the non-
identical. It is important to reiterate at this point that the 'true' for Adorno can be taken 
to be co-extensive with the 'non-identical'. As such, this attempt to discern Adorno's 
theory of the true, and his theory of the truth's instantiation, will result in an attempt to 
discern Adorno's theory of the non-identical and his theory of the non-identical's 
instantiation. 
 This being the case, we re-encounter the problem that we need to establish 
what the true is, in order to begin to understand the manner in which the truth is 
instantiated. While we have established what the non-identical's function is (a non-
conceptual critique of conceptuality), we have yet to establish the non-identical's 
ontological status. 
 I interpret the non-identical as a dialectical entity internal to thought, which 
appears at any point where an internally contradictory system of thought and the object 
of that thought interact. As such, the non-identical is not constituted by any property of 
                                                 
3
 'The nonidentical is not to be obtained directly, as something positive on its part, nor is it 
obtainable by a negation of the negative [...] It's only positive side would be criticism, 
determinate negation; it would not be a circumventing result with a happy grasp on 
affirmation.' (ND: 158 – 159 / 161) 
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an object itself – rather, it is an itinerant problematic internal to thought. It is revealed by 
confronting the system of thought with that object of thought which will make explicit 
the internally contradictory nature of that thought. If, then, a system of thought is 
internally contradictory in its treatment of, say, labour then it is the thorough dialectical 
confrontation of that system of thought and the object of labour which will produce the 
non-identical. The non-identical will consist in the system of thought's production, by its 
own principle, of a collapse in its concepts. The non-identical, then, will be the 
combination of the object and the concept's insufficiency, displayed through dialectical 
philosophy. 
 However, this non-identicality is not attributable to a property of the object 
'labour' simpliciter. By this I mean that the non-identity which arises is not simply the 
fact that the object 'labour' has certain properties not yet cognized by the concept of 
labour. Rather, it is the interaction of the object labour and the obtaining system of 
thought which gives rise to and results in non-identity. Non-identity, then, is a dynamic 
existent mutually constituted by a given object and an obtaining system of thought.  
Non-identity must be understood as being mutually constituted by the object and the 
concept, just because given certain corrections, the system of thought can 
accommodate and resolve the arising contradictions, and the given object will cease to 
have a non-identical aspect. 
  In brief, then, this reading understands the non-identical to be the confrontation 
of a system of thought with an object it cannot, for reasons of internal contradiction, 
subsume.4 This 'confrontation' is not a product of conventional cognition but must be 
engineered by dialectics. As such, non-identity cannot be identified merely with the 
object, nor with the subject – it is brought into being in the interaction of the two. 
 It is this interpretation of the non-identical that I will employ. For the present, I 
will simply stipulate that the non-identical meets this account. Exegetical support  for 
this reading will be given in the course of this dissertation. I will also attempt to 
demonstrate the benefits of adopting this reading, by showing the beneficial 
consequences it has for the comprehension of a great number of Adorno's 
methodological remarks. 
 
1.3. Adorno's Theory of Experience 
I have stipulated, then, that the non-identical is not a property of an object in itself, but 
rather an emergent entity which is produced by the interaction of a system of 
conceptual thought and an object of thought. Attempting to determine Adorno's theory 
                                                 
4
 So as not to anticipate the analysis in Chapter 2, I have here used the term 'system of 
thought' for what will be later termed a 'conceptual array'. 
14 
of truth thus entails fixing the precise nature of the mechanism by which one's system 
of thought is forced into a confrontation with its own insufficiency. I want to first examine 
Adorno's understanding of the medium in which this confrontation must take place – 
namely, experience. 
 Adorno takes all experience to be conceptually mediated. Adorno also holds 
that the structure of this conceptual mediation develops over time.5 Establishing this will 
be the task of this Chapter. Once we have established that access to the non-identical 
is necessarily conceptually mediated, we will need to understand precisely what the 
nature of the concept is. This will be the task of the next Chapter. A fair amount of the 
present Chapter is intended to facilitate this later discussion – as such, the present 
examination of Adorno's theory of experience will touch on areas that will not, at this 
point, seem strictly relevant. However, they are of essential importance in the later 
discussion. 
 As I have said, then, I hold that Adorno takes perception to be necessarily 
conceptually mediated. In Negative Dialectics, we have the following examples of this : 
 
Mental objectivity corresponds to the moment of the immediacy of vision. 
Pre-shaped in itself, it can be viewed like things of the senses [...] Beneath 
the ideating view, the mediation which had congealed in the apparent 
immediacy of spirit is at work. (ND: 82 / 89-90, translation modified)  
 
Here we see Adorno employing the perceptual as an analogue to the objectivity of 
thought ('Mental objectivity'). What makes these analogues of one another is that in 
each case mediation congeals in apparent immediacy. In other words, the immediacy 
of experience is in fact constituted by mediation – it is preformed.  
 
Coming to light in this is the fact that subjectification and reification do not 
merely diverge. They are correlates [...] The reduction of the object to pure 
material, which precedes all subjective synthesis as its necessary condition, 
sucks the object's own dynamics out of it: it is disqualified, immobilized, and 
robbed of whatever would allow motion to be predicated at all [...] The 
material however, divested of its dynamics, is not absolutely immediate – 
                                                 
5
 While this is a theory of experience simpliciter for Adorno, I will often, in the course of 
establishing this, need to have reference to examples of perceptual experience. For 
economy, rather than continually point out that the account of perceptual experience is 
intended to also apply to experience simpliciter, I will instead refer to 'perception'. Reference 
to 'perception', then, should be taken as reference not merely to perception, but to the 
perceptual element of experience in general. 
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despite its appearance of absolute concretion it is mediated by abstraction, 
impaled as it were from the first.  (ND: 91 / 98, translation modified) 
 
Here Adorno deals with the tendency of reification to obscure the object's 'own 
dynamics' (i.e., its dialectical nature) by reducing it to 'mere material'. As such, 
the object appears to the consciousness as mere immediacy. However, Adorno 
denies that such a reduction could ever be successful. This is because, he 
claims, the object is 'impaled, as it were, from the first' by 'abstraction' 
(Abstraktion) which mediates it. Adorno is claiming that all experience of objects 
are constituted by conceptual abstraction, no matter how immediate they appear. 
 
Because entity is not immediate, because it is only through the concept, we 
should begin with the concept, not with the mere datum. (ND: 153 / 156) 
 
Finally, Adorno makes the necessity of the concept for epistemological access to the 
object very bald in this extract. The 'mere datum', according to Adorno, cannot be a 
starting point for comprehension of 'entity' (das Seiende). Rather, we must begin with 
the concept, as entity is 'only through the concept'. This demonstrates that 
conceptuality is, if you like, epistemologically primary. Any attempt to circumvent the 
concept and deal with the 'mere datum' is, Adorno claims, impossible. 
 While these extracts do serve as exegetical support for Adorno's holding a 
theory of experience as necessarily conceptually mediated, I intend to further 
demonstrate Adorno's commitment to this theory of experience by extrapolating from 
his commitments a somewhat curious analogue of Kant's Transcendental Deduction. 
 
1.4. Adorno's Deduction 
I intend to use consideration of Kant's general position on the conceptuality of 
experience as a framing device – in order to throw into relief, and bring out the oddity, 
of Adorno's position. Consequently, my description of Kant will be in the most general 
terms possible, and insensitive to any given exegetical controversies. 
 Construed roughly, Kant's Transcendental Deduction argues that the 
conceptual (categorial) mediation of experience is absolutely necessary for the 
experience of finite beings. Kant predicates this necessity on the transcendental unity 
of apperception, and the continuity of experience. In order to unify the 'I' of each 
discrete experience into a temporally enduring 'I' which recognizes itself across time 
(or space), Kant argues, one must have the faculty of unifying each qualitatively 
distinct impression via a judgement (Ward 2006: 55). These judgements are effected 
16 
via any one of the basic forms of judgement (outlined in the Metaphysical Deduction). 
Each of these forms has a categorial counterpart, which mediates and makes possible 
unified, continuous experience (Ward 2006: 50, 53 - 56). The continuity of temporal 
experience is necessarily conceptually mediated. If the content of this experience (the 
phenomena) could not be mediated by these categories, it therefore could not be 
experienced; it could not be unified across time, and hence the constitutive unity of 
apperception could not be achieved. From this rather rough and ready sketch of Kant's 
position, we can draw two key points. First, the nature of the necessity of the 
conceptual mediation is transparently absolute – in the absence of conceptual 
mediation, experience itself is impossible. Secondly – and this point will become 
relevant at the beginning of the next Chapter – Kant's phenomenal ontology is strictly 
limited by the transcendental conditions on one's experiencing this ontology. Put 
differently, by virtue of his transcendental argument Kant takes himself to have 
demonstrated that any phenomenal existent which cannot conform to the categories is 
thereby not a phenomenal existent. In this way, the existence of phenomena as yet 
unperceived due to their requiring some putative different categorial structure in order 
to be perceived is nonsensical.6  
 For Kant, then, conceptuality is necessary for the unification and continuity of 
experience, and non-conceptual experience is impossible.7 
 Adorno's putative analogue with this Transcendental Deduction is so unusual 
precisely because he does not hold both of these claims. While he holds that 
conceptuality is necessary for experience, he also accepts that non-conceptual 
experience is possible. As should be apparent, in order to prevent this from being 
merely a contradiction, Adorno is obliged to finesse the meaning of  the terms 
employed. Adorno does this by finessing the meaning of the term 'experience' in each 
of these two claims, as well as modifying the force of the necessity of the conceptuality 
of experience. To anticipate, Adorno does this by translating Kant's demonstration out 
of the transcendental and into the pragmatic. As I hope to demonstrate, Adorno holds 
the conceptuality of perception as pragmatically necessary and, moreover, 
pragmatically motivated, as opposed to deriving from any transcendental condition on 
the nature of any possible experience. Similarly, an experience which is not 
conceptually mediated is held to be possible by Adorno, I will show, but pragmatically 
unsustainable. Not least significant in this difference from Kant will be Adorno's 
                                                 
6
 '[W]e then say that the conditions for the possibility of experience are such as simultaneously 
conditions for the possibility of objects of experience' (Kant 1996: 228). 
7
 This non-conceptuality being construed as either incompatibility with our categories, or 
compatibility with some putative category different to our own (a possibility Kant rejects, of 
course, in the Metaphysical Deduction). 
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positing of concepts as not transcendentally necessary, nor intrinsically truthful, but as 
products of self-interest. In order to begin establishing this reading of Adorno as 
plausible, we must make reference to both Negative Dialectics and, more extensively, 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
 Before I begin doing this, however, I will stipulate the meaning of a number of 
terms I will employ. Throughout this thesis, I will frequently refer to 'self-interest', 'self-
preservation' and the 'pragmatic' grounds for the formation of concepts. By 'self-
preservation' I refer to the agent's ongoing attempt to maintain the existence of his self, 
that self being construed as not merely physical, but also as bounded psychological 
agency. 'Self-interest' is defined as those requirements germane to the maintenance of 
the self as just defined. The 'pragmatic' grounds for the formation of concepts, and so 
on, are constituted by the way in which the requirements of self-interest interact with 
and are guided by the world. 
 That Adorno held that the conceptuality of experience was necessary is clear, 
as was shown earlier in section 1.3.  However, perhaps the most striking formulation of 
this thought occurs in Negative Dialectics, where Adorno asserts '[w]ithout concepts, 
that experience [individual experience] would lack continuity' (ND: 46 / 56). This 
assertion is so striking precisely because of its strong Kantian tenor. Adorno here 
asserts that conceptuality is essential for the presence of experiential continuity. 
Adorno would appear to be following Kant in asserting that non-conceptual experience 
is impossible, due to its inherent discontinuity. Such discontinuity, Kant argues, 
precludes the formation of a self in which the experience could take place. In Adorno's 
telling employment of the broadly Kantian term 'continuity', then, we might expect that 
Adorno is in straightforward agreement with Kant's Transcendental Deduction. 
However, this interpretation is frustrated by the fact that Adorno does not equate the 
continuity of experience with its possibility. Adorno allows for the possibility of non-
conceptual (and ex hypothesi discontinuous) experience. 
 
1.5. Non-conceptual Experience 
Characteristically, Adorno does not simply assert that non-conceptual experience is 
possible (indeed, he does not directly address the present topic of enquiry at all). 
Happily, while Adorno does not directly address the possibility of non-conceptual 
experience, he does spend a great deal of time in Dialectic of Enlightenment in 
attempting to outline the nature and genesis of conceptuality.  It is my position that the 
non-conceptual experience which Adorno allows is described in this account in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. Adorno alleges that conceptuality originated in a primal 
experience of terror, caused by man's inability to comprehend his immediate 
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surroundings ('the real preponderance of nature in the weak psyches of primitive 
people' ((DE: 11)). I want to argue that this 'terror' is in fact not merely a subjective 
'taking fright', but is rather an experience of helplessness deriving from a completely 
non-conceptual epistemological standpoint. 
 I will defend this interpretation in two ways. First, I will demonstrate that Adorno 
holds that this original experience occasions the formation of concepts. From this, I will 
be able to show that a full conceptual array is evidently not innate, nor necessary for 
experience according to Adorno (given the simple fact that the concepts that constitute 
such an array were not all present in the experience which occasioned their formation). 
However, this will have the problem for my interpretation that it could still be the case 
that while some of the concepts constitutive of experience were not present in that 
original terror, being formed subsequently, some other, minimal set was. In order to 
shore up the idea that this original terror was completely non-conceptual, then, I will 
consider Adorno's account of the emergence of conceptuality as it relates to what he 
terms the transition 'from tautology into language' (DE: 11).  
 Once these two lines of argument are concluded, I hope to have demonstrated, 
or at least made plausible, that Adorno allows for a non-conceptual form of experience. 
The importance of this will be not merely to demonstrate the difference between 
Adorno and Kant. Rather it will throw into relief the problem (broached in the next 
Chapter) of the origin and subsequent nature of concepts and, by extension, the 
possible nature of the non-identical (which must be accessed by means of concepts). 
  
1.6 Occasioning Concepts 
This original terror, the 'noonday panic fear in which nature appeared as all-powerful' 
(DE: 22) was overcome by the native's beginning to '[fix...] the transcendence of the 
unknown in relation to the known' (DE: 10). This fixing of the transcendence amounts 
to an arbitrary determination of an epistemological mode (which I will show to be 
incomprehensible in virtue of being discontinuous), such that the native is capable both 
of reducing his feeling of impotence and of being able to secure the practical 
necessities for a being of his sort. This can be shown in the following - 
 
Of course, mental representation is only an instrument. In thought, human 
beings distance themselves from nature in order to arrange it in such a way 
that it can be mastered. Like the material tool which, as a thing, is held fast 
as that thing in different situations and thereby separates the world, as 
something chaotic, multiple and disparate, from that which is known, single 
and identical, so the concept is the idea-tool which fits into things at the very 
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point from which one can take hold of them. (DE: 31). 
 
The 'transcendence of the unknown' (DE: 10) is worked by the idea-tool, such that it 
becomes reduced to the 'known, single and identical' (DE: 31). It would appear that in 
the above quote, Adorno is describing precisely what the process of fixing the 
transcendence amounted to – in describing the operation of the 'idea-tool', he 
describes a transition from the chaotic to the known and unified. This transition is 
effected by the concept. Already here we have support for the idea that the use of 
concepts was an emergent, rather than innate, or transcendentally necessary for any 
experience whatsoever, practice. Of course, for a transcendence to be 'fixed' it must 
have been at some point unfixed. Given that the use of concepts effects the 'fixing', the 
unfixed state, it would seem, must have been not mediated by concepts. 
 In the above quote we also have Adorno's key idea that the concept is not 
created in order to model reality, but rather to master it. This is most bluntly expressed 
in Adorno's reduction of the concept to an 'idea-tool', with which one becomes able to 
reduce the world from a state of being 'chaotic, multiple and disparate' to being 'known, 
single and identical'. As such, we can see that the concept is oriented not towards 
truth, but rather domination of one's environment (so 'it can be mastered'). Of course, 
this does not exclude the possibility that, in being so dominating, the concept may 
model truth as well (the conceptual structure required for domination being equivalent 
to that required from truth). As set out in section 1.1, Adorno has a number of levels of 
truth. Confining discussion to consideration of the unqualifiedly true, it is clear that 
Adorno does not think that conventional concepts are true in this sense.8 This will 
receive support in Chapter 2. However, there are 'lesser' forms of truth which 
conventional statements (like 'grass is green') can bear, despite being ultimately false. 
This receives further explanation in Chapter 3. 
 We have yet to show that the concepts that constitute a 'known, single and 
identical' experiential world out of a 'chaotic, multiple and disparate' one are not innate 
or unqualifiedly transcendentally necessary. To do this, we will have to return to 
Adorno's account of the generation of conceptual dichotomies. A strong example of 
                                                 
8
 The following are some examples of Adorno's rejecting the possibility of concepts truthfully 
modelling the world.  'The concept – the organon of thinking, and yet the wall between 
thinking and the thought – negates that yearning. Philosophy can neither circumvent such 
negation nor submit to it. It must strive, by way of the concept, to transcend the concept.' 
(ND: 15 / 27). 'While doing violence to the object of its syntheses, our thinking heeds a 
potential that waits in the object' (ND: 19/ 30-31, emphasis mine). 'As the experience of what 
has come into being in things which supposedly merely are, essence perception would be 
the almost diametrical opposite of the end it is used for. Rather than a faithful acceptance of 
Being, it would be its critique: rather than a sense of the thing's identity with its concept, it 
would be an awareness of the break between them.' (ND: 82 / 89-90).  
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this account of conceptual generation occurs early on in Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
After describing the experience of 'terror' for the native, and the ensuing process of 
'fixing the transcendence', Adorno asserts that  
 
The cry of terror called forth by the unfamiliar becomes its name [...] The 
doubling of nature into appearance and essence, effect and force [...] 
springs from human fear. (DE: 10). 
 
Here we have further support for the idea that primal fear of nature (the 'terror' earlier 
referred to) occasions the formation of concepts. Two of the most basic conceptual 
dichotomies, between appearance and essence, and cause and effect ('effect and 
force') are held to '[spring] from human fear'. They spring from this fear, rather than 
being the condition of the possibility of any experience (fearful or not) at all. Adorno 
appears to assert, then, that prior to, and during this fearful encounter with nature, the 
categories of cause and effect and 'appearance and essence' were absent. 
Presumably, this absence is responsible for the epistemological weakness which 
allows 'the real preponderance of nature in the weak psyches of primitive people' (DE: 
10 -11). We have here a clear example of the conceptless confrontation of the subject 
with the object giving rise to basic concepts. This would appear to lend support to the 
idea that this form of experience prior to the emergence was bereft of concepts. 
 However, even granting my reading of the above material, I have not yet 
provided adequate support for this interpretation. All that I have shown is that some 
conceptual categories are emergent, rather than innate or transcendentally necessary. 
This is not inconsistent with the claim that all experience is conceptually mediated. We 
could understand experience as mediated by some set of core innate / 
transcendentally necessary concepts, to which  new concepts are added over time. In 
order to discount the possibility that Adorno is operating on this basis, I will need to 
examine Adorno's account of the emergence of language, which he runs together with 
his account of the emergence of concepts.  
 
1.7 Tautology and Language 
I now provide further support for my claim that the state prior (or equivalent) to the 
occasioning of the concepts of cause and effect and appearance and essence was, in 
fact, a state which was entirely devoid of concepts. I do this by examining Adorno's 
account of the emergence of language. There is one particular passage in the Dialectic 
of Enlightenment which covers this extensively: 
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The split between animate and inanimate, the assigning of demons and 
deities to certain specific places, arises from [the] pre-animism [inculcated 
by man's original terror]. Even the division of subject and object is 
prefigured in it. If the tree is addressed no longer as simply a tree but as 
evidence of something else, a location of mana, language expresses the 
contradiction that it is at the same time itself and something other than itself, 
identical and not identical. Through the deity speech is transformed from 
tautology into language. The concept, usually defined as the unity of the 
features of what it subsumes, was rather, from the first, a product of 
dialectical thinking, in which each thing is what it is only by becoming what it 
is not. This was the primal form of the objectifying definition, in which 
concept and thing became separate, the same definition which was already 
far advanced in the Homeric epic and trips over its own excesses in modern 
positive science. But this dialectic remains powerless  as long as it emerges 
from the cry of terror, which is the doubling, the mere tautology of terror 
itself. (DE: 11). 
 
This passage, taken as a whole, does of course present its own specific interpretive 
difficulties. However, I want to focus on three key assertions, which will prove essential 
to understanding Adorno's account of the emergence of language, and the wider 
significance of that account. These three assertions are – 1), that 'the concept and 
thing became separate', 2) that the original terror of nature inculcates the transition 
from 'tautology into language'; 3) that the concept is dialectical as in it 'each thing is 
what it is only by becoming what it is not'. A discussion of 3) will serve to anticipate our 
exploration of the inner constitution of the concept in the following Chapter. 
 First, then, Adorno's assertion that the 'concept and thing became separate'. It 
is a simple, but crucial, inference from this assertion that this separation is not 
essential in the relation of concept to thing, but is rather something which came to be. 
It follows from this, of course, that at one point the concept and thing were united. A 
great deal of the remainder of this Chapter will be dedicated to exploring precisely 
what consequences arise from this putative unity of concept and thing. I will argue that 
this unity of the concept and thing, prior to the emergence of the conventional 
employment of concepts, in fact entails the absence of conceptuality, thereby proving 
that Adorno in fact allows for the possibility of a non-conceptually mediated form of 
experience.  
 In order to begin substantiating this, we should consider what the 
epistemological consequences of a unity of concept and thing would be. It is apparent 
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that by 'thing' Adorno is here referring to the specific thing (rather than class of things). 
That this is so can be seen from the German term employed – Adorno employs the 
singular 'Sache' (as opposed to 'Sachen' which would denote general collections of 
things) which has the clear connotation of the specific object (Adorno 1997a: 32). 
Moreover, Adorno claims that this unity of the concept and thing obtains prior to the 
emergence of the 'objectifying definition' (DE: 11). Therefore, it is before the 
emergence of the general class, given the plausible assumption that definition entails 
general classes.9 
 Having established that Adorno is referring to the unity of the concept and 
specific thing, we must now consider the nature of a thing in its specificity. Adorno's 
central disagreement with 'identity thinking' is the concept's inability to capture objects 
in their full specificity (ND: 148 / 151).  Adorno does not give a settled account of what 
determines a particular object in its specificity. However, we can infer from his critique 
of identity thinking that the object's specificity is constituted by the complexity of its 
constitution. It seems plausible, and at least compatible with Adorno's account, to say 
that every specific thing is differentiated from its peers, as it were, by its complex of 
properties, where this complex consists of intrinsic and relational properties. We have 
seen that the unity of concept and specific thing is prior to the emergence of definition, 
and prior to any separation of concept and specific thing. Hence, this unity cannot be a 
unity in the same way in which the general concept 'bison' and a specific individual 
mammal satisfying this concept could be said to be united. Rather, it must be a 
complete conformity of the concept to a specific thing. This being so, for a concept to 
be united to its specific object, such that it cannot be united to any other, it must 
somehow exhaust the object's specificity. Which is to say, the concept must exhaust 
the object's complex of properties, the concept being constituted by nothing over and 
above the specificity of a single object. This being so, each specific object would 
determine and fall under no other concept than its own (remember that the unity of 
concept and thing is a condition of every concept, for Adorno, at this stage). Seeing as 
this would be the condition for every concept, according to Adorno, no general 
concepts could be formed under which sets of objects could fall. At this point, when the 
concept and thing are not separated, the term 'concept' seems to be used merely by 
                                                 
9
 This assumption may seem odd; after all, one can imagine a definition of a specific 
object. In which case, what role does the 'general class' have to play? In defining a specific 
object, one nonetheless employs general concepts and classes. A definition (which is not 
merely ostensive) is accomplished by the enumeration of a set of conditions ('must be red, 
spherical, etc.'). These conditions are themselves general concepts (redness, sphericality) 
being employed in order to describe a specific object. Even should a definition consist solely of 
indexicals, as opposed to general properties, the definition nonetheless retains it generality just 
by its failure to necessarily correspond to any one object in the ontological set. Rather, it ranges 
over all of these objects, and acts as a definition to any object in that set which satisfies it. 
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courtesy. The conceptual manifold amounts to merely a series of ostensive terms 
linked exclusively to specific objects. I argue, then, that this level of 'conceptuality' in 
fact wholly precludes anything resembling conceptuality proper, let alone the 
conceptual mediation of perception. 
 In order to further support this, it would be helpful to turn to a line of argument 
which Adorno runs together with his account of the emergence of the concept – 
namely, his assertion that the emergence of the concept was accompanied by the 
transition from tautology to language. We saw in the extended quote above that 
Adorno held that the concept was at one point not separated from the specific thing, 
thereby arresting linguistic behaviour at the stage of tautology rather than language; 
 
Through the deity [i.e., through the 'preanimism' of magical behaviour] 
speech is transformed from tautology into language [...] This was the primal 
form of the objectifying definition, in which concept and thing became 
separate[.] (DE: 11). 
 
Adorno's opposition of tautology to language is odd. Tautology is usually held, along 
with contradiction, to represent limiting cases of the employment of language, rather 
than something which is external or opposed to non-tautological language itself. In 
considering precisely what it is about tautology which Adorno is opposing to language, 
we will be able to throw further light on the non-separation of concept and thing. 
 In considering the non-separation of concept and thing, we have established 
that this epistemological mode is a travesty of conceptuality, in that each concept is 
bereft of generality and refers solely to its specific object (as constituted in its 
specificity by its complex of properties). We should now consider what an utterance of 
this concept, or rather, of a term standing in for this concept, would amount to – what 
types of sentences could it constitute? In being employed, this utterance would 
exhaust its specific object entirely. Which is to say, it would have complete reference to 
the specific object, as it appeared to the speaker.10 This in itself does not preclude the 
employment of this term / concept in language. It is the fact that all concepts are 
constructed on this model which prevents the formation of recognizably linguistic (non-
tautological) sentences.  
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 It must have specific reference to the object as it appears to the speaker simply because the 
concept in this epistemological mode does not have an inherent understanding of the 
revisability of the properties of an object, such that one could synthesize two slightly differing 
reports as concerning the same object under differing perspectives. This is supported by 
Adorno's assertion that the distinction between 'appearance and essence' (DE: 10) only 
arises after this epistemological stage has been abandoned. However, I also explain this in 
further detail below. 
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 One might demonstrate this point by attempting to construct an informative 
sentence within this epistemological mode (of the unity of concepts and things). Let us 
take the neologism 'wylt' to refer (only and wholly) to a specific carnation.  A (Barbara) 
syllogism has the form - 
 All a are x 
 n is an a 
 n is an x 
This term 'wylt' cannot be conjoined to any other term syllogistically, just because there 
is no concept with any generality to allow such a sentence to be constructed. Let us 
substitute 'wylt' for n. Required for the successful completion of the syllogism will be 
the insertion of two genera in place of a and x. However, our conceptual 'tool kit' will at 
this point be wholly constituted by 'concepts' of the same type as 'wylt'. Which is to say, 
each concept will be completely exhausted by one specific object's properties, with no 
degree of generality. As such, no other concept can successfully correspond to any 
other, beyond being completely identical to it (i.e., being solely referent to the same 
object). In this epistemological mode, then, a syllogistic inference cannot be 
performed, as the general concepts required to fill a & x are unavailable.  
 Similarly, less formal methods of constructing sentences, with the possible 
exception of ostension, would appear to be impossible. For example, consider 'wylt is 
like gylf', 'gylf' having exhaustive reference to some other, different specific carnation. 
The relation of 'like' might appear to dodge the problems of the syllogism, by not 
employing any formal genera to which the objects in question must conform. However, 
in order to make sense of an assertion of likeness, we must be able first to 
comprehend a) in what the likeness might consist and, at a more basic level, b) the 
sense of the relation of 'likeness' in itself.  
 It is a relatively simple matter to show that a) is unavailable in this case. Being 
that 'wylt' and 'gylf' are each carnations, one might understand their likeness as 
consisting in – 'being flowers', 'being carnations', 'being coloured white', etc. However, 
this understanding is itself parasitic on an understanding of qualities in isolation from 
their specific objects – 'whiteness', 'carnation-ness', etc. We have already seen that 
Adorno has denied that this form of conceptuality is possible, given the unity of every 
concept to a specific object. We cannot help ourselves to the concept of being alike by 
virtue of any property (or collection of properties) without necessarily positing the kind 
of concept which is ex hypothesi impossible at this stage – namely, a general concept 
of a given property or genus, which does not have necessary and exhaustive 
reference to a specific object. 
 From a) we have seen that understanding a relation of likeness between two 
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objects requires access to a mediating concept, namely that of the concept of a 
property which is not exhaustively linked to a specific object, which is unavailable prior 
to the separation of the concept and thing. This being so (moving to point b)), it would 
appear that even the formulation of a sentence using the concept of 'likeness' would 
be impossible – the language user in question would have no way of acquainting 
himself with the practice of drawing likenesses between things, if there were no 
available conceptual materials for drawing such a likeness. Prior to the separation of 
the concept and thing, then, any assertion of an 'is like' relation between two objects is 
not only devoid of sense, but in fact impossible. 
 What appears to be at issue in the above examples is that any use of language 
which is informative, and has a truth value which exceeds the necessarily true 
(tautological) or necessarily false (contradictory) relies upon the employment of the 
contrast between the universal and particular. It is the particular's conformity to or 
divergence from the universal which allows us to employ language, to make 
informative utterances about objects. In an epistemological stage before the formation 
of universals, then, language use (as opposed to the tautological employment of 
'concepts' just examined) seems impossible. 
 We may now begin to see why Adorno terms this epistemological / linguistic 
stage 'tautology'- the utterance (or thought) of the concept serves to exhaust any 
possible assertion about its object. The concept is necessarily true, insofar as it simply 
serves to evoke the specific experienced object. In this tautological form, the concept 
has forfeited its universality – it has necessary reference to one specific object. This 
forfeiture has the double result that the formation of language would appear 
impossible, and the concept would appear to have lost its essential constituent, 
namely its universality. Such an epistemological stage is non-conceptual simply 
because the concept, as we conventionally employ it and as it must be in order to 
mediate perception in the relevant sense, has an intrinsic universality which has no 
necessary and exhaustive reference to any spatio-temporally specific object. This 
tautological epistemological stage which Adorno refers to now seems plausibly non-
conceptual.11 However, we can further reinforce this interpretation of Adorno by 
examining his account of the transition from tautology to language. 
  
1.8 From Tautology to Language 
Following on directly from Adorno's assertion that '[t]hrough the deity speech is 
transformed from tautology into language' (DE: 11) is the following sentence - 
                                                 
11
 For economy of expression, from this point I will refer to this epistemological mode of the 
unity of concept and thing as the 'tautological epistemological mode'. 
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The concept, usually defined as the unity of the features of what it 
subsumes, was rather, from the first, a product of dialectical thinking, in 
which each thing is what it is only by becoming what it is not. (DE: 11). 
 
This sentence, then, follows on from Adorno's assertion concerning the transition from 
tautology to language, and is itself directly followed by the assertion that this dialectical 
concept was 'the primal form of objectifying definition' which allowed man to '[emerge] 
from the cry of terror' (DE: 11). As such, this account of the concept is clearly being 
positioned as an account of  the constitutive epistemological process which allowed for 
this emergence from the terror of nature and, moreover, the emergence from tautology. 
In considering precisely what Adorno means by his definition of the 'dialectical' concept 
as the means of transition from tautology and terror into the conceptual, we will be able 
to confidently establish that this terror was in fact non-conceptual, and thus that Adorno 
allows for experience to be non-conceptually mediated. As a consequence, we will be 
able to understand precisely what sort of necessity Adorno allots to the conceptual 
mediation of experience. 
 
1.8.1 An Exegetical Problem 
Before we do this, however, there is a small exegetical problem. Adorno asserts above 
that the concept 'from the first' was a product of 'dialectical thinking'. To anticipate the 
discussion below, this latter will be shown to mean that the concept ceases to have a 
direct, exhaustive and necessary reference to a specific object. The problem lies in 
Adorno's assertion that this was the case 'from the first' – after all, prior to this point we 
have seen Adorno assert that the concept was united to the thing and, moreover, that 
this constituted a tautological epistemological mode. I will demonstrate below that 
Adorno's assertion that the concept is 'dialectical', can only be understood as an 
assertion concerning the concept's employment of general terms. The concept's 
dialecticality will consist in its not having necessary and exhaustive reference to a 
single specific object. However, as I have shown, just this dialecticality appears to be 
precluded by the uniting of the concept with the object. There is a conflict, then- Adorno 
asserts that the concept was 'from the first' dialectical, while, in his account of the unity 
of concept and thing, appearing to demonstrate a non-dialectical employment of the 
concept. If we construe this conflict as genuine, then Adorno's work is simply 
contradictory, as it would impute to the concept a universal form ('from the first') while 
elsewhere demonstrating a different form of concept (in the 'tautological' mode of 
uniting the concept to the thing). There are two ways of resolving this problem. Either 
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this conflict of the concept's two modes (of non-dialecticality in being united to the 
thing, and of dialecticality in not being so united) is merely apparent due to my 
misinterpretation of Adorno's account of the concept's being united to the thing, or the 
conflict is merely apparent due to Adorno's lack of care in expression. 
 The former possibility, that this apparent conflict is due to my misinterpretation 
of Adorno's meaning concerning the unity of concept and thing, would mean that in fact 
the unity of concept and thing was already dialectical, in the sense outlined above. In 
this case, it would render puzzling Adorno's assertion that the transition from tautology, 
and the separation of concept and thing, was effected by the dialectical concept. If the 
concept was dialectical in form in each case, the source of the transition from tautology 
into language is left obscure, as is the reason for Adorno's juxtaposition in the text of 
this transition and the essential role of the dialecticality of the concept in that transition.  
 Although I believe discarding my interpretation would be an error, for the above 
reasons, if I am wrong concerning the non-conceptuality of the unity of concept and 
thing, this error would leave the main thrust of this Chapter untouched. Adorno asserts 
that enlightenment reason depends on the separation of concept and thing (DE: 11). 
Moreover, as has already been shown, Adorno holds the enlightenment form of thought 
to be emergent. This being so, if the uniting of concept and thing does not accord with 
the non-conceptual 'cry of terror' as I had thought, my account is still secure. Adorno 
nonetheless holds that the enlightenment form of thought is constitutively dependent on 
the employment of concepts, and emerged from some other epistemological mode 
opposed to it (DE: 10 – 11). This being so, it still appears eminently plausible that the 
opposing epistemological mode must, in being so opposed, have been bereft of the 
constitutive feature of enlightenment thought (the 'dialectical' employment of classifying 
concepts). As such, this original epistemological mode would have to be non-
conceptual. 
 The latter option in resolving this conflict, that Adorno is simply expressing 
himself slackly, is far more cogent, simply because there is a great deal of difficulty in 
understanding the tautological, pre-magical mode of the unity of concept and thing as 
in any way corresponding to the properties which Adorno here attaches to the concept 
'from the first', as I have shown above.  
 
1.8.2 The Possibility of Non-Conceptual Experience 
I hope I have shown that Adorno's assertion that the concept was 'from the first' 
dialectical is either not a mistake in expression, in which case the ultimate aim of this 
Chapter (demonstrating that Adorno allows for a non-conceptually mediated 
experience) is nonetheless secure, or, more likely, it is a mistake in expression, in 
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which case the following exegesis will demonstrate that Adorno in fact takes the 
'tautological' unity of concept and thing to be not mediated by concepts. I will now leave 
this problem, and continue with my analysis of what Adorno means by calling the 
concept 'dialectical'. Let us reconsider the quote in question : 
 
The concept, usually defined as the unity of the features of what it 
subsumes, was rather, from the first, a product of dialectical thinking, in 
which each thing is what it is only by becoming what it is not. (DE: 11). 
 
Perhaps the most puzzling part of this extract is Adorno's assertion that the concept's 
operation entails that 'each thing is what it is only by becoming what it is not' (DE: 11). 
In order to throw light on this, let us consider again the problem of the 'tautological' 
employment of concepts. The peculiar problem of that form of conceptuality, and 
attendant linguistic behaviour, was that the concept was in complete accord with its 
object but, in so mirroring its object, it thereby precluded any communicative behaviour,  
judgement and, moreover, the acquisition of detailed knowledge. These were 
precluded just because the conformity of the concept to the object prevented the 
formation of general concepts which bore no necessary reference to specific objects. In 
the absence of such general concepts, knowledge of the object could not be 
communicated  beyond bald ostension. Detailed knowledge was impossible just 
because, having only concepts which merged with specific objects, understanding the 
complicated causal structure of an object would appear to be impossible. For example, 
if I were to place a red object in green light, and to observe the resultant alteration in 
the object's colour, I would only be able to draw any inference about the general 
behaviour of coloured objects should I be in possession of the general concepts of 
colour, coloured objects, etc. However, we have already seen that these general 
concepts are unavailable. As such, one's definition of the object cannot be cashed out 
in more general, nor in communicable, terms. These are the characteristic difficulties of 
the unity of the concept and thing. In considering what is necessary in order to 
surmount these difficulties, it will become apparent what Adorno intends in referring to 
the concept as dialectical, and displaying what the object is by means of its becoming 
what it is not. 
 If one separates the concept and thing, we instantly acquire a web of universal, 
general concepts, none of which have an intrinsic reference to a specific object. The 
object's correspondence to any given concept is contingent, which is why the object's 
conformity to that concept is informative. There is no concept which exhaustively 
models a specific object with no further universality. On the previous epistemological 
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model, we 'knew' an object simply by virtue of appending a concept to the specific 
object, which thereby modelled nothing but that object. In this instance, then, the 
concept served as a token to signify the object, with no intrinsic meaning beyond that 
object. Once the separation of concept and thing has been effected, the reverse 
obtains, which is to say that the object is known insofar as we comprehend its 
conformity and divergence with each of the elements of our array of universals. As 
such, the object becomes a token which signifies the matrices of its agreement with 
various universals, and is known, and is communicable, insofar as we comprehend 
these agreements and divergences. For example, should I have a dog, I do not 
possess a single concept which exhausts that animal. Rather, I have a name, emptied 
of intrinsic meaning, which is cashed out in terms of various general properties, none of 
which have specific reference solely to my dog – 'mammal', 'not rabid', 'brindle', etc. I 
suggest that this is what Adorno has in mind, in asserting that with the advent of 
conceptual thinking 'each thing is only by becoming what it is  not' (DE: 11); the object, 
rather than having a specific concept which matches its specificity, is rather placed into 
a mediating context of a web of concepts, in respect to which the object is merely a 
token of its agreement or disagreement with those concepts. In taking on this 
'tokenality' the object forfeits its specificity ('becomes what it is not'), but thereby 
becomes comprehensible and communicable. Thereby, the object can become 'what it 
is' through being comprehensible through this extensive web of general concepts, and 
thereby linguistic behaviour becomes possible. All manner of informative sentences 
can be constructed, by means of introducing the dichotomy between universal and 
particular. 
 In referring to the dialecticality of the concept, then, it would appear that Adorno 
is simply drawing our attention to a neglected feature of the concept. Why, though, 
does Adorno assert that this dialecticality diverges from being 'the unity of the features 
of what it subsumes' (DE: 11)? After all, this transition to general concepts would not 
seem to exclude these concepts being defined by the unity of features which are 
subsumed under them. As shall be argued in more detail in the following Chapter, 
Adorno does not hold the formation of concepts to necessarily derive from any truth in 
man's environment – they are rather formed according to one's self-interest. As such, 
the conceptual web with which the object agrees may have no correspondence to any 
property of the object. For Adorno, in separating the concept from the object, we are 
not releasing the object into a web of concepts, all of which have in actuality genuine 
reference, but rather placing an object in a mediating web of concepts, not all of which 
will have any actual ontological foundation in the subsumed objects themselves.  
 We have seen, then, that the employment of concepts is for Adorno an 
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emergent practice – it is not innate, nor transcendentally necessary, but rather 
originates in the separation of the concept and thing. Prior to this separation, every 
concept was united to a specific thing. I have argued that this unity of concept and 
thing in fact travesties conceptuality, and thereby prevents the employment of concepts 
at this stage. Now that we have examined my two lines of argument, from the 
occasioning of concepts, and from Adorno's account of the generation of language, we 
have established that this stage, prior to the generation of language and 'objectifying 
definition' was devoid of concepts, and thereby devoid of conceptual mediation. 
 Having concluded this line of argument, then, we have established that Adorno, 
although asserting that conceptuality is necessary for the 'continuity' of experience, in 
fact allows that non-conceptually mediated experience is possible.12 This vastly 
complicates the apparently Kantian tenor of Adorno's position, and throws into question 
the nature of the necessity which Adorno is imputing to the conceptuality of experience. 
We will now consider this latter question.  
 
1.9. Discontinuity and Conceptuality 
It is already apparent that the necessity which Adorno appends to the conceptuality of 
experience cannot be straightforwardly transcendental, as we have established that 
experience can in fact take place outside of the mediation of the concept. I propose 
that we examine the nature of this non-conceptual experience in order to understand 
why Adorno holds its abolition to be necessary.  
 You will recall that Adorno held that conceptuality was necessary for the 
continuity of experience. Therefore, ex hypothesi, this original non-conceptual form of 
experience was discontinuous – it was devoid of any general concepts which could 
have unified that experience. I will argue that this lack of continuity is pragmatically 
unsustainable, for the kind of beings that we are. Furthermore, it is this pragmatic 
unworkability which gives rise to the 'cry of terror' which Adorno alleges is the genesis 
of the conceptual. As such, concepts, which alleviate this discontinuity, are necessary 
for pragmatic reasons. Adorno therefore transposes Kant's deduction from the 
transcendental to the pragmatic. In order for this unusual argument to appear plausible 
as an interpretation of Adorno, I would like to flesh out the assertion that such a mode 
of experience would be pragmatically unsustainable. I hope to show this by 
demonstrating that in the tautological epistemological mode, given the assertions which 
Adorno makes about this mode, the individual has no cognitive resources by which to 
                                                 
12
 Furthermore, this non-conceptual experience is not only possible, but in fact has occurred, 
and it is from this form of experience that conceptual experience was derived. The 
problematic question of how one might derive concepts from the unconceptually mediated 
will become highly significant in the next Chapter. 
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meaningfully relate any discrete experience to any other. As a consequence of the 
absence of general concepts, it will be shown, the individual in this epistemological 
mode will be bereft of a reliable ontology (i.e. they will be unable to see the same 
entities persisting from experience to experience) and of a causal understanding of 
their environment. It would be as well to address these two lines of thought in turn. 
 
1.10 The Absence of Ontology 
In the course of the remainder of this Chapter, I will have frequent reference to 
Adorno's 'ontology'. I stipulate Adorno's 'ontology' to refer to the phenomenal ontology 
of the agent. As such, I will not be attempting to derive a given argument about the 
objective ontology of objects in themselves, but rather about the phenomenal ontology 
presented to the agent, and the conditions of the possibility of this phenomenal 
ontology. This stipulation also applies to the variations on the term 'ontology' I will use, 
such as 'weak ontology', 'rich ontology' and so on – these remain referent solely to 
phenomenal ontology.  
 I will argue that, given Adorno's assertions about the epistemological state prior 
to the separation of the concept and thing, the individual undergoing this 
epistemological mode will be not only incapable of formulating a general, rich ontology 
(including general classes, properties, etc.), but in fact incapable of forming a basic, 
'weak' ontology (of individuating objects across discrete experiences over time). The 
former assertion has already been supported in the course of this Chapter. The latter 
assertion however, concerning the impossibility of a basic ontology, outstrips the 
position which Adorno explicitly maintains in his work. I will now demonstrate that this 
move is justified. 
 
1.11 Weak Ontology 
Adorno is largely silent on the ontological constitution of the epistemological stage 
which gives rise to the 'cry of terror'. As such, one's interpretation of Adorno on this 
score takes place somewhat in a vacuum. There is an isolated utterance in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, however, which suggests that Adorno is too lax in his account of the 
consequences of the non-dialecticality of thought prior to the separation of concept and 
thing. Adorno says - 
 
The cry of terror called forth by the unfamiliar becomes its name. It fixes the 
transcendence of the unknown in relation to the known [...] If the tree is 
addressed no longer as simply a tree but as evidence of something else, a 
location of mana, language expresses the contradiction that it is at the 
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same time itself and something other than itself, identical and not identical. 
(DE: 10 -11). 
 
We can see in this quote that Adorno is imputing to primitive magical behaviour the 
beginning of conceptuality – the employment of 'mana' inaugurates the 
contradictoriness of something being 'itself and something other than itself', which 
Adorno, on the same page, asserts is constitutive for the concept (DE: 11). The laxity in 
Adorno's thought is in his assertion that, prior to this epistemological practice, one can 
see a tree 'as simply a tree'. We have already seen, from examining Adorno's thought, 
that at this stage general concepts such as 'tree' are unavailable, due to the unity of 
concepts and specific things. What is at stake in this quote, then, is that Adorno seems 
to be relying on the idea that the individual arrested at this pre-conceptual stage is able 
to still individuate objects over time (addressing a tree 'simply as a tree' – as a specific, 
individuated object). In other words, at this point, while a richer ontology of general 
classes may not be available, Adorno seems to be implying that a 'weak ontology' is 
available. 
 There is a trivial sense in which an ontology might be achievable with non-
dialectical concepts, and this is that while I may not be able to identify the genus 'tree', 
'rock', etc., I will nonetheless have a personal, consistent ontology, as it were, in being 
able to consistently attribute names to things. As such, I will not be able to acquire the 
general concept 'tree' but will be able to enduringly individuate a specific object, which 
happens to be a tree, across time. I will name this a 'weak ontology'. On this weak 
ontology, then, one can apply a name to a specific object, as in our example of the 
carnation 'wylt', but will not be able to acquire general concepts. 
 Regardless of whether Adorno himself holds a weak ontology to be possible at 
the tautological epistemological stage, it is important to demonstrate that it is not, in 
order to properly explain the nature of the necessity which Adorno allots to 
conceptuality. Adorno has asserted that, without concepts, experience does not have 
continuity (ND: 46 / 56). In examining Adorno's account of the 'tautological' 
epistemological mode, we have established that concepts cannot operate. This implies 
that a weak ontology would, at this epistemological stage, be impossible.  
 
1.12 The Impossibility of Weak Ontology 
Adorno asserts that the concept is essential for the continuity of experience. Should 
this weak ontology inhere in the knower at the tautological epistemological stage, it 
would seem that the discontinuity which Adorno asserts must accompany the absence 
of conceptuality would not take place. While one may be unable to form general 
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concepts in order to arrive at generalized causal accounts, taxonomies, etc., 
nonetheless one would be able to unify one's experience as taking place with 
reference to the present specific objects, and their behavioural tendencies. For 
example, with a rich ontology, the experience of seeing our carnation sway in the wind 
and release pollen, causing a scent, is assured continuity by our explicit 
comprehension of the distinction between appearance and actual structures, between 
cause and effect, etc. However, in the example of the  weak ontology, the experience 
still seems assured of continuity if one is able to individuate, however bereft of 
classifying concepts, the objects present in one's experience. The perceived flower 
'wylt', while it changes its apparent properties (bending in the wind), is nonetheless still 
present as the same object. As such, the experience is continuous, as its disparate 
sensory constituents are organized , albeit not explicitly, around a centering conception 
of the object which is not exhausted by the properties which are presented to the eye 
immediately.  
  In order for the object to be individuated, and hence grant continuity to one's 
experiences, this individuation cannot be predicated on the immediately presented 
properties. Should this not be the case, should this awareness of the object not be 
based on the idea of what is in fact perceptually absent – that is, the object which is 
not exhausted by its immediate appearance – then this weak ontology collapses. If this 
were the case, one's ontology would be erased and rebuilt from moment to moment, 
with the alteration of these properties due to one's kinaestheses, natural causality, etc. 
If one can prove that this weak ontology, the possibility of which Adorno does not 
discount, is impossible, then, we will have displayed that this non-conceptual 
epistemological mode is truly discontinuous. This will have the benefit of ensuring 
Adorno's consistency and revealing to us why Adorno holds concepts to be necessary.  
 It is a short step to demonstrating that a 'weak' ontology of the type Adorno 
appears to be gesturing at is impossible. Individuation across time, as in our 
examination of a swaying carnation, presupposes a distinction between the object and 
its immediate properties. If a change in apparent properties is not taken to be a change 
in objects, the agent must be possessed of a concept of the object which is not 
exhausted by the presently presented phenomena. As such, the agent must be in 
possession of a concept which is 'dialectical' – not wholly identical to the presented 
object. However, as we have seen, Adorno asserts that precisely this is possible only 
once the transition from the tautological epistemological mode into 'language' and full-
blown conceptuality has already been accomplished. As such, no weak ontology is 
possible at the tautological stage since there are no concepts available to facilitate the 
persistent individuation of objects.  As such, experience in the tautological 
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epistemological state will have no persisting objects across time. We have established 
that it is wholly discontinuous. 
 With the erasure of a persisting ontology, then, it should be obvious why causal 
forms of knowledge are also impossible at this tautological epistemological stage, as 
Adorno himself affirms.13 If from discrete moment to discrete moment the set of 
presented objects is altered, any objective causal process will not be perceptible, just 
in virtue of to the absence of any continuous ontology. In the absence of a continuous, 
enduringly individuated environment an objective causal process will not appear as a 
given process affecting a given object, but rather a disparate collection of behaviours 
of disparate, distinct objects. To return to the example of the carnation bending in the 
wind, each discrete presentation of apparent qualities will result in reindividuation. As 
such, one will not experience a single object undergoing a behaviour which one might 
try and comprehend, but rather a procession of distinct objects.  
  
1.13 Conceptuality and Self-Interest 
This now concludes our examination of the pre-conceptual state posited by Adorno. 
The primary importance of this examination is that we have established that Adorno 
does hold non-conceptual experience to be possible. By examining his commitments in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment, we have established that conceptuality comes about rather 
than being innate or transcendentally necessary for experience simpliciter. This allows 
us, then, to return to the question which begun this Chapter – what is the nature of the 
necessity of conceptuality, for Adorno?  
 In the previous section, we established that, in line with Adorno's thought but 
against his lapse in expression, pre-conceptual thought was both devoid of a 
continuous ontology, and moreover experienced as acausal. While this is not held to be 
a transcendentally impossible form of experience, for Adorno, it would appear that it is 
pragmatically unsustainable. Given its strong discontinuity, the enduring identification 
and comprehension of objects appears to be impossible. If this is the case, then this 
form of experience must necessarily be abandoned if the agent is to be able to identify 
and manipulate regularities in his experience. The agent is unavoidably thrust into the 
project of identifying and manipulating regularities by virtue of the intrinsic pragmatic 
demands of the type of creature that he is. He is a creature that has organic needs 
(food, water, etc.) and cannot satisfy these needs without comprehending and 
manipulating his environment. As such, the agent's nature and attendant desire for self-
preservation compel him to engage in the project of identifying and manipulating 
                                                 
13
 This is shown in Adorno's assertion that the distinction between 'effect and force' was not 
present at this earlier epistemological stage (DE: 10). 
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regularities in order to find sustenance in his environment. The necessity of 
conceptuality therefore derives from the agent's self interest. The necessity of  
conceptual mediation comes not from its being a transcendental condition of the 
possibility of any experience whatsoever, but from its being a transcendental condition 
of the possibility of the agent's project of self-preservation (which itself entails the need 
for continuous experience). 
 This may sound like an overly speculative take on Adorno's thought concerning 
the concept, but it is in fact attested to in Adorno's work.14 The above has served to 
demonstrate the grounds for this belief of Adorno's. It has also served to problematize 
the medium in which the relationship between thought and object is realized. We have 
seen that this medium is conceptually structured without, however, any guarantee that 
the conceptual mediation is amenable to the instantiation of truth. The following 
Chapter will be dedicating to elucidating the precise nature of this problematic.  
 
1.14 The Nature of the Concept 
At the close of this Chapter, then, we have established that for Adorno continuous 
experience is necessarily conceptually mediated. The medium of experience is 
necessarily conceptually structured, and this structure must factor in any putative 
explanation of the access to the non-identical. In establishing the conceptual mediation 
of experience, we also established that Adorno has problematized the constitution of 
the concept. Rather than positing the concept as deriving from an attempt to grasp 
truth, we saw that Adorno instead saw concepts as derived from the requirements of 
self-preservation. Relatedly, we saw that these self-preserving concepts were produced 
out of a non-conceptual epistemological state.  
 These two issues –  concepts being self-preserving rather than necessarily 
geared towards truth, and concepts being derived from non-conceptual experience – 
open two questions. We will need to gain a more finessed understanding of the precise 
nature of concepts (exactly how is their operation self-preserving? Does this hold for all 
concepts?), and an understanding of how these concepts are formed (how were they 
derived from non-conceptual experience? And how are concepts formed once this non-
conceptual experience is left behind?).  
 We have established that experience is structured conceptually – addressing 
                                                 
14
  'In truth, all concepts, even the philosophical ones, refer to nonconceptualities, because 
concepts on their part are moments of the reality that requires their formation, primarily for 
the control of nature.' (ND: 11 / 23) In this example, we see that Adorno identifies concepts 
not with an attempt to cognize the world accurately, but rather as deriving from the agent's 
desire to control his environment. While in order to control the world some basic 
correspondence between concept and reality is necessary, this does not guarantee that the 
concept will be wholly accurate. 
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these two issues will demonstrate in detail Adorno's theory of the nature of these 
structuring concepts. This will serve to constrain the possible nature of the non-
identical, and of the eligible form of philosophical and aesthetic instantiations of it. The 
problematic of the structure of experience will be determined by the nature of the 
constituents of that structure. As such, we must now turn in the following Chapter to 
consider Adorno's theory of the concept. 
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2. – Totality, Universality and the Concept 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In the previous Chapter, we stipulated, with some argumentative support, that the non-
identical must be accessed in the medium of experience (sections 1.2 and 1.3). As was 
argued throughout Chapter 1, the medium of continuous experience is necessarily 
conceptually mediated. As such, this access to the non-identical must take place via 
the concept, by virtue of taking place in experience.  
 In Chapter 1, we were also able to explain the grounds for Adorno's assertion 
that concepts are necessary for continuous experience. We established that Adorno 
grounds the necessity of concepts for experience  in a transcendental argument from 
self-preservation. Non-conceptual experience is possible, but for the ongoing 
constitution of the self and the satisfaction of the self's basic needs, concepts 
necessarily must be formed. The necessity of concepts, then, derives from their role in 
securing the agent's self-preservation. They are what Adorno terms 'idea-tool[s]' (DE: 
31) employed solely (outside of dialectical philosophy and authentic art) to secure self-
preservation.  
 This Chapter will be concerned with a problem which arises given the 
conjunction, in Adorno's theory, of three claims. The first two have just been 
enumerated – that continuous experience is necessarily conceptually mediated and 
that concepts are inherently merely self-preserving. These two claims are perfectly 
consistent, but they come into conflict with a third feature of Adorno's philosophy. This 
is Adorno's reliance on the idea that his analyses (of the non-identical as found in 
philosophy and art, and in his sociological and 'metalogical'15 analyses more generally) 
hold universally for all agents.16  Adorno feels entitled to assert that a quirk identified in 
any given concept (e.g., that the concept of x employed dialectically reverses into y) 
holds universally, for all subjects.  
                                                 
15
 Adorno takes concepts to have innate reference to extra-conceptual, socio-historical 
conditions. This reference he terms 'meta-logical' (Jarvis 1998: 153) 
16
 Adorno's frequent declamations of the cataclysmic homogeneity of society, and thought in 
society, are subject to a mild interpretive controversy. Adorno often gestures towards the 
usefulness of the practice of exaggeration ('But only exaggeration is true.' (DE: 92), which 
leads some interpreters to interpret Adorno's assertions concerning homogeneity to be 
themselves examples of this practice (i.e. - hyperbolic). However, Adorno elsewhere gives 
reason to think that he is rather more sincere than this. For example, Adorno alleges that 
only 'a stroke of undeserved luck' allows for critical, non-reified thought (ND: 41 / 51). As 
such, this issue is somewhat interpretively 'open'. While I do try to close this ambiguity in 
section 3.5, I should for now to merely note that I incline towards seeing as Adorno as not 
methodologically hyperbolic. At any rate, regardless of the way in which one resolves the 
ambiguity, one can say at a minimum on any interpretation that Adorno held society to be 
virtually or largely homogeneous, which stands in need of justification just as much as the 
stronger assertion of complete universality.  
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 To show why this third feature, Adorno's reliance on the universality of his 
analyses, is problematic I will demonstrate first that Adorno's analyses require universal 
scope and, secondly, that Adorno's account of the formation of concepts discussed in 
Chapter 1 appears to allow the possibility that individuals have divergent sets of 
concepts, thus preventing the universal scope of these analyses.  
 In this Chapter, I will have repeated reference to 'conceptual sets', 'conceptual 
arrays' and the 'social universality of conceptual arrays'. I stipulate the meaning of 
'conceptual set' to be simply the set of concepts which the individual possesses. I 
stipulate the meaning of 'conceptual array' to be that set of concepts which the 
individual possesses, the internal determining relations which obtain between those 
concepts (i.e., concept x being the condition of the possibility of, or a mediating 
influence on, concept y), and the relationship of both the set and the internal 
determining relationships to given metalogical conditions (social conditions, relations of 
production, etc.). I stipulate the meaning of the 'social universality of conceptual arrays' 
simply to be the total or virtually total (cf. footnote 16) incidence of a given conceptual 
array in a given society. I should add, for the sake of completeness, that the social 
universality of conceptual arrays applies both concerning the concepts the individual 
actually has, as well as the concepts he could conceivably go on to acquire  – the 
conceptual array of a given individual's array might be missing certain constituents (for 
example, a recluse might have no concepts relating to architecture), but should they 
acquire these concepts they would be in conformity with the socially universal 
conceptual array. Without this stipulation, the idea of social universality would be 
absurd, as we would have to believe that each individual, regardless of experience, 
possesses a full conceptual array which exhausts all possible experiences. 
 Due to the fact that conceptual arrays hold socially universally in this way, it is 
often helpful to refer to the conceptual array in abstraction from an individual holding 
those concepts. As the social whole determines and imposes the conceptual array, I 
will occasionally have reference to 'the conceptual array' that holds in society or 
governs society.  I do this strictly for economy of expression – I do not mean to imply 
the conceptual array is in some way reified into existence, outside of the conceptual 
apparatuses of individuals. Rather, the universal imposition of this conceptual array 
onto all individuals by the social totality makes it economical to speak of a conceptual 
array existing, as it were, in the determining influence of society itself. 
 Finally, I will frequently make use of the term 'social totality'. For the purposes of 
this discussion, this should be understood as short hand for reference to the social 
whole, this whole being constituted not merely by individuals and institutions, but also 
determining processes and influences, and the complexity of the interaction between 
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these constituents. 
  
2.2 Adorno's Reliance on Universality 
Adorno employs and relies on universality in two key ways. First, he relies on the 
existence of a socially universal conceptual array. Secondly, Adorno holds that the 
concepts in the socially universal conceptual array are universally applied solely with a 
view to self-preservation, and hence in a coercive controlling manner. I want to first 
briefly demonstrate exegetically that Adorno does rely upon and employ these forms of 
universality, before I move to showing why this reliance is problematic. 
 Adorno operates consistently with the presupposition that, for all individuals, 
their individual experience can be taken to be determined by and illustrative of, the 
social whole and, conversely, that the social whole itself serves to ensure that all 
individuals are so determined by and reflective of that whole. This is most baldly 
asserted by Adorno in the introduction to Minima Moralia: 
 
Nevertheless, in an individualistic society, the general not only realizes itself 
through the interplay of particulars, but society is essentially the substance 
of the individual [...] For this reason, social analysis can learn incomparably 
more from individual experience than Hegel conceded. (MM: 17). 
 
For a writer as diffident about explicitly laying out his methodology as Adorno, this 
constitutes a strikingly direct declaration of a founding methodological principle. Adorno 
asserts directly that analysis of the social whole ('social analysis') can be conducted 
through examination of  the immediate experience of the individual. The relationship 
between the individual and society which makes this possible is that society is 'the 
substance of the individual'. This is a clear example of a strong asymmetrical 
determining relation obtaining between the individual and society. This assertion is 
clarified in Negative Dialectics - 
 
[T]hings of the mind are not constituted by the cognitive intentionality of 
consciousness, but are based objectively, far beyond the individual author, 
on the collective life of the mind, in accordance with its imminent laws. (ND: 
82 / 89) 
 
Society is the 'substance' of the individual just insofar as it is society that has a 
powerful determining influence on what the individual takes to be his own free, 
autonomous thought. The universality of this assertion, its applying to all individuals, 
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can also be seen at work implicitly in the above quote – it is made categorically, with 
reference to individual experience simpliciter, without qualification. This implicit claim is 
made explicit, however, in Dialectic of Enlightenment -  
 
Through the mediation of the total society, which encompasses all 
relationships and impulses, human beings are being turned back into 
precisely what the developmental law of society, the principle of the self, 
had opposed; mere examples of the species, identical to one another 
through isolation within the compulsively controlled collectivity [.] (DE: 29) 
 
Adorno is asserting here that, due to socio-historical conditions (he reinforces this 
thought later – 'It is the concrete conditions of work in society which enforce 
conformism' (DE: 29)) the autonomy of the individual, which the concept of the 
individual presupposes, has been progressively converted into heteronomy – for all 
individuals. What presents itself as autonomous thought is in fact thoroughly 
determined and mediated by the social whole. The generality of the claim, as opposed 
to it only applying to a given class or type of individual, is demonstrated by Adorno's 
employment of the unqualified class 'human beings' as the subject of this process of 
social mediation of the individual. 
 I hope that this makes plausible the thought that Adorno relies on the social 
universality of conceptual arrays as a fundamental presupposition. This presupposition 
of the social universality of conceptual arrays draws its vital importance from the way in 
which Adorno employs it. Adorno relies on this universality in his philosophical, 
sociological and aesthetic analyses. The conclusions, and conceptual critiques, derived 
from these critiques are presented without qualification. In other words, they are 
implicitly held to be the case for all users of the relevant concepts. As such, his 
critiques are held to have universal scope (relative to their socio-historical context). 
This is important because Adorno takes it that analyses of those phenomena excluded 
by the conventional conceptual boundaries of philosophy are revelatory of the non-
conceptual - 
 
[T]he interest of philosophy can be found to lie at the precise point where 
[...] the entire philosophical tradition [has] no interest, namely, in the non-
conceptual [...] Freudian psychology [pays attention...] to the dross, the 
'dregs of the phenomenal world', to otherwise neglected phenomena [...] if 
you have a theory like Freud's, and a well-formed theory of repression, you 
will be able to see in advance that such apparently lifeless, obscure objects 
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may contain something of interest that has been pulled out of shape. 
[Freudian analysis combines] an element of the non-conceptual or, as we 
would say nowadays, the absurd, the irrational, with a relevance, an 
essential importance for the concept. I think, then, that philosophy [...] ought 
to follow Freud's truly brilliant example and concentrate on matters that 
have not been pre-digested by the pre-existing concepts of the prevailing 
philosophy and science. (Adorno 2003: 68 - 69) 
 
Employing the methodological principle outlined above, Adorno conducts explanatory 
transitions from individual experience (and individual objects in the field of experience) 
to socio-historical and philosophical facts. These analyses are taken by Adorno to be 
revelatory of, or concerned with, the non-identical, and to be universally valid. 
 The pressing difficulty would appear to be the serious conceptual contradiction 
between Adorno's employment of social universality and his account of the nature of 
the concept as laid out in the previous Chapter. A second puzzle presented both by 
Adorno's work in general and the above quote in particular, is Adorno's presumption 
that the object itself contains, as it were, the critique unfolded by dialectical practice 
('objects may contain something of interest that has been pulled out shape' (Adorno 
2003: 69)). Adorno is here holding that the object bears in-itself these universally 
binding conceptual contents. This in itself a puzzle (how do objects bear socio-historical 
content in themselves?) which this Chapter should help clarify.   
  
2.3 Universality and Self-Preservation 
In the previous Chapter, we discovered in the course of our investigation into the kind 
of necessity which Adorno allots to the concept that the concept was a product of self-
preservation. The concept comes into being for the individual not due to any 
transcendental constraint on experience simpliciter, but rather solely due to the 
demands of self-preservation. Similarly, the concept's determining relations to other 
concepts, the way in which it mediates experience, etc., are not determined by the 
autonomous unfolding of the concept, but rather due to the concept's metalogical 
imbrication with self-preservation, and the context in which the individual's self-
preservation has to operate. Put bluntly, then, the concept is for Adorno heteronomous 
or, put differently, adventitious. Seeing as the concept's necessity derives entirely from 
reference to the individual's self-preservation, there is no constraint internal to the 
concept in itself which determines the form it will take.  
 It is just this adventitiousness inherent in the concept which makes Adorno's 
reliance on the idea that conceptual arrays hold with social universality problematic. 
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The concept, as Adorno defines it, has no ability to ensure that the concepts which the 
individual forms are in conformity with the concepts formed by other individuals. This is 
just because Adorno has emptied the concept of any necessity other than that deriving 
from the individual's own self-preservation. As the concept constitutes a reflection of 
the pragmatic requirements of the individual's requirement for self-preservation, and 
self-preservation has reference solely to the individual, the concept has no internal 
resources to ensure its social universality. Which is to say, an individual's conceptual 
array is contingent on the requirements of his own self-preservation – as such, any 
conformity between the conceptual arrays of various individuals cannot be located as 
attributable to some feature of the concept, but rather some other, extra-conceptual, 
influence. For example, we might hold that the nature of the needs entailed by self-
preservation just happen to converge for a set of individuals, and thus the conceptual 
arrays which reflect this happen to be identical for each individual. No appeal to an 
inherent feature or nature of the concept is possible, as Adorno's theory of the concept 
has emptied it of a transcendentally necessary specific form.  
 The majority of this Chapter, then, will be  spent examining this problem. Where 
should we locate that element which allows, and makes plausible, the social 
universality of conceptual arrays, given that it cannot be found in the concept itself?  
 A related problem is the universality of the mode of conceptual employment. 
Adorno not only holds that the concept is formed from self-preservation, but that it goes 
on to be employed in a self-preserving manner (DE: 10). This is simply left unexplained 
by Adorno. However, we cannot simply take it as an explanatorily basic feature of the 
concept, both because the resulting explanatory deficit is considerable, and because 
the account Adorno gives of this universal employment would then appear to commit 
the genetic fallacy (by presuming that ongoing conceptual employment is self-
preserving due its genesis in self-preserving behaviour). While these two types of 
universality, of array and employment, are mutually conditioning, and must at points be 
considered together, I want to begin by considering the problem of universal conceptual 
employment. There are some problems in Adorno's theory of the universality of 
conceptual employment which threaten to destabilize his entire programme, and so I 
will address these in isolation first. 
 
2.4 The Genetic Fallacy 
The first problem which we face in understanding Adorno's reconciliation of the concept 
as self-preserving and the concept as universally obtaining, is that Adorno has 
apparently founded his account of the universal self-preserving nature of the concept 
on a particularly egregious genetic fallacy. This genetic fallacy seems to appear in 
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Dialectic of Enlightenment. This problem is simply that Adorno's account of the 
generation of self-preserving concepts appears to be posited as occurring solely due to 
a historically specific experience of fear - 
 
[T]he primitive experiences [the] supernatural[...] The cry of terror called 
forth by the unfamiliar becomes its name. It fixes the transcendence of the 
unknown in relation to the known, permanently linking horror to holiness. 
The doubling of nature into appearance and essence [...] springs from 
human fear. (DE: 10, emphasis mine) 
 
Most troubling in this extract is that the fearful reaction of the 'primitive' is explicitly 
shown to 'permanently' effect a change – here the link between 'horror and holiness'. 
This link of terror with the incomprehensible (the 'holy') is maintained in science's 
rejection of experience in favor of systematic consistency (DE: 7). This primitive 'cry of 
terror', the full consequences of which were laid out in the previous Chapter, is being 
posited as the cause of the ongoing epistemological mode. Adorno appears to be 
presenting us with a phylogenetic account of the self-preserving nature of concepts, 
and a fallacious one at that. An account which explains any human practice or 
epistemological capacity as arising in some psychological or emotively charged origin 
does not entail that the subsequent continuation of those practices of capacities will 
retain that charge. If Adorno's account here were merely fallacious, Adorno's 
philosophical position as a whole would be jeopardized. In order for Adorno to maintain 
the founding thesis of the dialectic of enlightenment – the conformity between modern 
and primitive thought in prizing self-preservation over fidelity to experience – he needs 
a justification for extending his historically specific account of the primitive to the 
concepts held outside of this historical period.  
 If we follow Adorno's commitments carefully, this difficulty can be dissolved. In 
the last Chapter we discovered that Adorno does not hold the concept to be innate, but 
rather a contingent epistemological technique created to obtain control over one's 
environment. This lack of innateness should cause us to re-describe Adorno's theory as 
ontogenetic. In the previous Chapter, we saw that human experience is not inherently 
conceptually mediated – it is the conflict between the discontinuity of non-conceptual 
experience and human need which gives rise to the contingent formation of concepts. 
As concepts are not innate, presumably no historical event (be it concerning a primitive 
ancestor or anyone else) can make them innate. This being so, for every individual 
there will be a point at which they will be bereft of concepts, and hence experience the 
clash between the discontinuity of their environment and their pragmatic need. So, from 
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this clash they will be faced with the 'terror' Adorno identifies and be forced into 
generating concepts. This would result in Adorno's account taking place not merely at 
the beginning of some human history, but rather at the beginning of each individual's 
history. The phylogenetic becomes ontogenetic. 
 One might object to this that, rather than the formation of concepts being 
repeated for each individual, the generation of concepts can be explained in terms of 
the reciprocal engagement of the child with its parents. Such an account would share 
much with Honneth's use of Winnicott (Honneth 2005: 98 -106) and would have the 
further virtue that the social universality of conceptual arrays could be explained in 
terms of the child's synchronizing his conceptual faculties to his parent's. This familial 
influence, then, could be posited as one of the myriad factors which serve to ensure 
that the individual's conceptual array is brought into line with society's. However, this 
cannot serve to explain the initial formation of the conceptual mediation of experience, 
just because Adorno denies the innate presence of conceptuality. As there are no 
innate concepts, the child's initial form of experience will be discontinuous (ND: 46 / 
56). As such, it would appear impossible for familial influence to take place at this level, 
just insofar as a discontinuous experiential field would provide no way for the child to 
enduringly identify and individuate, and hence form a dialogical relationship with, his 
parents. In initially ordering his experience then, through forming concepts, the child is 
alone – he is cut off from any influence. Therefore, Adorno's account in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment is repeated – the child is placed in the same position of 'terror' as the 
'primitive'.17 So, we should see Adorno's account as in fact ontogenetic, positing the 
initial terrified formation of concepts from non-conceptual experience as being repeated 
for each individual.18   
 Through understanding the initial formation of concepts as being an ontogenetic 
clash between discontinuous experience and self-preservation, we have mitigated 
somewhat the appearance of the genetic fallacy in Adorno's theory of concepts as self-
preserving. We can see these initial concepts as self-preserving just because they 
stem from the clash between pragmatic interests and experiential discontinuity.  
 
2.5 Self-Preservation 
However, understanding Adorno's account as ontogenetic only serves to eliminate this 
                                                 
17
 This is not to deny that there is a role for familial influence on Honneth's model. However, it 
simply cannot be used to explain the initial acquisition of concepts. 
18
     Adorno's work does contain exegetical support for this position also- 'Humanity had to 
inflict terrible injuries on itself before the self – the identical, purpose-directed, masculine 
character of human beings – was created, and something of this process is repeated in every 
childhood.' (DE: 26). 
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genetic fallacy. Even on the ontogenetic account, the genetic fallacy is recreated 
elsewhere in Adorno's theory. This higher-level genetic fallacy occurs when we 
consider those concepts which are 'non-basic', which is to say not plausibly related to 
the individual's initial formation of self-preserving concepts. Concepts which are 
sufficiently recondite to be non-basic would largely be cultural concepts, such as 
aesthetic, moral and religious concepts. These concepts are non-basic just because an 
initial, terrified, attempt to structure discontinuous experience would not seem to have 
reference to them. 
 So, for each individual, we have a plausible relationship between a given set of 
basic concepts ('basic' in the sense given above) and self-preservation. However, the 
initial genetic fallacy relating to the phylogenetic reading of Adorno is now, on the 
ontogenetic reading, repeated for each individual – while the basic concepts are 
plausibly related to self-preservation, once these basic concepts are in place, there 
seems to be no plausible reason to link the subsequent non-basic concepts to self-
preservation.19 If the individual, at the beginning of his personal history, is forced to 
personally form concepts in accord with his requirement for self-preservation, the 
question remains what ensures a) that the ongoing process of concept formation takes 
place in accord with the demands of self-preservation and b) that the basic concepts, 
having been formed in accord with self-preservation, continue to be employed in a self-
preserving manner. As such, a genetic fallacy still appears to be at issue here.  
 However, this is in fact more reflective of infelicitous expression on Adorno's 
part than of a genuine philosophical error. Adorno does in fact have a more developed 
position which allows him to shore up the universality of the employment of concepts in 
a coercive, self-preserving manner. This more developed position involves Adorno's 
sociology. 
 
2.6 Sociology and Self-Preservation 
Adorno's sociological thought is a considerably large area of his body of work which I 
cannot hope to address sufficiently here. However, of the three definitive statements of 
his thought (Dialectic of Enlightenment, Negative Dialectics, and Aesthetic Theory), the 
first, the Dialectic, was written in close temporal proximity to his more sustained 
engagements with sociology (his work with Lazarsfeld, the writing of The Authoritarian 
Personality) and accordingly reflects his sociological concerns to a larger extent, in a 
somewhat compressed manner. This allows us to extract the essentials of Adorno's 
position, as relevant to our present investigation.  
                                                 
19
 Nor, indeed, the basic concepts, once formed. Their emergence from self-preserving 
behaviour entails no commitment on their part to an ongoing project of self-preservation. 
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 Adorno held a distinctively pessimistic view in his sociological work – he took 
the social whole not to be composed of competing groups, or a liberal consensus 
maintained by the negotiation of competing claims to scarce resources, but rather to be 
an increasingly monolithic whole which unilaterally imposed a given form of behaviour 
and thought. Adorno often referred to this as the 'administered world' (DE: xi). The 
guiding principle of Adorno's sociological analyses was the positing of society's 
complete social control over the individual's life and thought. This total social control 
and manipulation which Adorno posits as real (or increasingly realized, as one chooses 
to interpret him) receives, in Dialectic of Enlightenment, explanation in terms of self-
preservation. Adorno asserts that the social whole maintains its power over the 
individual by forcibly binding the requirements of the individual's self-preservation to the 
social structure he finds himself in. This is expressed most clearly in three places in the 
Dialectic. First, Adorno says -  
 
The countless agencies of mass production and its culture impress 
standardized behaviour on the individual as the only natural, decent, and 
rational one. Individuals define themselves now only as things, statistical 
elements, successes or failures. Their criterion is self-preservation, 
successful or unsuccessful adaptation to the objectivity of  their function and 
the schemata assigned to it. (DE: 21-22) 
 
Here we see that Adorno, in the process of attempting to explain the imposition of a 
given form of behaviour, draws a vital equivalence between self-preservation and 
'adaptation to the objectivity of [one's] function' in society. Rather than explaining social 
conformity as a result of ideological influence, or appeals to the self-esteem of 
individuals, Adorno is forcefully relating the coercive power of social structures 
('schemata') solely to the individual's most basic requirement, namely his self-
preservation. This thought is reinforced - 
 
In the bourgeois economy the social work of each individual is mediated by 
the principle of the self [...] But the more heavily the process of self-
preservation is based on the bourgeois division of labour, the more it 
enforces the self-alienation of individuals, who must mold themselves to 
the technical apparatus body and soul. (DE: 23) 
  
Once more we see that the individual's basic self-preservation becomes 'molded' to a 
social structure, in this case the 'technical apparatus' which governs their work. Finally, 
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Adorno makes clear that he takes this equation of the individual and society, effected 
via self-preservation, to be socially universal in scope -  
 
By subordinating life in its entirety to the requirements of its preservation, 
the controlling minority guarantees, with its own security, the continuation of 
the whole. (DE: 24, emphasis mine)  
  
Finally, we can see here in stark relief the equivalence which (Adorno holds) society 
enforces between the requirements of its own continuation and the preservation of 
each individual. Each of the quotes which I have provided as textual support show 
Adorno attempting to demonstrate that society enforces behavioral uniformity, and 
society's own continuation, through its manipulation of each individual's requirements 
for self-preservation. What is vital is that Adorno has demonstrated here that self-
preservation and even the most recondite features of cultural life ('life in its entirety' 
seems to plausibly include the cultural aspects of life) are imbricated. For Adorno, then, 
all life, in the administered society, relates to self-preservation and is controlled thereby. 
By all life, Adorno explicitly has reference not only to behaviour, but to conceptual 
behaviour as well - 
  
The exclusivity of logical laws stems from [...] obdurate adherence to 
function, and ultimately to the compulsive character of self-preservation. 
The latter is constantly magnified into the choice between survival and 
doom, a choice which is reflected even in the principle that, of two 
contradictory propositions, only one can be true and the other false. (DE: 
23) 
  
Adorno once again clearly draws a picture of the imbrication of apparently autonomous 
thought and social structure, this imbrication again being effected through the medium 
of the individual's self-preservation. Here, he explicitly spreads the claim from 
behaviour to thought, and to the most apparently autonomous principles of thought, at 
that. With this exposition of Adorno's sociology, we are now in a position to answer the 
two questions raised in the previous section, namely: a) what ensures that the ongoing 
process of non-basic concept formation takes place in accord with the demands of self-
preservation? and b) what ensures that basic concepts, having been formed in accord 
with self-preservation, continue to be employed in a self-preserving manner? I can now 
tackle a) and b) in tandem. 
 We are now in a position to explain not only why basic concepts, but in fact all 
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concepts continue to be employed in a self-preserving manner. When we first 
examined Adorno's ontogenetic account of his formation of concepts, Adorno's 
assertion that the initial self-preserving impetus towards conceptual thought was 
preserved appeared problematic. This was just because we objected that the appeal to 
the self-preserving psychological charge which accompanied the initial formation of 
concepts could not suffice as an argument for seeing the concept as innately self-
preserving. However, from our examination of Adorno's sociological thought above, we 
can see that a genetic fallacy, of drawing conclusions about innate properties of 
concepts from the circumstances of their origin, is not at issue. Adorno does not need 
to give any account of the inherent nature of the concept in order to explain and 
support the claim that concepts are universally employed in a self-preserving manner. 
Rather, the social structure, according to Adorno, enforces self-preserving conceptual 
behaviour by structurally ensuring that the agent must be continually aware that his 
self-preservation is an issue which must be constantly addressed (DE: 24). This 
'subordination of life' to self-preservation allows Adorno's linking of concepts to self-
preserving activity to be theoretically justified, answering concern a). The formation of 
concepts in accord with self-preservation is necessary, just because the agent's life as 
a whole has been emptied of non-self-preserving behaviour.   
 This also serves to answer concern b). The concept is constantly employed in a 
self-preserving manner, just because the agent is constantly required to enact his own 
self-preservation. There is no innate constraint in the concept itself to prevent the 
cessation of self-preserving behaviour – it is rather a product of the agent's social 
milieu. Adorno's sociology allows him to posit the agent as always already in a situation 
of being forced to preserve himself and exert his mental resources towards that end. 
Once again, as in the examination of Adorno's analogue of Kant's Transcendental 
Deduction in the previous Chapter, Adorno has situated the necessity for a given 
conceptual feature not within the concept itself, but in the pragmatic context in which 
the concept is situated. 
 With this broad sketch of Adorno's sociological thought, then, we can see a 
clear account which appears to support Adorno's implicit reliance on a universality of 
conceptual behaviour, and the universal imbrication of conceptuality with self-interest. 
This will serve as a foundation for our consideration of the most pressing difficulty, 
namely Adorno's reliance on the universality of conceptual arrays. 
 
2.7 Array Universality and Self-Preservation 
Above, in section 2.5., a distinction was drawn between 'basic' and 'non-basic' 
concepts. Concepts were termed 'basic' only insofar as they bore a probable relation of 
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primacy to an individual in his forming an initial set of mediating concepts in an attempt 
to impose regularity onto a discontinuous experiential field. Those concepts which are 
either of no apparent function in such a situation, or are higher order concepts which 
require the initial set, are termed 'non-basic'. I should like to continue employing this 
distinction, just because the universality of conceptual arrays which Adorno employs 
seems to run into difficulties of differing natures, according to whether we consider the 
basic concepts or the non-basic. I should like to consider the problem of the universal 
conceptual array of basic concepts first, moving on from this to consider the problem of 
non-basic universality. 
 
2.8. Basic Concepts and Universality 
In the foregoing, we have established that Adorno is able to consistently maintain that 
all conceptual employment and formation takes place according to the requirements 
dictated by self-preservation – initially due to the conflict between one's basic needs 
and the discontinuity of non-conceptual experience, and secondly due to the coercive 
nature of society's structuration, which enforces self-preserving behaviour. We 
supplemented this account in section 2.4. with a brief argument demonstrating that 
Adorno's account of the initial formation of concepts from a non-conceptual experiential 
field was ontogenetic. It is this ontogenetic, initial formation of self-preserving concepts 
which presents a specific challenge to Adorno's reliance on conceptual universality. As 
the individual confronts a discontinuous experiential field, without any guiding inter-
subjective influence, he must form a set of mediating concepts. The question arises as 
to why this initial, individual confrontation with the non-conceptual, and ensuing 
formation of concepts, is resolved in each case, for each individual, by the formation of 
an identical set of basic concepts.  
 The concept's sole role here is to serve the individual's self-preservation. As 
such, it would appear possible that an individual could form a radically divergent set of 
mediating concepts, such that either a) some set of non-basic concepts which are 
parasitic on a normal set of basic concepts would be unavailable to this individual, who 
would hence fail to conform to the socially universal conceptual array or b) the aberrant 
set of basic concepts would be sufficiently aberrant as to preclude any communication 
whatsoever between this individual and the population at large. Eventuality a) is 
problematic just because it would demonstrate that Adorno has insufficient theoretical 
resources to ensure the universality of conceptual arrays which he relies on. His theory 
of the concept and its formation would just be such that an individual's conceptual set 
could be bereft of, or differ radically from, some set of non-basic concepts which 
Adorno requires to be socially universal. Eventuality b) is problematic just because we 
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do not encounter individuals whose fundamental conceptual set-up renders them 
radically incommunicable, and Adorno's theory has no way of explaining how this is. 
 To reformulate the problem, then: our difficulty is that the initial formation of 
basic concepts is such that its sole object is the imposition of manipulable order onto a 
discontinuous experiential field. This goal would appear to be satisfiable by any number 
of conceptual arrays. Moreover, these differing arrays would plausibly preclude some 
non-basic concepts which Adorno wants to see as socially universal. (For example, a 
set of basic concepts which did not include perspectival spatiality might preclude an 
appreciation of sculpture). As such, the formation of an aberrant basic conceptual array 
would in turn problematize the social universality of Adorno's analyses of non-basic 
concepts and phenomena which necessitate these non-basic concepts. 
 An interesting example of a possible divergent basic conceptual array which 
would satisfy Adorno's requirements by forming a regular experiential space would be 
Strawson's 'sound-world'. For our purposes, we can bracket a good deal of the detail 
and interest of Strawson's account, and instead focus solely on the fact that the sound-
world seems to meet Adorno's criteria for the initial formation of concepts. 
 In the Chapter 'Sounds' of Strawson's Individuals, Strawson attempts to 
consider whether the fact that we take material objects as primary in the identification 
of particulars in our 'conceptual scheme as it is' (Strawson 1990: 59) could not be 
usurped in some other possible conceptual scheme, wherein the identification of 
particulars does not proceed by taking material bodies as primary. Put differently, 
Strawson attempts to show that the epistemological viewpoint which  takes 'material 
particulars' (Strawson 1990: 62) as primary for comprehending  'objective particulars' 
(Strawson 1990: 62) (i.e., objects which are identified via one's experience, which 
however exist outside of that experience (Strawson 1990: 69)) is contingent. Strawson 
outlines a different epistemological process (and hence a differing conceptual array) 
which is able to satisfy the requirement of identifying objective particulars, without 
needing to posit materiality as primary.  
 What makes this attempt of Strawson's, which I shall detail presently, so 
interesting and dangerous for Adorno is precisely that Strawson does not achieve his 
goal of a radically different epistemological set-up by means of introducing new 
categories. In this sense, the conceptual set remains identical. Rather, Strawson 
retains the standard categories and re-tools the relationships between them. In this 
sense, Strawson posits a new conceptual array (by re-ordering the primacy allotted to 
material particulars in achieving an understanding of objective particulars), which 
satisfies the requirement of providing continuous experience just as well as the 
standard array (which continues to take material particularity as primary).  
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 To compress Strawson's account considerably, Strawson achieves the 
maintenance of the concept of objective particulars, while jettisoning extension, by, as 
he puts it, creating an 'analogy' of material space within which to house these objective 
particulars. What Strawson is concerned with, is that the comprehension of objects as 
objective (i.e., as not being exhausted by one's perceiving them, but capable of existing 
without being perceived) necessarily entails a given 'housing' (Strawson 1990: 74) in 
which they can be seen to be sustained, regardless of our perception of them. Having 
jettisoned material space (within which we usually understand objects as being 
housed), Strawson creates an analogy of space with what he calls a 'master sound' 
(Strawson 1990: 76), to different pitches of which other audible particulars are 
correlated.20 This, Strawson argues, delivers a sufficient housing, in the same way as 
material space, to allow for the agent to take himself to be re-identifying particulars (the 
same particular sounds). Just as one may walk into a room which contains a sound, 
leave momentarily, and return, and thereby take oneself to have two experiences of 
one sound particular, so one might experience a sound particular at master-sound pitch 
a, move to master-sound pitch b where it is not, and then return to pitch a and take 
oneself, due to the housing of the master sound pitches, to be re-identifying the same 
sound particular. This master-sound, then, provides us the with the concept of 
particulars having 'absence and presence' at a given point (Strawson 1990: 75).  
 With this account in tow, Strawson is able to re-position a basic facet of 
continuous experience (the identification of objective particulars across time) out of the 
conventional conceptual array, and into a radically different conceptual array while 
retaining the same conceptual set.21 This is so important just because it would appear 
to loosen the necessity of the basic conceptual array initially formed by the infant. 
While we can continue to grant to Adorno that a given conceptual set is pragmatically 
necessary, it would appear, from Strawson's example, that the conjunction of that basic 
conceptual set and pragmatic goal of self-preservation could nonetheless result in any 
number of radically differing conceptual arrays. We need an explanation, then, as to 
why there are no sound-world infants – how do we explain the universality of the basic 
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 'One may imagine, finally, that variations in the pitch of the master-sound are correlated with 
variations in other sounds that are heard, in a way very similar to that in which variations in 
the position of the tuning-knob of a wireless set are correlated with variations in the sounds 
that one hears on the wireless.' (Strawson 1990: 76). 
21
 While Strawson takes himself to have replaced space with 'an analogy of space' (Strawson 
1990: 75), and hence not the category of space itself, I do not take this to be particularly 
compelling. What Strawson presents us with is the category of space re-positioned without 
reference to visuality or extension. He takes such an alteration to be a forfeiture of the 
concept – equipped with our distinction between arrays and sets, however, we can rather 
take it to be the same set, merely with radically altered determining relations holding in that 
set. 
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conceptual array?22 
 Strawson's sound-world is such a problem, then, because Adorno deals with the 
universality of the conceptual array, not merely the conceptual set. This is significantly 
richer than simply the presence of the same set of concepts. For the universality of the 
basic conceptual array to be satisfied, it is not sufficient merely for all agents to have an 
identical set of basic concepts. The determining relationships between the members of 
this set must be identical. I take Strawson's sound-world to be an example of an 
aberrant basic array. Strawson presents such a problem for Adorno, as he allows us to 
posit a significantly different basic conceptual array, without needing to posit some 
radically different concepts which no-one has yet held.  
 So, how can Adorno prevent the formation of basic governing conceptual arrays 
which are aberrant, like sound-worlds, and the like? A promising move would be to 
enrich the concept of self-preservation with which we have been operating up to now. If 
we are able to open up the concept of self-preservation such that some set of concepts 
are necessary for any self, just given the nature of human experience, we might be 
able to derive a universally obtaining set of basic concepts from the wholly self-
regarding desire for self-preservation.  
 In fact, this enrichment of self-preservation has already been largely achieved in 
the previous Chapter, wherein we demonstrated the necessity of a given set of basic 
concepts for continuous experience (cause and effect, appearance and essence, etc. – 
see section 1.12's argument concerning the necessity of concepts facilitating a 
distinction between an object and its presented properties). These basic concepts can 
be taken to be universal just by virtue of their pragmatic necessity, and the absence of 
the availability of any functional equivalent which could replace them. This pragmatic 
necessity is prior to any specificity of the agent's particular goal or desires. In other 
words, these concepts are a condition of the agent's exercising his will in a non-
discontinuous field of experience. In order to enduringly individuate objects at all, 
concepts of causality and the appearance / essence distinction, for instance, appear 
necessary. Similar arguments are available for other basic concepts, such as space, 
time and number. However, recapitulating these arguments serves only to secure the 
presence of a basic conceptual set. The worry introduced by Strawson's sound world is 
simply that these basic conceptual sets can be present without thereby necessitating a 
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 While Strawson's example operates without the sense of vision, there is no reason why the 
presence of the sense of sight should prevent the formation of a sound-world consciousness. 
The privileging of vision in our epistemological schema is contingent – it is perfectly 
conceivable that the sense of sight could be entertained but marginalized, and seen as 
largely a source of pleasure rather than information (analogously to our present employment 
of our sense of smell, or taste). 
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particular conceptual array. Strawson's sound-world includes the fundamental 
conceptual set, but the determining relations between them, most notably their 
forfeiture of the visual in favour of imbrication with the audible, are different. We need 
to find some manner of explaining the universality of these determining relations. 
 However, Adorno can now appeal to a constraint which prevents the formation 
of radically differing conceptual arrays, which nonetheless contain the same conceptual 
set, by the agent. We find ourselves in a position to introduce what was previously 
excluded in section 2.4 – namely, an appeal to the role of intersubjectivity in the 
determining of one's conceptual array. Broadly speaking, an account on this basis 
could take a developmental-psychological (Honneth 2005: 95-107) approach to arguing 
that through interaction between child and parent, the child is trained to acclimatize his 
conceptual lay-out to the parent's. This account is usually employed to explain the 
child's formation of all concepts, but we were forced to rule this out in section 2.4. 
However, once the basic concepts have been formed by the individual (without inter-
subjective influence), inter-subjective influence becomes possible, as experience is no 
longer discontinuous, and the agent is able to identify and individuate objects over 
time. Adorno can now employ such an inter-subjective account to argue that once the 
set of basic concepts is acquired, any aberrant array would be inter-subjectively 
precluded. So, Adorno can derive the basic conceptual set from an expanded account 
of self-preservation. The array relations of these basic concepts, however, cannot be 
determined as universal by this concept of self-preservation. But, while Adorno cannot 
derive the universality of the array relations between basic concepts from basic 
pragmatic requirements (after all, Strawson's sound world allows for continuous 
experience just as well as conventional conceptual mediation), developmental 
psychology can step in and provide the determining constraint, here. 
 Reading Adorno in this way has one chief virtue, which is that it allows Adorno 
to simultaneously maintain the universality and contingency of the governing basic 
conceptual array, whilst simultaneously maintaining the initial necessity of the basic 
conceptual set. The contingency of the array is important just because Adorno's 
dialectical and philosophical analyses will be oriented towards breaking and critiquing 
this array. In other words, while Adorno clearly feels that the conceptual mediation of 
experience is necessary, and that certain conceptual sets are necessary for continuous 
experience, it is the obtaining employment and determining relations between these 
concepts which Adorno's philosophy critiques23. However, if these relations and 
                                                 
23
 'Yet the appearance of identity is inherent in thought itself, in its pure form. To think is to 
identify [...] Aware that the conceptual totality is mere appearance, I have no way but to 
break immanently, in its own measure, through the appearance of total identity.' (ND: 5 / 17). 
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employments were unqualifiedly necessary, the normative ground for this critique 
would appear to vanish. However, the conceptual array is contingently necessary. It is 
necessary internal to the social totality, which determines and imposes the conceptual 
array universally. However, the social totality is itself contingent (it is vulnerable to 
socio-historical change, and so on). As such, the conceptual array is necessary given 
the social totality it is found in – but this determining totality is not itself necessary. 
 This line of thought can be termed successful, then, in that while it retains the 
strict contingency of concept formation in accord with Adorno's position, this 
contingency has been sufficiently qualified to ensure that the results of this contingent 
process of concept formation are both in conformity with everyday experience and are 
universally instantiated. However, this success is of course only partial. This mitigation 
of the contingency of concept formation, such that it can be made to yield up a 
universality of the basic conceptual arrays, is insufficient to explain the universality 
which Adorno attributes to the highly complex analyses which he makes of various 
recondite phenomena. We must now turn to the problem of non-basic conceptual 
universality. 
 
2.9. Non-Basic Concepts and Universality 
It would be appropriate to here re-state the governing problem of this Chapter. Adorno 
makes highly complex and obscure analyses of highly complex and obscure social 
phenomena. These range from philosophical antinomies, to developments in avant-
garde music, to immanent analyses of what Adorno termed 'ephemera'. Uniting all of 
this is Adorno's fundamental methodological commitment that an object, interpreted 
properly, will be revelatory of its social whole (ND: 25 / 36, 47 / 57). So, then, one can 
analyze a cultural product in such a way that its apparent conceptual imbrication (the 
artwork's being a determinate negation of the concept of form, for example) holds 
objectively, for all possible observers. Similarly, Adorno feels entitled to assert that 
apparently subjective phenomena, such as one's feelings about one's gender (DE: 95) 
are in fact reflective of a social whole, and this reflection holds true for all other 
individuals. In short, then, Adorno holds that conceptual transitions effected and noted 
in even the most apparently subjective philosophical and cultural realms hold 
universally – he traces conceptual arrays, and criticizes these arrays, while holding 
them to be socially universal. The question up to now has been, how can he reconcile 
this with a theory of the concept which holds that its form and formation is wholly 
contingent, determined merely by the demands of self-preservation? 
                                                                                                                                               
Here we see both Adorno's admission of the necessity of concepts, and his determination to 
use these self-same concepts in order to do away with their incorrect employment. 
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 We have been able to answer this question for what we termed 'basic' concepts, 
just by looking at the basic demands for the formation of continuous experience, and 
supplementing that with an account of the way in which the conceptual set is 
acclimatized to the obtaining conceptual array through inter-subjective influence in the 
course of the individual's psychological development.  
 However, we have now come to consider the non-basic concepts. These 
concepts differ radically from basic concepts in that a) they are not a member of the 
minimal set of concepts necessary for continuous experience, b) they are not plausibly 
formed through inter-subjective influence24 and c) they concern various phenomena 
which are not pragmatically basic. From section 2.6, we have established that Adorno 
can consistently maintain that all individual behaviour and concept formation, even in 
the non-basic sphere, is determined by the demands of self-preservation. As such, 
Adorno's sociology closes the difficulty of relating, say, aesthetic concepts to self-
preservation just by virtue of asserting that social structuration enforces self-
preservation as an ever-present concern, and so trains all mental activity towards the 
ever-present concern of self-preservation. The distinctive problem of the non-basic 
concepts arises solely from the fact that, even accepting Adorno's claim about the 
imposition of self-preserving behaviour, the stratified and differentiated nature of 
society entails that the self-preserving behaviour (and attendant concepts) of various 
individuals will be radically divergent. Put differently, as non-basic concepts are not 
necessary for continuous experience simpliciter (point a)), nor concerning phenomena 
which are pragmatically basic (point c)) –  which is to say, they do not concern 
phenomena with which everyone has contact in roughly the same way e.g., the ground, 
the existence of other people's bodies, etc. – there seems to be no reason why the 
self-preserving activity of two individuals in relation to these phenomena, and the 
resultant conceptual arrays, cannot differ radically. In fact, it would seem that we should 
expect this difference, given the contrasting and competing relationships which 
individuals bear to various social phenomena. 
 While it seems reasonable to extract basic concepts from an individual's self-
interest in such a way that they can be applied to a society of individuals, just due to 
the basic nature of the concepts and avenues for self-preservation being considered, 
the same does not appear to be true of non-basic phenomena. The interests of self-
preservation diverge powerfully in regard to various social powers and concepts, 
dependent on one's social position. Adorno himself obliquely recognizes this in his 
affirmation of the class theory of society (ND: 21 / 32, 42 / 52). If Adorno maintains that 
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 This is due to the sociological divergence in interests and relationships to processes which I 
will explore below. 
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concepts are construed in response to the constantly enforced requirement for self-
preservation, and that self-preservation is 'molded' (DE: 23)  to its structural situation, 
then it is reasonable to expect that the divisive class-derived divergences in the 
requirements of self-preservation will give rise to divergent conceptual arrays. We 
should expect varying (and in some cases, contradicting) self-preserving interests to 
render up differing conceptual arrays, just in so far as these concepts are intended to 
be in service of these self-preserving interests. In the case of non-basic concepts, then, 
self-preservation simpliciter does not seem to be a plausible candidate for the 
derivation of universally obtaining conceptual arrays.   
 While uniting self-preservation to the transcendental requirements of the 
satisfaction of an individual's pragmatic needs secures universality for the basic 
concepts, it would appear insufficient for the non-basic concepts. We must locate the 
determining factor which secures this universality elsewhere. In the following, I will 
locate this universalizing factor in the object itself.  
 
2.10 Non-Basic Universality 
We have, then, reached the limit of the efficacy of uniting the sociological explanation 
with the explanation from the basic pragmatic needs of the agent. In outlining the 
solution to this problem, my account is fine-grained enough to necessitate some new 
terminology, the meaning of which I will now stipulate. I will be referring extensively to 
those determining influences on the formation and employment of the concept (often 
termed the 'metalogical' element of the concept by Adorno (Jarvis 1998: 153)). I will 
need to distinguish between this influence exercised on the individual via their full 
social situation and psychological make-up, and this influence as exercised on the 
agent  prior to that situation and make-up. I term these 'rich determination' and 'thin 
determination' respectively. The first, 'rich determination', applies to the individual's full 
specificity, and effects its influence via that full specificity. Axel Honneth provides an 
especially clear example of rich determination, in his account of reification and 
recognition as having a determining influence with reference to and via the individual's 
self-image, desire for prestige, personal projects and so on.25 The second, 'thin 
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 'Reification in the sense of “forgetfulness of recognition” therefore means that in the course of 
our acts of cognition we lose our attentiveness to the fact that this cognition owes its existence 
to an antecedent act of recognition. Now, there are at least two exemplary cases of this [...] To 
start with the first case, in the course of our practices we might pursue a goal so energetically 
and one dimensionally that we stop paying attention to other, possibly more original and 
important motives and aims. An example of this phenomenon might be the tennis player who, 
in her ambitious focus on winning, forgets that her opponent is in fact her best friend, for the 
sake of whom she took up the game in the first place [...] The second kind [...] derives [...] from 
[…] a series of thought schemata [and prejudices] that influence our practices by leading to a 
selective interpretation of social facts can significantly reduce our attentiveness for meaningful 
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determination', applies to and influences the individual, but does not make use of these 
higher order, more multifarious, properties of individuals. I should point out that thin 
determination is not transcendental – which is to say it is not entailed as a condition of 
the possibility of given experiences. Also important to note is that while the 
mechanisms and relevant social phenomena are different for each kind of 
determination (for example, rich determination has a clear relevance to cultural media, 
whereas thin determination does not) the social whole is exercised through both. In 
each case, the social totality determines the individual – what differs is the mechanism 
by which this is effected.26 As it turns out, the problems with the social universality of 
non-basic concepts that we identified are simply a result of attempting to apply a rich 
determination model – we can avoid these difficulties entirely through the application of 
a thin determination model. 
 In the previous section, then, we in fact discovered that a rich determination 
model could not explain the universality of non-basic concepts. The derivation of 
concepts from the individual's specific self-preserving relationship to social phenomena 
failed just because of the divergences in the specificity of various individuals and social 
classes. What is required is a way of understanding social determination of concept 
formation and employment at a level prior to the individual's specificity, such that it can 
bear a determining influence on that specificity. The social influence on non-basic 
concepts, then, will have to be seen as pre-intentional, in that it will be uninfluenced by 
the divergent patterns of intention and self-understanding in agents.  
 Before we make this move, however, it might be objected that the Marxist 
discourse within which Adorno finds himself has sufficient theoretical resources to solve 
this difficulty. Innumerable Marxists, beginning of course with Lukács, have posited the 
existence of 'reification' (Verdinglichung).27 Reification has two aspects, referring to the 
transformation of 'human properties, relations and actions into properties, relations and 
actions of things', and the 'transformation of human beings into thing-like beings which 
do not behave in a human way but according to the laws of the thing-world' (Bottomore 
et al 2003: 463).  
 Construed thinly, as a process by which society forces the consciousness of 
individuals into accord with the form of society, it seems obvious that some type of 
                                                                                                                                               
circumstances in a given situation.' (Honneth 2006: 130 - 131) 
26
 What will become clearer later, but unfortunately I will have little space to explore, is that 
Adorno's cultural analyses (which often look as if they necessitate a rich determination 
model) in fact require and rely on the existence of a thin determination model. Thin 
determination models secure the social universality which rich determination models cannot. 
27
 Marx's analyses of commodity fetishism in Capital can be read as an early analysis of 
reification; however Marx does not explicitly employ the term Verdinglichung. The Grundrisse 
der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie also contains early intimations of the concept of 
reification. 
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account of reification is in fact at issue in Adorno. Indeed, if one re-examines Adorno's 
talk of the coercive use of self-preservation to 'mold' individuals (DE: 23) we can see 
that Adorno is employing an account on this model.  Furthermore, Adorno has frequent 
explicit recourse to the term 'reification' in his major works (DE: 23, 130, 163, 170, 191, 
195; AT: 36, 129, 130, 153, 222, 392; ND: 190 / 191, 374 / 367). So, it is undeniable 
that reification is at issue. However, Adorno has, I contend, an incredibly unusual 
understanding of the term reification, which diverges strongly from its conventional 
employment. Reification is conventionally understood as a material phenomenon, 
emerging due to the nature of the process of commodity exchange. In Marx's analysis 
of reification in Capital, for example, the reification of objects, such that they bear 
human properties like exchange value as if they were intrinsic, natural properties, is the 
result of the way in which commodity exchange is organized (Marx 1908: 42). 
Reification, on this reading, is the upshot of material processes. Similarly, reification's 
influence on the agent's consciousness derives from the agent's subordination to 
material practices of exchange (Lukács 1971: 89). The agent's interaction with these 
material practices enforces a particular form of consciousness. 
 However, Adorno does not understand reification, in either of its two aspects, to 
operate in this way. He rather understands reification to be an epistemological 
tendency of the agent. Reification, for Adorno, is the propensity of the individual to 
accept concepts as exhaustively modeling their object. In other words, reification is for 
Adorno equivalent to what he calls 'identity thinking' – the forgetting of that which does 
not correspond to the concept.28 Jarvis characterizes reification for Adorno as 'the 
conversion of a process into a thing; particularly the presentation of social process as 
the property of a thing' (Jarvis 1998: 191). What Jarvis does not note is that this 
misidentification, the occlusion of the mediating process, can only be a product of the 
agents taking the concept to exhaust its object. This is so just because the object for 
Adorno is always already a testament to its social mediation. Its immediacy, properly 
related to, opens onto comprehension of the mediacy which produced it (see sections 
2.13 – 2.14). As such (contra Lukács and Marx) reification cannot be merely a social 
process which effects the translation of processes into things. Marx, for example, 
attempts to understand reification as the consequence of a material process, which, 
just due to this material process, results in processes becoming 'stamped upon' 
objects, reified into apparent properties of objects (Marx 1908: 42 – 43). For Marx, the 
experience of objects is mystified and obscured by material processes. However, 
Adorno cannot understand reification in this manner, just due to his assertion that 
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 Hence 'all reification is a forgetting' ((DE: 191) 
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things, correctly related to, display the mediation which gave rise to them. Adorno (ND: 
13 / 25) holds that simple 'full, unreduced experience' of the object will reveal its 
mediation.  As such, the object, for Adorno, is an anti-reifying force (if experienced 
fully). This being so, reification cannot be identified with some property of material 
processes (or properties of objects, resulting from these process), but rather with an 
epistemological error which blinds us to the true nature of those material processes 
(which even objects testify to).  The translation of mediacy into immediacy, which 
reification refers to, is thus not the consequence of some material process in Marx's 
sense, but is more generally an epistemological flaw in the concept which entails a 
neglect of the true nature of its object. To reiterate, then, as the object for Adorno bears 
on its face the mediation which gives rise to its immediacy, reification cannot be, for 
Adorno, a property of material processes which conceal mediating processes by 
making them into the immediate properties of things. The conversion of mediacy into 
experienced immediacy (reification) must not be identified with a property of the object, 
therefore, but rather with a property of the agent. Therefore, reification is for Adorno 
equal to identity thinking – it is the occlusion of the true mediacy of the object, by taking 
the concept to exhaust the object. 
 This interpretation of Adorno's use of the term reification, although quite 
heterodox, is also found in Gillian Rose's The Melancholy Science. Rose has a closely 
related understanding of reification. Rose understands reification to take place by 
means of the identification of the concept with its object - 
 
Identity thinking is reified thinking […] Identity thinking makes unlike things 
alike. To believe that a concept really covers its object, when it does not, is to 
believe falsely that the object is the equal of its concept. […] It is the way 
unlike things appear to be identical or equal, and the mode of thinking which 
can only consider them as equal, which is reification as a social 
phenomenon and as a process of thinking for Adorno. (Rose 1978: 46) 
 
[Adorno sometimes posits] 'complete reification': the concept's apparent 
identity with its object has become unbreakable. (Rose 1978: 48) 
 
Here, Rose identifies reification as when the concept is taken to exhaust the object, but 
in fact does not. As such, Rose ties in reification with the agent's propensity to take the 
concept to exhaust the object. In this aspect, Rose's account of reification is very close 
to my own. 
  Rose's account differs from mine in that, rather than identifying reification with 
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an inherent propensity of the part of the agent to presume identity between concept 
and object, Rose identifies reification as obtaining whenever this presumption of the 
agent fails to map onto the world. In other words, Rose sees reification as taking place 
whenever I apply a concept which imputes properties to an object which the object 
does not 'have “by itself”' (Rose 1978: 47). When the agent presumes adequacy 
between concepts and objects, and this adequacy does in fact hold, my thought is in 
fact non-reified.  
 This difference, however, is largely terminological. I take it that the agent is 
always already engaged in a project of attempting to exhaustively model the world 
employing his concepts, and I term this 'reification'. However, I take it that should the 
imposition of self-preserving behaviour be removed from the agent, and the agonism of 
the mediation of the object be removed (cf. section 3.8), then this reifying tendency of 
the agent will no longer result in misunderstanding of the object. Rose would term this 
state of affairs 'non-reified' – I would it term it a state in which reification was at work, 
but benign. (There are other, more troubling differences between Rose's account and 
mine – most notably her identification of the non-reified and reified properties and 
concepts of objects with 'use-value' and 'exchange-value', respectively – but they are 
not presently relevant). 
 There are two things which are vital to note at this stage. The first is that 
reification, as laid out by Adorno, is not a contingent form of determination. Adorno 
does not see reification as contingent, but in fact an inherent property of self-hood 
('The correlative of intention is reification' (AT: 354)). We have backed up this view of 
Adorno's in Chapter 1, where we discovered that conceptual mediation was necessary 
for continuous experience. In order for concepts to mediate experience, it is essential 
that they are reified (in other words, present themselves as exhausting their object). 
This conceptual mediation is prior to, and a condition of the possibility of, experience. 
As such, the concept attempts only to grasp and impose continuity onto experience, 
and is prior to even the possibility of doubt concerning the concept's sufficiency. The 
concept's mediation of experience is an operation prior to the experiential field within 
which doubt concerning this operation can arise. Reification, then, is not inherently a 
form of social influence – the agent always already, constitutively, takes concepts to 
exhaust the properties of the object (it is art and philosophy which will break this 
constitutive tendency of the self). 
 As such, for reification to be social influence, there must be a social 
determination of what concepts there are for the agent to mistakenly take to be 
exhaustive. This brings me to the second point. As Adorno does not understand 
reification to be strictly a form of determination at all reification cannot be introduced 
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here alone to explain the social universality of non-basic concepts. Adorno's variety of 
reification tells us about the individual's acceptance of concepts, but it does not explain 
how the individual comes into ownership of these concepts. As such, reification is not, 
for Adorno, inherently a medium for social determination at all. This is so simply as 
reification has no determining influence on which concepts the agent has in the first 
place. Rather, it can only affect how these concepts are understood and employed by 
the agent. So, reification is in a sense a necessary epistemological component for 
Adorno – it is not in itself determinative of the conceptual set of an agent's conceptual 
array. As such, Adorno's concept of reification cannot suffice on its  own to explain 
social determination. We need an account of how society influences the concepts 
which the agent comes to form, which then go on, via reification, to be mistaken as 
somehow exhausting their objects.29 
  
2.11 Setting Out the Solution 
Let us review what has been established up to this point. We established that the 
formation of concepts was, for Adorno, an imposition and  search for manipulable 
regularities which could allow the individual to control his environment. Adorno 
expressed this quite baldly in terming the concept an 'idea-tool' (DE: 31) which gives 
regularity and control to the agent's environment. The process of concept formation, 
then, was the imposition of experiential continuity. These concepts become reified just 
insofar as these regularities are held to exhaust the object.  
 Our examination of Adorno's sociology (section 2.6). allowed us to see that this 
self-preserving imposition of experiential regularity does not only apply to some initial 
stage in the agent's life, but is in fact an ongoing process. The individual is continually 
compelled to create concepts in this manner, so that he can control and manipulate the 
structure in which he is situated (the difference being that this structure is increasingly 
determined by social phenomena, rather than merely natural ones). 
 This self-preserving search for and imposition of experiential regularity could not 
be forced into yielding universal non-basic concepts through rich determination, just 
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 I realize that this is a heterodox interpretation of Adorno's use of reification. Please note that 
my claim that Adorno takes identification of an object with its concept to be constitutive of 
experience (this identification I have termed 'reification') still holds, regardless of whether my 
naming this 'reification' is justified. Adorno makes his commitment to this quite clear, e.g. - 
'We can see through the identity principle, but we cannot think without identifying. Any 
definition is identification.' (ND: 149 / 152). As such, if my interpretation of Adorno's theory of 
reification is incorrect, my thesis is unaffected. What I have termed 'reification' will still remain 
a facet of Adorno's theory, which I can accommodate under a different name. If Adorno does 
in fact have a conventional understanding of reification, I have given an account of why it 
should not be seen as playing a role relevant to the present topic of investigation, regardless 
of what Adorno may have intended. 
62 
because the specific interests of the self-preservation of individuals diverge. The 
solution to this problem, then, is to see the determining influence not at the level of the 
specificity of the individual's self interest (rich determination) but at the level of the 
regularities from which the individual forms his self-preserving concepts. If concepts 
are formed from the imposition and discovery of experiential regularities and if this is 
impelled by self-preservation, then self-preservation (in attempting to unify experience 
in accordance with these regularities) is prior to the specificity of the individual's needs 
for self-preservation. Which is to say, at the point at which the individual attempts to 
form a concept of the object such that it unifies experience and is a model of the 
regularities of that object, the specific, rich relation of the individual to that object is not 
currently at issue. Thus, if we can see social influence as being effected at the level of 
these experiential regularities from which concepts are continually being drawn and 
formed30 , then we have an account of thin determination which can ensure the social 
universality of the non-basic concepts while maintaining Adorno's theory of the concept 
as being the reflection of the individual's self-preserving impetus. Both the way and that 
from which the agent forms his concepts would be socially determined. With a 
universally socially determined process (self-preserving manipulation of regularities) 
and universally socially determined material for that process (the regularities from 
which each individual forms their concepts, determined via thin determination), we can 
ensure the social universality of conceptual arrays. 
 We will be able to ensure the universality of non-basic concepts by positing two 
universal determining influences. The first of these will be the determination of the way 
in which concepts are formed. This has already been achieved in section 2.6, where 
we saw that Adorno's sociology entails that all individuals form their concepts according 
to the demands of self-preservation. As such, we already have a universally 
determined process of concept formation. I will now posit a universal determining 
influence on the subject of that process of concept formation – i.e., experience of the 
object, from which concepts are formed. This influence will ensure that the experiential 
regularities presented by the object will be the same for each individual. As a result, the 
universality of non-basic concepts will be secure just because the process of concept 
formation, and the material on which this process is exercised, will be identical for 
every individual within the social totality. 
 This latter form of universal determination is my proposed 'thin determination'. 
In order to begin establishing it as a plausible notion, I first need to make plausible the 
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 Adorno sees life as being continually compelled into self-preservation and adjustment to 
one's social milieu (DE: 21 - 24). As such, the concept is not formed once but, through the 
continually enforced need for self-preservation, remade over and over again.  
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idea that  the object's presented regularities are capable of being determined by 
society.  I will do this in the next section, by examining Adorno's theory of the social 
mediation of experiential immediacy. 
 
2.12 The Object and Totality 
O'Connor notes, in his examination of Negative Dialectics, that Adorno holds that the 
social totality 'has a determinative influence on objects' (O'Connor 2004: 59). This 
'determinative influence' lies in the social totality compelling the agent to form a given 
concept of an object (O'Connor 2004: 59 – 60). O'Connor here identifies a crucial 
feature of Adorno's philosophy. The object is bereft of 'inherent conceptuality' 
(O'Connor 2004: 59) and, as O'Connor puts it, the social totality provides the 'theater' 
(O'Connor 2004: 60) in which the objects are invested with these concepts. I will 
maintain this reading of the object's conceptual properties as being determined by the 
social totality – however, in rendering this as thin determination, I will be able to finally 
secure Adorno's employment of the social universality of non-basic concepts. 
 First, however, I just want to support O'Connor's contention that Adorno takes 
the social totality to be determinative of the immediate appearance of the object. This 
position is, on my reading, one of the fundamental underpinnings of the entirety of 
Negative Dialectics. There are a good number of places, however, where Adorno 
makes this explicit. Two extracts, which combine to provide a solid support to 
O'Connor's position, are the following- 
  
The object opens itself to a monadological insistence, to a sense of the 
constellation in which it stands: the possibility of internal immersion requires 
that externality. (ND: 163 / 165) 
 
[Ideology is] the surreptitious acquisition by indirect things of a directness 
vested with the authority of absolute, unimpeachable, subjectively evident 
being-in-itself. (ND: 82 / 89) 
 
The first extract demonstrates only that Adorno takes the object to contain, and be 
constituted by, the social totality. However, the second extract demonstrates that 
Adorno believes that mediating influences (the social totality) effects an ideological 
influence on individuals simply by making mediacy appear as if immediate. Put 
differently, Adorno here explicitly says that immediate experience of objects ('things') is 
in fact constituted by mediacy. Adorno  baldly expresses the social totality's determining 
influence in Negative Dialectics -  
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[T]he whole which theory expresses is contained in the individual object to 
be analyzed. What links the two is a matter of substance: the social totality. 
(ND: 47 / 57). 
 
 This quote is particularly useful because it confirms that the social totality determines 
the individual object, and also that this determination of the social totality is available 
for analysis. What is emerging here is a two-tier theory of the influence of the social 
totality. On the one hand, it is determinative of the immediate appearance of the object 
to the perceiver ('[T]he individual has no experience, nor any so-called empirical 
material, that the universal has not predigested and supplied.' (ND: 313 / 307)). This 
immediate aspect is taken by the agent to be exhaustive of the object, and moreover 
exhausted by the concept alloted to it. We might term this the delusive aspect of the 
determination ('delusive determination' for short) – the social totality inculcates and 
maintains an incorrect epistemological orientation.31 On the other hand, the object's 
determination by the social totality also stores up a latent critique of that delusive 
determination. Which is to say, the same determination which misleads, is always 
already capable of being analyzed in such a manner that this delusive determination 
becomes visible, and the true form of the object's determination becomes clear. This 
second role of the social totality we will call the revelatory aspect of the determination 
('revelatory determination' for short).  
 This determining role of the social totality will provide the theoretical material for 
justifying Adorno's employment of socially universal non-basic concepts. The previous 
section has already provided an argument for the impossibility of deriving this 
justification from a rich determination. However, I should like to reinforce this thought 
with reference to the determining power of the social totality, and show that the social 
totality's determination must be thin, and not rich. While the social totality is a unified 
collection of determining relations between social phenomena and so has a single, 
determinate, form, this single form is still internally differentiated according to the 
perspective of each of its constituents. Which is to say, while the totality does have a 
single form, this form appears and operates differently from each individual's 
perspective, dependent on their place in this totality.32 As such, if we see the social 
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 'The theory of second nature, to which Hegel already gave a critical tinge, is not lost to a 
negative dialectics. It assumes, tel quel, the abrupt immediacy, the formations which society 
and its evolution present to our thought; and it does this so that analysis may bare its 
mediations to the extent of the immanent difference between phenomena and that which 
they claim to be in themselves.' (ND: 38 / 48) 
32
 'In Mannheim's late version of sociological relativism, which fancies that scientific objectivity 
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totality's determination as rich, we will run into the same problem encountered in 
section 2.9. Namely, that the complex of relations and personal projects engendered by 
self-preservation borne by each individual in the social totality will be relative to their 
position in that totality. As such, the totality's rich determination (through appeal to the 
individual's specific interests, drives, etc.) of the object as it appeared to the individual 
would have different results from individual to individual due to the differing affective 
specificities of different individuals caused by their place in the social totality. By seeing 
the social totality's determination as thin, and hence bypassing the individual's 
specificity, the problem of perspective disappears, and the social totality as a whole can 
be instantiated in the object. 
 In interpreting the totality's dual (delusive and revelatory) determination of the 
immediate appearance of the object as thin, then, we will finally have established a 
theoretic basis for the social universality of non-basic concepts. To show this, I will 
explain the delusive and revelatory determinations in turn as varying consequences of 
a single thin determination. 
 
2.13 Delusive Determination 
As I begin, it would be helpful just to review the meaning of thin determination. Thin 
determination is the influence on the agent which bypasses the individual's affective 
specificity. As such, thin determination does not appeal to or employ the agent's self-
conception, desire, etc. Now, Adorno's claim that the immediate appearance of the 
object is socially determined would seem to fit this model of thin determination. We 
saw, in our recap in section 2.11, that Adorno is able to hold that concepts are 
universally employed and formed according to the agent's desire for self-preservation 
and controlling manipulation of the environment. This is due to the fact that, according 
to Adorno's sociology, society inescapably enforces self-preserving behaviour at all 
times. Being formed according to self-preservation, these concepts are formed in 
accordance with the optimal method of cognizing the manipulable regularities in the 
experiential field (cf. Chapter 1). This serves to posit the process of conceptual 
formation as identical in nature for all agents. 
 If we see the social totality as determining the appearance which the object 
                                                                                                                                               
might be distilled from the different perspectives of the strata of a “freely suspended” 
intelligence, the factors are reversed: the conditioning becomes the conditioned. In fact, the 
law that governs the divergent perspectives is the structure of the social process as a 
preordained whole' (ND: 36 – 37 / 47). Here in the course of his response to Mannheim's 
sociological relativism, Adorno makes clear that society has a non-relative, determinate 
structure which enforces 'divergent perspectives'. This serves as a recognition on Adorno's 
part that although the social totality is a unified whole, it creates divergent perspectives 
within itself. 
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presents immediately to the individual as he encounters it, then we have a clear case 
of social influence on the agent of the thin determination type. By determining the 
regularities the agent's self-preserving concept formation deals with, the social totality 
can determine which concepts are formed. This determination is thin just because the 
agent is not influenced according to his affective specificity, but rather at the founding 
level of his epistemological practice (i.e., forming concepts according to manipulable 
regularity).  As determination takes place at this fundamental level, its influence can 
apply identically to all agents. It determines the material worked by the process of 
conceptual formation, and ensures it is identical for all agents. Whenever two agents 
come to conceptualize an object, their processes of conceptualization and the 
experience of the object from which their concept is drawn are identical. As such, we 
can assert that the resultant concepts will be identical. Using thin determination in 
tandem with Adorno's sociological theory of self-preservation, we have secured the 
universality of non-basic concepts. 
 But how does this thin determination of the object take on a delusive aspect? 
What Adorno needs is a theory of how society can determine the agent's concepts of 
objects and of social phenomena whilst simultaneously concealing and distorting this 
self-same determination. This can be explained by appeal both to Adorno's sociology, 
and his theory of reification. 
 As we saw in section 2.10, Adorno takes reification to be the agent's propensity 
to take the concept to be an exhaustive modeling and accounting for its object, rather 
than merely a pragmatic construct. In order for this reifiying tendency to result in the 
delusive concealment of the true grounds of objects, all that is necessary is for the 
pragmatically relevant properties of a given social phenomenon to diverge from its full 
nature. It is the self-preserving impetus which occasions the formation of concepts, and 
it is the socially determined immediacy of the object which provides the material on 
which this formation of concepts works. So, if for any object its relevance to the agent's 
self-preservation has no reference to, or diverges from, its true social imbrication, the 
resultant concept (having reference only to the object as relevant to immediate self-
preservation) will be delusive, as it will not take in the object's broader mediation with 
the social whole which is not immediately relevant to self-preservation. 
 We might see a clear example of this in Marx's  analysis of 'free' labour. For the 
agent, the absence of indentured labour, the reciprocal signing of a contract upon 
beginning work, and so on, denote the free exchange of labour (Marx 1908: 147). Most 
importantly, in the context of Adorno's philosophy, it is imperative to the agent's survival 
(as well as that of society's) that he behave as if his labour truly were free (Marx 1908: 
147, 152).  As such, society compels the formation of a concept of labour which is 
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arrayed with the idea of its being free. However this is incorrect; the putative 'free 
exchange' of labour is asymmetrical – the purchaser of labour needs to make his 
purchase only in order to enlarge his capital (Marx 1908: 147), whereas the labourer 
must sell his labour in order to provide for his own subsistence (Marx 1908: 152). The 
genuine freedom with which labourer and employer engage in contracts conceals the 
compulsion under which the labourer makes this contract, and the social organization 
which enforces this compulsion. Using this simple test case from Marx, then, we can 
see that if an object is, in its immediacy, determined by the social whole, then the 
concept of the object becomes delusive just because the individual's processing of that 
immediacy only has relevance to his immediate self-interest (selling his labour), which 
ignores the larger social whole in which he and the object are imbricated (the social 
organization which makes selling his labour linked to his survival). 
 This, then, forestalls the following objection. It could be objected that reification 
need not necessarily result in delusive concepts, just because the agent's taking the 
concept to exhaust the object might in fact be contingently an accurate reflection of the 
world as it is. Even though the agent may take his concepts to exhaust the object due 
to reification, it might nevertheless be the case that the object has no properties outside 
those captured by the concept. The above paragraph defeats this objection just 
because, even ignoring Adorno's more complex analyses of the impossibility of 
adequate concepts, we can see that the sufficiency of the concept is necessarily 
precluded by the divergence between immediate self-preservation and the social whole 
within which this self-preservation takes place. 
 I should point out that in the example from Marx, the relevance of self-
preservation is obvious (the need to earn wages). Do not forget, however, that our 
investigation earlier in section 2.6 showed that Adorno theorizes all life as compelled to 
a self-preserving form (DE: 24). As such, the analysis can be repeated for recondite 
phenomena, like cultural artefacts. In these cases, the compelled self-preserving form 
of concept formation works on the apparent immediacy of the object (which is thinly 
determined). The combination of this determined immediacy with the reductive concern 
for modeling regularities ensures that the formed concept will exclude the larger 
context in which the artwork's immediacy came to be so mediated. This is just because 
the larger context of mediation is not immediately relevant to the project of forming self-
preserving concepts, and so is not included in the concept-forming process.  
 So, the combination of thin determination, self-preservation and reification 
coincide to result in the formation of concepts which take themselves to exhaustively 
model a phenomenon, while in fact being in ignorance of the greater social context of 
the determination of the object. This results in what we have called delusive 
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determination. 
 
2.14 Revelatory Determination 
'Revelatory determination' is just the object's ability, once properly related to 
epistemologically, to inform the agent about the social whole which determines it. As 
has been shown above, Adorno clearly commits himself to the existence of such a 
propensity of the object (ND: 47 / 57). While delusive determination instills in the agent 
a distorted understanding of the social whole (due to the determining influence of the 
social whole itself), revelatory determination amounts to the object's making available a 
comprehension of the social whole which caused this delusive determination. This 
revelation is contingent on the agent's breaking the delusive determination and 
attaining an ideal epistemological relationship to the object. Seeing the object's 
immediate appearance, prior to the agent's applying the concept-forming process to it, 
as being constituted by the social totality, straightforwardly provides an explanation for 
this revelatory determination. While the delusive determination conceals the true social 
ground of the object's constitution, nonetheless this true social ground is always 
testified to by the object.33  
 So, this revelatory determination is presupposed by the delusive determination, 
and the revelation of the object's true ground amounts simply to undoing the effects of 
the conjunction of reification and self-preservation, and rediscovering the true 
immediacy of the object. This true immediacy, as it is created by the thin determination 
of the social totality, is in fact mediated, and leads to comprehension of this mediacy – 
'[t]o dialectics, immediacy does not maintain its immediate pose. Instead of becoming 
the ground it becomes a moment' (ND:  40 / 50).  
  
2.15 Ensuring Universality 
So, we have seen that our model of the thin determination of the object by the social 
totality is consistent with the delusive and revelatory determinations which Adorno 
holds to be associated with the object. We now need to examine whether this thin 
determination in fact suffices to secure the social universality of non-basic concepts. 
 We have seen that the self-preserving method of concept formation is 
compelled in every individual in the social whole, just by the social structure which 
enforces self-preserving behaviour in 'life in its entirety' (DE: 24). This, coupled with 
reification, means that we have a universally obtaining method of concept formation. 
                                                 
33
 Remember, it is the object's bearing on its face the true social totality which makes possible 
the concealment of that totality, by virtue of the reductive practice of concept formation 
employed by the agent, together with the effects of reification, ensured by society's 
compelling self-preserving behaviour.  
69 
What this means is that, for each individual, we can know that they will form and 
employ concepts in the same way – the processes are compelled to be identical by 
socially enforced self-preservation, and reification which is a condition of the possibility 
of continuous experience. If we couple this with our account of the thin determination of 
the object by the social totality, we are able to ensure that the concepts formed by 
every agent will be the same. This is just because the social totality determines the 
immediate experiential presentation of the object, for every individual. As such, while 
each individual employs the same conceptual processes, the material upon which 
these processes are put to work (i.e., the experience of the object) is also identical. As 
such, we should expect an identical result.  
 This allows us to explain then, why Adorno can employ the concept of self-
preservation in such a way as to maintain a universally obtaining conceptual array 
regardless of the divergences in the specific behaviour required by each individual's 
self-preservation. This is just because the operation of the self-preserving concept is 
determined thinly and not richly – the social influence does not address itself at the 
level of the individual's affects and self-conceptions, but instead at the basic, pre-
specific level of the individual's constitutive epistemological processes. I take this, then, 
to be a satisfactory solution to the puzzle of how Adorno is able to reconcile the 
contingency of concepts with the necessary universality of conceptual arrays. 
 A further benefit, which will be of cardinal importance in the following Chapters, 
is that this account of determination forms the foundation for Adorno's understanding of 
the nature of aesthetic and philosophical truth, and the relationship obtaining between 
these two kinds of truth. This thought will receive more attention in later Chapters, but 
the essential problem which this theory solves is as follows. Adorno, in his 
interpretation of the artwork, consistently alleges that mere technical analysis of the 
artwork is insufficient. The formal properties of the artwork must be seen in their wider 
socio-historical context. The difficulty with this procedure is simply that it is seems 
unanchored. Dahlhaus, (cited in Paddison 2002) characterizes the problem thusly - 
 
[Adorno's methods -] the formal-analytically individualizing and the socio-
logically generalizing procedure [are supported merely by] verbal analogies 
[which] perform the function of hiding a gap which [his] arguments could not 
close. (Dahlhaus 1987: 244, cited in Paddison 2002: 223) 
 
In other words, Adorno's free translation of aesthetic properties into socio-historical 
contexts which require philosophical interrogation appears to be unwarranted. The shift 
of focus from aesthetic autonomy to sociological heteronomy appears forced. We might 
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twin this problem with Adorno's metalogical analyses – Adorno frequently alleges that 
philosophical truth requires the dissolution of philosophical categories, and their 
translation into a socio-historical account. The same difficulty appears to be at issue. 
Paddison, writing in an aesthetic context, rightly notes that the solution to this difficulty 
is mediation - 
 
[T]he externality to which [Adorno] points, the heteronomous social other 
apparently excluded by the blind autonomy of the work, is conceived as 
simultaneously constituting the material structure of the work itself. 
(Paddison 2002: 223) 
 
However, while Paddison is correct, he is largely silent on how one should understand 
this process of constitution. While he does append salient quotations from Adorno 
concerning the socio-historical pre-formation of aesthetic content, and adds that art-
works are mediated such that any treatment of aesthetic material necessarily involves 
an immanent-critique of the employed aesthetic form (Paddison 2002: 226), Dahlhaus' 
criticism remains not fully answered. This is because Paddison's account, as 
expressed in the paper cited, comes to a close before formulating a thorough theory of 
mediation which can accord both with the universality and necessity which Adorno 
allots to it, and to Adorno's theory of the concept. Our theory of thin determination 
supplies this theory, and allows us to display precisely how the individual object, be it 
aesthetically or philosophically considered, can be immanently socio-historically 
mediated. This Chapter, then, has provided a concrete response to Dahlhaus' criticism 
of Adorno's aesthetics – the comprehension of aesthetic form (and philosophically 
considered objects) necessitates reference to its social context simply because that 
object, as experienced, is determined by the totality. It owes its appearance and 
behaviour to its determination by the social whole – as such, its proper comprehension 
necessitates the transference of the aesthetic or philosophical perspective to the socio-
historical. This will receive further detail in Chapter 4. 
 
2.16 Concept Through the Non-Concept 
At the close of this Chapter, then, we have, through the examination of Adorno's theory 
of the object, been able to close the problem of Adorno's employment of socially 
universal conceptual arrays. Through examining this problem, we have been able to 
further examine Adorno's theory of the social control of conceptuality. Further to 
Chapter 1's establishment of the necessity of conceptuality, we can confidently assert 
that concepts are not only necessary, but necessarily delusive. The socially enforced 
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self-preserving formation of concepts ensures that the agent will be delusively 
determined. The question which will exercise us in the following two Chapters is – how 
is this delusive determination broken?  
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3. – Truth, Texturalism, and Performativity 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous Chapter was dedicated to reconciling the contingent, self-preserving 
nature of the concept with the social universality which Adorno attributes to conceptual 
arrays. While Adorno posited the conceptual mediation of continuous experience as 
necessary, it was only through an  investigation of Adorno's theory of reification (section 
2.10.) and the positing of a process of thin determination (sections 2.11 – 2.16) that we 
were able to posit the conceptual mediation of experience as being identical in form for 
every individual. This universally obtaining form of  conceptual mediation we termed a 
'socially universal conceptual array'.  
 Through expanding and explaining Adorno's reliance on the universality of 
conceptual arrays, we were able to throw into stark relief one of the more unique 
properties of his theory of the concept. This is Adorno's positing of the concept as 
inherently delusive, or misleading. We saw that any continuous experience entertained 
by any individual would be determined – via self-preservation, reification and thin 
determination – to be unable to capture (and to preclude the capture of) the actual 
state of affairs obtaining in the world. Moreover, we saw that – due to the nature of 
concepts and that threefold influence on the concept – this state of affairs was not 
contingent, but in fact necessary. The conceptual mediation of experience was not 
merely necessary, then, but necessarily delusive. 
 It is this combination of necessity and delusion which provides the motivating 
problem of this Chapter. We appear to be in a position where the nature of the 
conceptual mediation of one's experience precludes the expression or cognition of the 
true, and the nature of the determining grounds of those concepts prevents any attempt 
to jettison these delusive concepts in favour of some new, non-falsifying set. 
 The governing problem of this Chapter, then, will be the apparent impossibility 
of instantiating the true given the necessary mediation of experience by thoroughly 
delusive, coercively determined, concepts. While it may seem that Adorno (or my 
reading of Adorno) has here come to an impasse, in fact this difficulty does admit of a 
solution. In laying out this solution, Adorno's theory of truth will finally find full 
expression. We will be able to give an account of what the true is, what it means for a 
given entity to be true, and of the exact manner in which one must instantiate the true. 
This will, I take it, serve as a completion of the project of arriving at an understanding of 
Adorno's theory of truth. This will have been executed largely in a theoretical context, 
as a method of understanding the truth of philosophical assertions. However, I believe 
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that Adorno's theory of truth is intended to apply equally – and in the same way – to 
both philosophical and aesthetic instantiations of truth. Chapter 4 will constitute an 
attempt to extend the theory of truth outlined here into the context of Adorno's aesthetic 
theory. 
 
3.2 Truth via the Concept / Texturalism 
We saw in Chapter 1 that we cannot posit the truth as being instantiated, expressed or 
cognized outside of conceptuality, as Adorno has posited the concept as a condition of 
the possibility of continuous experience. Bearing this in mind, we see that the 
presentation, comprehension and instantiation of truth in experience must be, for 
Adorno, effected via the concept. However, as summarized above and displayed in full 
in Chapter 2, the form of the conceptual mediation of experience is coercively 
determined to take a given form. Moreover, this conceptual structure is inherently 
delusive. This gives rise to the odd combination of necessity and delusiveness – 
experience is simultaneously necessarily conceptually mediated, and necessarily 
delusive.34  
 As this mediation of experience by a delusive conceptual array is necessary, 
the presentation of truth cannot take place outside of this array. It would seem, then, 
that we are forced to try and effect a presentation of the true via a conceptual array 
which necessarily occludes the true. While this may sound counter-intuitive it is in fact, 
I argue, the position which Adorno holds. This Chapter will be dedicated to explicating 
how Adorno is able to hold that necessarily delusive concepts can be employed in such 
a way as to instantiate the truth.  
 
3.3 Texturalism 
This theory of truth, wherein the truth is the product of the employment of necessarily 
truth-hostile concepts in such a way as to induce them to instantiate the true, is highly 
complex. In essence, however, this theory holds the true as being effected by a 
combination of negativity and performativity.35 For short, I will term this theory of truth 
'texturalism'.36 In short, it holds the true to be not a given assertion, but a conceptual 
                                                 
34
 Due to the influence of self-preservation, reification, and thin determination, as summarized 
in the introduction, and explained in full in Chapter 2. 
35
 Please note that the term 'performativity' as I employ is intended to have no reference 
whatsoever to the Austinian sense of performativity and performative utterances. 
36
 This name is derived from Negative Dialectics. Adorno twice lays out his theory's rejection of 
conventional forms of truth instantiation in favour of performance and 'texture' - 
 'The open thought has no protection against the risk of decline into randomness; nothing 
assures it of a saturation with the matter that will suffice to surmount that risk. But the 
consistency of its performance, the density of its texture [Gewebes], helps the thought to hit 
the mark.' (ND: 35 / 45) 
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performance which engages the delusive concepts which govern experience and leads 
them to break-down (through contradiction, antinomy or aporia) and display their own 
insufficiency. As I will show, this performance is not reducible to a simple assertion of 
the insufficiency of concepts, nor will its being performative entail a reduction in the 
complexity of the true. Rather, Adorno will be able to posit the grounds of the possibility 
of this conceptual performance as being sufficiently complex as to meaningfully link up 
with his own complex philosophical practice.37 
 The texturalism which my reading imputes to Adorno is, I should think, a fairly 
unique approach to the theory of truth, both in terms of what Adorno takes to be the 
methodological requirements for instantiating the truth, and the attendant view which 
Adorno takes on the ontological status of the true. As has been mentioned, this 
texturalist theory of truth is constituted by the combination of negativity and 
performativity. While I believe that these two constituents are mutually conditioning,  as 
a means of making Adorno's texturalist theory of truth clearer, I should like to display, 
with exegetical support, these two features in turn. 
 
3.4 Negativity 
The assertion that Adorno's philosophy is 'negative' is, perhaps, an over familiar 
assertion. The assertion is certainly well represented in the Adorno literature. However, 
the precise meaning (and consequence) of this negativity is not always fully brought 
out. This is due in part to the competing connotations of 'negativity'. The most salient of 
these are what I shall call for economy the 'Hegelian' and the 'political'. It is important 
that we disentangle these notions. 
 The Hegelian connotation of terming Adorno's philosophy 'negative' lies in its 
evoking  Hegel's employment of determinate negation (most relevantly in the 
Phenomenology). In this Hegelian form of negativity, one approaches the true not by 
positing a new, self-contained account, but rather by critically rejecting the pre-given. 
Moreover, this rejection of the pre-given is accomplished without appeal to some 
theoretic content external to the pre-given under consideration. In short, it is an 
immanent critique, which effects its critique using only those standards presupposed by 
the subject of its critique. What it is vital to note is that this negation is not merely a 
simple denial of some pre-given theory or information. Rather, the critical rejection 
which is effected is highly informative. As such, Hegel's negativity here does not simply 
                                                                                                                                               
 'The crux is what happens in [thought], not a thesis or position – the texture [das Gewebe] , 
not the deductive or inductive course of one-track minds.' (ND: 33 / 44) 
37
 This is, of course, vital; if the grounds of the possibility of this performance of the true bore 
no meaningful relationship to Adorno's philosophical practice (which he takes to be true), 
there would be any number of methodological problems entailed. 
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abolish a given position, but rather gives a full and rich display of the grounds of the 
insufficiency of the subject of that critique.  
 For example, Hegel's critique of sense-certainty (i.e., the position that the world 
'contains nothing but sheer particulars that can be grasped immediately' (Westphal 
1988: 84) without theoretical mediation) in the Phenomenology produces a detailed 
display of the complex grounds of the incoherence of that position. The falsity of sense-
certainty is not merely displayed, then, but is unpacked, this unpacking resulting in a 
highly informative and complex philosophical work. Also important to note is that this 
productive form of negation conducts itself by way of an ongoing critique of pre-given 
philosophical and theoretical positions, and abstains from any giving any 
presuppositions of its own.38 It is this process of negation resulting in an informative 
and thorough critique of that which is negated, which conducts itself without relying on 
any first philosophy, which I intend to signify by 'Hegelian negativity'. 
 This must be sharply differentiated from the positive, productive moment that 
Hegel attributed to negation (for example, he held his critique of sense-certainty to not 
only be informative, but productive of a further form of consciousness, namely 
perception) which must not be attributed to Adorno. Negation, for Adorno, does not 
have a positive moment, and much of his criticism of Hegel centres about this 
disagreement (e.g. ND: 158 – 161 / 160 - 163). 
 If we were to interpret Adorno's philosophy as 'negative' in this sense, then, we 
would not allege that Adorno was a Hegelian, nor that his work was in any way 
meaningfully identical to Hegel's, but rather merely that Adorno's philosophy refused to 
posit any foundational truth of its own. In effecting its critiques of other positions, and 
confining itself to these critiques, Adorno takes care not to employ any explanatorily or 
methodologically basic 'first philosophy'.39 In addition, these critiques are negatively 
informative, and go beyond mere blunt denials. 
 The second sense of 'negative' – the 'political' – is significantly broader, 
signifying a broader rejection of a given philosophy, political position or creed without 
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 'Hegel's defense of his own views about knowledge rests on their resulting from an internal, 
self-critical assessment of every form of consciousness and on that basis rejecting all 
alternative accounts of knowledge and its objects [...] he seeks to eliminate the errors but 
retain the insights of less adequate views through a self-critical process of revision.' 
(Westphal 1988: 85) 
39
 '[D]ialectics amounts to thinking so that the thought form will no longer turn its objects into 
immutable ones, into objects that remain the same […] For [logical problems of identity ...] 
technical terminology stands ready with the customary formula of “identity in nonidentity” [...] 
But such a purely formal reversal would leave room for the subreption that dialectics is prima 
philosophia after all [...] The test of the turn to nonidentity is its performance; if it remained 
declarative it would be revoking itself.' (ND: 154 – 155 / 157). The extent of Adorno's 
rejection of any first philosophy ('prima philosophia') is such that any static formal statement 
of dialectical principles is invalid as it would cause dialectical philosophy, in Adorno's view, to 
revert to first philosophy by using pre-given formal principles. 
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any attendant commitment to the immanent nature of that criticism. Unlike Hegelian 
negativity, then, this latter sense is not incompatible with a commitment to a 'first 
philosophy' or foundational set of truths. This 'political' form of negativity is well-
represented in Finlayson's précis of Honneth's characterization of critical theory - 
 
A critical theory of society must at least give an account of what is wrong 
with the social world or show that it is bad in some significant way and that it 
ought not to be like it is. (Finlayson 2009: 12) 
 
This principle, ostensibly a necessary condition for the exercise of a critical theory, is 
recognizably negative in the political sense. It is predicated only on a rejection of the 
obtaining society, without an attending condition (as would be necessary for Hegelian 
negativity) that this rejection would avoid being based on any 'first philosophy'. 
 As should be apparent, these two types of negativity come apart. For example, 
should one reject Mannheim's sociology due to a methodologically basic commitment  
to, say, scientific socialism, one would satisfy the latter, political, sense of negativity, but 
fail to satisfy the Hegelian form of negativity. It is quite easy to accidentally conflate 
these two meanings of 'negativity'. To be clear, when employing the terms 'negative' 
and 'negativity' with reference to Adorno's 'negative philosophy' I only mean to refer to 
negativity in its broadly Hegelian sense. Which is to say, I hold that Adorno identifies 
the true as nothing over and above the negation of the pre-given. As already asserted, 
this is not to deny that this negation will be informative – the negation of the pre-given 
(be it sensory, philosophical or cultural) will result in the pre-given being unpacked, and 
displaying the full complexity of those grounds which gave rise to its falsity. However, it 
is important to note that for Adorno the true never outstrips this unpacking of falsity to 
become a concrete, simple assertion of truth.40  
 So, in referring to the 'negativity' of Adorno's theory of truth, I am signifying that 
Adorno does not believe that the true is positively expressible. This reading of Adorno 
as negative is, as I have said, not new. However, I hope now to explain and reinforce 
this position of Adorno's, with reference to the preceding two Chapters. This should 
afford us some support and explanation of Adorno's negativity, such that we need not 
take it as explanatorily basic. 
 We have established that Adorno's theory of truth is negative, and we 
interpreted this negativity broadly in line with the 'Hegelian' sense of negativity. In order 
                                                 
40
  It is here that Adorno's employment of negativity diverges strongly from Hegel. While Hegel 
believes that negativity has a positive moment (achieved through the 'negation of the 
negation'), Adorno by contrast believes that negation is shorn of any positive moment.  
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to lend theoretical support to this aspect of Adorno's philosophy, I will now demonstrate 
that the nature of the delusive conceptual array (detailed in the previous Chapter) is 
such that it necessarily closes off any positive expression of the true.  
 I should like to do this by elimination. I will consider all the plausible ways in 
which the truth could be expressed positively, and demonstrate that – due to Adorno's 
theory of the concept – these ways would necessarily fail. I see the plausible ways in 
which the negativity of Adorno's philosophy could be circumvented as threefold. First, 
one might attempt to mitigate or deny the concept's status as necessarily delusive. If 
this were accomplished, one would be able to lay out a set of concepts, or 
circumstances in which concepts could be used, such that the truth could be expressed 
positively. This way of introducing a positive account of truth will be discounted in 
section 3.5. Secondly, one might attempt to circumvent the problem of the delusiveness 
of concepts by voluntarily changing one's epistemological practice. In other words, one 
might intentionally form new concepts, which do not suffer from the same problem of 
being delusive as the concepts presently employed. This possibility is discounted in 
section 3.6. Thirdly, one might attempt to express the truth positively just via simple 
predicative statements about objects. One might correct a simple misapplication of a 
predicate to an object (for example – 'in fact, that tower is not octagonal, but 
hexagonal'), or make simple assertions about the world ('grass is green'). Discounting 
this possibility (in section 3.7) will also entail a consideration of the relationship of 
Adorno's theory of truth to the truth conditions of simple propositions (see section 3.8).  
These three candidate accounts having been defeated, I will then take it that Adorno's 
theory of the concept comprehensively excludes any possibility of the positive 
expression of the truth. Hence, we will have given a full philosophical account of and 
support to the negativity of Adorno's theory of truth. This will prepare the ground for 
consideration of the other constituent of Adorno's texturalist theory of truth – namely, 
performativity. 
 
3.5 Mitigating Universal Delusion 
The first and most promising way of construing Adorno's philosophy as allowing for the 
possibility of the positive expression of the true would be to mitigate the universality 
and necessity which I have attached to the delusiveness of concepts. One might think 
that this is flatly impossible; after all, in the previous Chapter– section 2.10 –  I 
construed reification as an inescapable element of conceptuality, for Adorno. However, 
reification's being necessary does not entail the necessity of conceptual delusiveness. 
Were these reified concepts freed from the social imposition of self-preserving 
behaviour, they would cease to be delusive. The reasons for this as are follows. Firstly, 
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were conceptual employment to be freed from self-preserving urgency, it would no 
longer limit itself to being merely an 'idea-tool' (DE: 31) intended to make possible the 
goal of preserving one's self. Rather, it would be free to lend experience continuity 
while fully respecting the true constitution of the experienced object.  
 In the previous Chapter – section 2.14 – I argued that the presented immediacy 
of the object, constituted by social thin determination, was revelatory. Properly 
cognized and perceived, it lead to the comprehension of the social whole which gave 
rise to it. As such, the proper and false understanding of an object are not differentiated 
by the absence and presence of thin determination, respectively, but rather by the 
proper interrogation of that determination. As such, if the agent's process of concept 
formation were not instrumentalized by self-preservation, it would have the latitude to 
properly perceive and interrogate the immediacy presented to it. And, if our account in 
the previous Chapter is correct, such considered interrogation of immediacy would 
necessarily lead to the web of mediacy giving rise to that immediacy. 
 The thought then might be that as concepts are drawn from the presented 
properties of the object, and as the non-self-preserving comprehension of the object 
leads inherently to its mediating context, the concepts which would be formed without 
reference to self-preservation would not be insufficient concepts which need to be 
dialectically employed in order to be true; rather, they would be some unconventional 
species of concept which directly exhausted and expressed the true mediated nature of 
objects, without having to be dialectically employed in 'constellations', the sole purpose 
of which is mitigate the insufficiency of conventional concepts.41 
 In this case, reification would not result in the concept's falsifying the object. The 
agent would take these non-conventional concepts to model the object exhaustively – 
and, indeed, they would do so. Reification, then, would secure, rather than prevent, the 
employment of those concepts in such a way as to make possible the positive 
expression of the true. The removal of the imposition of self-preserving behaviour 
would be sufficient to remove the delusiveness of the concept – it would not be 
necessary that thin determination be removed.42  
 So, if the social imposition of self-preservation is ever less than total,  we should 
expect the formation of some given concept or set of concepts which can 
                                                 
41
 'The determinate flaw in every concept makes it necessary to cite others: this is the font of 
the only constellations which inherited some of the hope of the name [i.e., an expression 
which exhausted its object].' (ND: 53 / 62). See also (Sherman 2007: 243). 
42
 It is also desirable that we do not commit ourselves to the possibility of the removal of the 
thin determination of objects. To return to O'Connor's apposite phrase, the concept does not 
have 'inherent conceptuality' (O'Connor 2004: 59, see also O'Connor 2004: 50). This being 
so, in speaking of objects 'as they are' without the influence of social content we may be 
appealing to a concept of naturalness which Adorno's philosophy would not be well-disposed 
towards (cf Adorno 1985: 28). 
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unproblematically express the truth positively, by virtue of their being in complete 
conformity with their object. 
 However, it would seem that there is in fact no leeway to interpret Adorno as 
allowing for the existence of individuals who escape being determined as constantly 
concerned with their own self-preservation. His assertions appear intended to be 
universal in scope, and are certainly not made tentatively - 
 
Individuals define themselves now only as things, statistical elements, 
successes or failures. Their criterion is self-preservation, successful or 
unsuccessful adaption to the objectivity of their function [...] (DE: 21) 
 
In the bourgeois economy the social work of each individual is mediated by 
the principle of the self […] But the more heavily the process of self-
preservation is based on the bourgeois division of labor, the more it enforces 
the self-alienation of individuals, who must mold themselves to the technical 
apparatus body and soul [...] By subordinating life in its entirety to the 
requirements of its preservation, the controlling minority guarantees, with its 
own security, the continuation of the whole. (DE: 23 - 24, emphasis mine)  
 
If we take these statements, along with my exegesis of them in the previous Chapter, at 
face value, then it would not appear plausible to posit a mitigation of the universally 
delusive nature of concepts. However, there is a well-established line of thought in 
Adorno scholarship which alleges precisely that we should not always take Adorno's 
assertions at face value (cf. (Düttman 2007: 15 – 21), (Leppert 2002: 64)). Due to a few 
scattered assertions made by Adorno concerning the usefulness of hyperbole (e.g, 
(DE:  92) .(MM: 126 - 128)), it has been asserted that we should understand these 
apparent endorsements of hyperbole as applying self-reflexively to Adorno's own work. 
Rose provides an example of this type of reading - 
 
[Adorno] warns that “dialectical knowledge is taken all too literally by its 
opponents”. If someone asks that we do not take him literally, then we 
should, presumably, not take the advice not to take him literally, literally. To 
follow the original injunction consistently means both that we must 
sometimes not take it literally, and that sometimes we must. (Rose 1978: 17, 
emphasis mine) 
 
While acknowledging this may seem a 'chaotic principle for exegesis', Rose 
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claims that 'Adorno usually undermines his own hyperbole and auxesis quite 
clearly himself' (Rose 1978: 17). However, this putative 'undermining' which 
serves to tip us off to when Adorno is employing hyperbole is constituted by the 
presence of 'contradictory and self-defeating' (Rose 1978: 18) moments in 
Adorno's account. The difficulty here is that understanding given elements of 
Adorno's account as 'contradictory and self-defeating' is, in a number of places, 
wholly dependent on a specific, complex way of interpreting Adorno. As such, 
what Rose takes as evidence of Adorno's not intending to be taken literally – 
contradictions in Adorno's work – can, on other interpretations (such as mine) be 
seen as not in fact contradictory at all – and hence do not demand to not be taken 
literally. An excellent example of this is provided by Rose herself. She takes 'the 
prevalence of ideas such as “the total society”, “the end of the individual”, and 
“complete reification”' to be intentionally hyperbolic as they 'imply no critical 
consciousness is possible' (Rose 1978: 18). However, with the account of 
performativity laid out below, this apparent contradiction disappears and, on my 
reading, there is no need to interpret Adorno as hyperbolic. 
 The problem here, then, is that my account of Adorno would appear to be 
vulnerable to an account which posits his core concepts as intentionally 
hyperbolic (this further account being parasitic on a given interpretation of 
Adorno). This seems a plausibly threatening objection. As such, rather than 
simply denying the usefulness or cogency of asserting that Adorno's philosophy is 
thoroughly or partially hyperbolic, I should like to point out why we should not 
want to understand Adorno, in this instance, as being hyperbolic. 
 The dissatisfaction which I feel with this line of thought –  that Adorno's 
philosophy is in some details hyperbolic –  stems from my concern that this objection is 
in essence unanswerable. It is clear that my reading of Adorno cannot understand him 
as being hyperbolic. The previous Chapter has posited, with clear exegetical support, 
that reification is inherent and hence universal, that thin determination has universal 
scope, and that self-preserving behaviour is sociologically made to obtain universally. If 
any of these universal influences (reification, thin determination, sociological structure) 
were construed as hyperbolic, then my reading would fail to satisfy its desideratum, 
which is to provide support for Adorno's analyses of truth, which are both socio-
historically relative and universally binding. Put differently, along with O'Connor, I hold 
that Adorno's whole project is to sustain a theory of truth as simultaneously socio-
historically relative and yet objective.43 Were any of these social determinations to be 
                                                 
43
 O'Connor gives a concise explanation of this facet of Adorno's theory of truth with relevance 
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not in actuality universal, then Adorno's analyses would cease to hold with their 
apparent universal social scope, and would instead apply only to those agents who 
happen to have the same form of conceptual mediation. In this sense, then, my reading 
of Adorno cannot allow for hyperbole and simultaneously be coherent with its 
desideratum.44 However, the proponent of the theory of Adorno's being hyperbolic can 
posit my desideratum to be a misreading of Adorno's true, less ambitious, project. Such 
an allegation could not appeal to the text I employ – as I hope to have shown, Adorno 
does appear to commit himself explicitly to universal scope – but rather to the scattered 
endorsements of the use of exaggeration, and some ostensible concealed motive of 
hyperbole lying behind Adorno's apparently sincere assertions. This being so, there is a 
sense in which any argument ceases to be fruitful, as my antagonist appeals to 
something to which neither of us are privy (viz., what Adorno 'really meant'). I cannot, 
then, disprove or refute the allegation that Adorno's true intent was to be hyperbolic. I 
can, however, doubt whether a reading of Adorno as being hyperbolic in this instance is 
coherent. 
 At the head of this section I outlined the consequences of reading Adorno as in 
any detail employing hyperbole concerning the delusiveness attributed to the concept. 
Were this to be the case, the resultant concept would not necessitate a dialectical 
employment (such as we see in Adorno's philosophy) but rather could be employed 
directly, as it were, in order to accurately and fully express the truth of its object. While, 
as I have said, I cannot refute the idea that Adorno was hyperbolic in such a fashion, I 
believe I can provide a response. This is simply the fact that Adorno's entire philosophy 
appears committed to the revelation of the falsifying mediation inherent in immediacy 
and, vitally, the dialectical employment of concepts in order to reveal this fact. These 
'constellations' which Adorno continually employs do not correspond to the direct 
positive expression of a given truth, but rather the complex mediation of any given 
number of concepts, none of which on their own serve to exhaust and completely 
express their object. As such, Adorno's philosophy is at no point conducted by the 
direct employment of a concept – rather, concepts are always employed as if inherently 
delusive and in need of dialectical correction.  
 The point, then, is that while it is possible to interpret Adorno as hyperbolic with 
regard to the universal delusiveness of concepts, it is not plausible. It is not plausible, 
                                                                                                                                               
to Adorno's analysis of freedom (O'Connor 2004: 60). 
44
 In truth, I also doubt that Adorno in fact intends his own account to be self-contradictory at 
all, but it is not important that I argue this here. Finlayson provides an enjoyably blunt 
rebuttal to Rose's line of thought – '[W]e must not fall into the trap of thinking that because 
[Adorno & Horkheimer] have a dialectical approach (which they do) they welcome 
inconsistency or contradiction in their own theory (which they do not).' (Finlayson 2009: 35) 
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simply because the entirety of Adorno's philosophical practice appears predicated on 
the inherent and universal fallibility of concepts. 
 As such, I will take it that this suffices to rule out the first form of positivity which 
could have been seen as compatible with Adorno's account. Namely, the view that his 
positing concepts as universally determined and delusive may have been hyperbolic. If 
that view had held true, there would have been some privileged conceptual area, free 
from self-preservation, wherein concepts would be wholly benign and allow for an 
uncomplicated positive expression of the true. However, as I have shown, such a 
reading of Adorno is needlessly contentious, and sits uneasily with his methodology. 
 This first attempt to secure positivity on Adorno's account  was made within his 
account, as an attempt to demonstrate some pre-existing area of Adorno's account 
which could allow for a positive expression of the truth. In what follows, I will consider 
two attempts to force Adorno's account into allowing for the positivity of the true.  
 
3.6 Adding Concepts 
The first of these attempts to force Adorno's philosophy into making space for an 
unproblematic method of the positive expression of the true consists in the attempt to 
introduce new, unproblematic concepts into the conceptual array of the agent. This 
proposed method of introducing a conduit for the unproblematic positive expression of 
truth into Adorno's account is as follows.  
 While the previous section has demonstrated that Adorno's philosophy is 
plausibly non-hyperbolic, and intended to be conclusive in its positing of concepts as 
delusive, this does not necessarily preclude an attempt to introduce non-delusive 
concepts. Rather, one could understand Adorno's account as assuredly non-hyperbolic 
and yet nonetheless not comprehensive. One could understand Adorno's account as 
accurate concerning the types of concept with which we are conventionally acquainted, 
but in fact not germane to some other form of concept, which is not vulnerable to these 
difficulties. In essence, then, one might respond to Adorno's analysis of conceptuality 
by formulating some putatively different type of concept which could be employed by 
the agent which was not vulnerable to the delusive influences Adorno identifies. This 
new concept would be such that, ostensibly, it would be perform the same function as 
the old concept (mediating experience, and so on) while not being vulnerable to the 
same difficulties (of falsifying experience, and so on). Should this be accomplished, 
concepts could be employed without thereby falsifying their objects, and thereby would 
serve as conduits for the positive expression of truth without falsification.  
 It is not particularly important exactly how such a new concept would be 
constituted – whether it remained unable to exhaust the object's full specificity but 
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inherently made this state of affairs plain to the agent (and hence avoided falsifying the 
object), or was in fact in some manner able to exhaust the object, etc. There is a 
feature of Adorno's account which allows us to rule out in principle the formation of any 
such concept which is able to grasp its object in a non-falsifying manner. 
 This general feature of Adorno's account has already been set out in full in 
Chapter 2. This general feature is Adorno's theory of reification, and the universality of 
thin determination and self-preservation. For Adorno, reification is a constitutive 
element of agency. Reification necessitates the mistaking of a concept for something 
which straightforwardly exhausts its object. As reification is constitutive for agency, and 
necessary for the conceptual mediation which creates continuous experience (cf. 
section 2.10), even if the addition of a new concept to the agent's conceptual array 
were possible, the agent would necessarily take the new concept – precisely by virtue 
of reification – to exhaust its object. This discounts the possibility of a concept which 
could prevent its being delusive by virtue of presenting to the agent the incompleteness 
of its grasp of the object. 
 However, this does of course still leave open the possibility of a concept which 
takes itself to be exhausting an object while actually accomplishing this. However, this 
possibility is in turn ruled out by the interaction of self-preservation and thin 
determination. This has already been demonstrated in Chapters 1 and 2. To 
recapitulate briefly, self-preservation forces the agent into forming a concept from the 
presented, manipulable regularities of a given object. However, the presented 
immediacy of an object is itself determined by the social whole, and in such a form as 
to obscure its true mediated social nature. As such, the concept necessarily models 
only the presented regularities which are germane to the individual's self-preservation, 
and so does not model the full mediated complexity of the object. Combined with the 
influence of reification, the concept will take itself to be exhaustively modeling the 
object which it in fact is only a partial reflection of. 
 Just because Adorno's theory of reification, self-preservation and thin 
determination is not hyperbolic, then, the formation of a concept which is not subject to 
these influences (and thereby not delusive) cannot be coherently posited. 
 
3.7 Primitive Correspondence 
We may feel that Adorno should introduce an account of the true as positive just 
because we have an intuitive grasp on a truth-apt practice which is both positive, and 
apparently employed universally. This practice is what I shall call 'primitive 
correspondence', by which I mean the everyday practice of making assertions about 
the properties of objects and, moreover, the disagreements which these assertions can 
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entail.45  
 There are two problems introduced by this practice. Firstly, if Adorno is correct 
that truth is entirely negative, we need an explanation as to why the simple assertion 
'grass is green' fails to be true. (As a corollary, we need an explanation of why a theory 
of truth which excludes such apparently unproblematic statements as true is desirable). 
Secondly, one might be worried by the fact that disagreements over such statements 
only seem to be possible if all of the interlocutors  possess and employ an 
understanding of the truth as positively expressible. We decide between the two  
statements 'grass is green' and 'grass is red' just by testing these assertions either 
against the world, or against what we reliably know to be the case about objects. 
Neither of these procedures seem workable if we see predication as in some way 
inherently delusive, problematized or divested of any truth whatsoever. This latter 
problem, then, sharpens the issue. It would appear that a positive theory of the true is 
central to much of what we might reasonably term basic human behaviour (public 
speech about the world). These simple public statements about the world seem 
inherently bound up with the presumption that they are made true straightforwardly by 
correspondence with the way the world is. I have named this presumption and 
propositional practice 'primitive correspondence'. Adorno has to either a) give a 
compelling reason to in fact see this behaviour as false in a meaningful sense (which 
would seem a tall order) or b) provide some argument for that positive standard of 
truth's not interfering with his commitment to the true as being wholly negative. 
 As perhaps befits a dialectical philosopher, Adorno's account in fact demands 
that we satisfy both of these (apparently mutually exclusive) requirements at once. I will 
do this in the following section. 
 
3.8 The Attenuation of the True 
The entirely reasonable criticism which is being addressed to Adorno is, given his 
wholly negative theory of truth, how can his theory of truth apply to conventional 
propositions like 'grass is green'? Being wholly negative, it would appear to be unable 
to give a determinate account of the traditional concerns of a theory of truth concerning 
propositions about the world, beyond simply positing them as false. This seems to be a 
culpable neglect of the intricacy both of the linguistic structure of simple predication, 
and of the requirements of any conventional linguistic behaviour (ordinary language 
                                                 
45
 The kinds of practices involving propositions which we might think should be 
uncomplicatedly true of course includes more than mere primitive correspondence. However, 
I choose to engage primitive correspondence alone, as a test case, as the reason for its 
falsity (the holistic theory of falsity) easily relates to and falsifies all other forms of linguistic 
practices. 
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use seems to stand in need of a theory of truth as positive). It is of course important to 
note that Adorno operates outside of the presently conventional 'analytic' philosophical 
tradition, and hence no more explicitly addresses questions of propositional content 
than Hegel or Fichte. (Excepting certain modern readings of these philosophers – e.g. 
Brandom). However, this context can only be allowed to explain differences in 
emphasis – if Adorno's philosophy is without defence in his neglect of simple 
propositional forms of truth, we might consider it seriously compromised. 
 What would constitute a philosophical defence of this neglect? If Adorno has a 
readily available set of philosophically motivating reasons why conventional 
propositions are either not worthy of philosophical investigation, or in fact fall below the 
definition of truth that we should want to use (as opposed to any definition of truth that 
there may be), then we might view this neglect as in fact legitimated. Conventional 
propositions would be posited as not satisfying the basic requirements of truth for the 
theory of truth which Adorno has identified as optimal. This would not be to deny that 
positing these conventional propositions as true in some sense or from some 
perspective would be workable, or even useful. However, it would remain sub-optimal. 
 Such a defence does seem available to Adorno. It is constituted by Adorno's 
theory of mediation. Adorno will allege that any simple proposition which presents itself 
as the sole focus of any 'serious' theory of truth or, moreover, as being 'true' in a 
straightforward sense, has placed itself outside of Adorno's theoretical context and is 
thereby invalid. This is so just because, for Adorno, the experience and cognition which 
is the grounds of the possibility of those propositions is mediated. Now, in the course of 
this account we have already had frequent reference to Adorno's employment of 
mediation. However, in this context I think it is important to carefully delineate and go 
over the precise nature of the mediation which Adorno posits as relevant to the 
meaning and knowability of simple propositions.  
 The difficulty presently being considered is that simple propositions, which are 
checked against the world, appear to be true in a straightforward sense. I have claimed 
that Adorno is able to discount these propositions as true due to his theory of 
mediation. However, in this instance the employment of mediation is not unique to 
Adorno's  account. I should like to lay out the kind of mediation found in a 'conventional' 
account, before drawing out the salient differences of Adorno's employment of 
mediation.  
 Now, of course on any account of perception, save perhaps naïve realism, the 
experiential background which serves as the grounds of the possibility of the 
expression and understanding of simple propositions is mediated in some sense of the 
word. Which is to say that this experience is itself dependent on some mediating factor 
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which does not show up immediately in that experience. Salient examples of such 
mediation would be any representationalist account of perception, or any account 
which makes use of epistemic intermediaries. In either of these cases, the presented 
experience is mediated by a mechanism (be it the formation of representations, or the 
operation of the epistemic intermediaries) and set of conditions (the relationship 
obtaining between perceiver and perceived) which either make possible or constitute 
that experience. The experience itself is not immediately informative of that mediation 
(which is not to say that it cannot be interrogated to reveal it); the experience instead 
presents itself as complete, self-contained and self-constituting. 
 These mediating factors are capable of breaking down, and hence creating 
false experiences and attendant false propositions. However, under ideal conditions 
these mediating factors are not themselves held to bear truth-content – the resultant 
experiences and propositions are. They are a pre-cursor to truth-relevant propositions 
and states, which are themselves checked against objects and states of affairs.46  
 On this conventional understanding of the role of mediation, mediation serves 
as a vehicle or mechanism which inculcates a relationship between speakers, sayings 
and objects. There are two key consequences of understanding mediation in this 
manner. First, the proposition 'grass is green', so long as it expresses an obtaining 
state of affairs, cannot be seen to be false in any meaningful way. Secondly, we should 
expect these types of propositions to be the primary topic of any serious theory of truth. 
On this understanding of mediation, then, Adorno's negative theory of the true, as 
applied to basic propositions, seems unintelligible, and his failure to take up the 
linguistic turn in philosophy appears culpable. 
 So, we have seen the conventional understanding of the role of mediation, as 
well as the reliance of the criticism of Adorno on that understanding of mediation. I now 
want to lay out Adorno's understanding of the role of mediation in this issue, and why 
this allows him to intelligibly both posit basic predicative statements as meaningfully 
false, and as allowably true in a way which does not problematize his theory of the true 
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 This may sound false in light of – speaking very broadly – the lines of thought found in 
Davidson, Quine or the later Wittgenstein. For these philosophers, the truth of an assertion is 
ultimately referred to a community of language users. However, there remains a key 
congruency. The mediating operation of the community / language game is transparent and 
not truth-hostile (cf my consideration of Adorno's 'agonic' mediation below) and the criterion 
created by that community / language game reverts to reference. The community / language 
game functions as the pre-condition of truth-relevant speech, and defines the horizon of that 
speech, but does not complexly  undermine or interfere with that truth-relevant speech once 
constituted. Due to the absence of agonic mediation, the criteria of truth reverts to an 
individual and an object, with the community of language users serving as a determining 
influence which sets the horizon of truth-relevant speech (or sets the language game), but 
which does not problematize that speech. Once the community has erected a truth-apt 
practice, the truth internal to this practice reverts to propositions and states of affairs. 
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as negative.  
 As we have seen in the previous two Chapters, Adorno not only sees 
experience as conceptually mediated, but as in fact determined by the socio-historical 
whole. This has been covered in detail in Chapter 2, and is too intricate to be reviewed 
in detail at this point. Adorno takes any given experience to be determined by and 
dependent upon a totality, composed of various social, historical and intellectual 
processes. We saw that the totality determines the object by virtue of constituting the 
experience of the object. While this determination produces the delusive immediacy of 
the object (cf. section 2.13), this determination, related to properly, becomes revelatory 
of the totality which produced it (cf. section 2.14). So, Adorno is committed to the idea 
that any experience, investigated properly, will necessarily lead to comprehension of 
the larger context which gave rise to it. To put it bluntly, for Adorno no single proposition 
can be isolated as obtaining singly between an individual and a state of affairs. Rather, 
the nature of the proposition that one is trying to comprehend in full forcibly transfers 
comprehension away from the individual proposition to the social and conceptual whole 
which is the grounds of the possibility of this proposition. 
 This is a motivating philosophical argument as to why Adorno can see isolated 
propositions as falling below a standard of truth he should want to use. It legitimates an 
attempt to comprehend not propositions, but propositions together with their mediating 
context. However, as yet it does not legitimate positing these basic propositions as 
meaningfully false. After all (as briefly explored in footnote 45) there are a number of 
theories of truth which see individual propositions as significantly mediated by a larger 
governing epistemic context. Moreover, these theories of truth agree that exhaustive 
comprehension of a proposition goes beyond consideration of the speaker and the 
object, and necessitates exploration of the mediating context. Moreover, for these 
individuals this mediating context is supra-individual (for example, a community of 
language-users). However, for these theories of truth the proposition itself is not 
thereby false – rather, the grounds of its being true are simply expanded.  
 What is it, then, that allows Adorno to posit these basic propositions as 
meaningfully false? The difference lies not in the scope of mediation, but in the nature 
of mediation which Adorno allots to experience. You will recall that for all conventional 
uses of mediation (up to and including Quine et al.) the mediating influence is both 
transparent – while it does not show up in the experience, it can be easily interrogated 
– and not truth-hostile (outside of sub-optimal conditions where delusions, 
hallucinations, etc. can occur). This mediation, then, is benign. The relevant difference 
for Adorno is that the totality which is operative in the mediation of experience is 
agonic. This agon problematizes the relationship of the agent to the world, and 
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compromises the knowability of the world. This agon of mediation has three elements. 
 The first element of agon is constituted by the social totality's simultaneously 
creating complexity and preventing the comprehension of that complexity. As we saw in 
our examination of thin determination, and revelatory and delusive determination, the 
social totality constitutes the object. By virtue of the complexity of this social totality 
which constitutes the object, the object is itself highly complex, involved in complex 
mediations. However, the social totality which constitutes the complexity of the object, 
simultaneously mediates conceptual practices so that they are unable to comprehend 
this complexity. As we saw earlier in section 2.13, the social totality gives rise to (and 
sociologically enforces) a self-preserving, reified process of concept-formation which is 
constitutively incapable of grasping this totality. The social totality simultaneously 
creates a complex social ontology, and causes the universal employment of an 
epistemological mode which is incapable (dialectics aside) of grasping this complexity. 
As such, experience is mediated in such a way that the same social totality which 
constitutes the complexity of objects enforces epistemological practices which cannot 
grasp this complexity. 
 The second element of agon relates to the double life of concepts as both 
autonomous and heteronomous. While concepts and the propositions they make 
possible may hold themselves to be autonomous, and to be taking place according to 
transparent rules of inference, and so on, they are in fact caused by and predicated on 
processes which do not conform to the concept's autonomous self-understanding. 
Which is to say, these mediating processes violate the concepts they give rise to, and 
cannot be comprehended by them. While the concept produced by the social totality 
(say, of music) will reify itself into having a determinate, static account of the 
constitution of its subject (as, for example, in Hindemith's account of atemporal, 
'natural' tonality (Paddison 1993: 67)), the subject of the concept is in fact temporally 
determined and in flux (Paddison 1993: 93) . As such, the reified concept both fails to 
grasp the complete mediating context of its object (due to the influence of self-
preservation, cf. section 3.5), and is also falsified over time, as the concept fails to keep 
pace with the alterations in the totality which produced it. So, not only does the 
mediation prevent comprehension of the full complexity of the mediated, it also 
enforces a diremption between the concept's apparent autonomy and atemporal 
validity, and its nature as in fact heteronomous and socio-historically determined. This 
is another aspect of how mediation creates a form of conceptuality which is incapable 
of comprehending its object (in this case, mediation itself). It is this break between the 
concept and its subject, the difference between the concept and the mediating totality 
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from which it was crystallized, which gives rise to antinomies and contradictions.47  
 The third, and most important for our present purposes, aspect of this agon of 
mediation concerns the holistic nature of the social totality. Each concept and object of 
experience, by virtue of being mediated by a totality, is also bound up with that totality's 
operations in other spheres. The processes which may facilitate some set of 
autonomous concepts (like logic, say) may elsewhere close off some access to some 
other truths. This becomes an especially pointed difficulty when we bear in mind that 
this social totality has not only theoretic and conceptual consequences, but attendant 
social and behavioral consequences. As such, the mediating context within which a 
'true' proposition is nested may be false in other areas, even leading to socially 
disastrous consequences. The truth of an isolated proposition may be made possible 
by a mediating whole which, taken as a whole, is completely untrue.  
 This agonic mediation is what enables Adorno to posit these basic propositions 
(like 'grass is green') as meaningfully false. The grounds of the possibility of those 
propositions is imbricated with the falsity of the totality which determines experience as 
a whole.48 These propositions are false, then, by virtue of their being a constituent of a 
mediating totality which, seen as a whole, is false. However, it is important to note that 
this allows Adorno to term these basic propositions as meaningfully false, but it does 
not commit him to terming them completely false. Their falsity derives from their 
ultimate epistemological value – considered exhaustively, with regard to their total 
imbrication and mediation, they represent an element of an ongoing, false 
epistemological whole. This falsity of their ultimate epistemological status considered 
as a part of a whole however, does not entail their falsity if considered in isolation. 
Which is to say, that the statement 'grass is green' can be posited as true in a limited 
sense.  
 To be clear, the line of thought runs like this. Assertions of the primitive 
correspondence type can be seen under two aspects. Taken in isolation, the assertion 
'grass is green' can be seen as true, just in case grass actually is green. We might 
explain the coincidence of this assertion with the way the world is in terms of self-
                                                 
47
 'Dialectics is the consistent sense of nonidentity [...] What we differentiate will appear 
divergent, dissonant, negative for just as long as the structure of our consciousness obliges 
it to strive for unity: as long as its demand for totality will be its measure for whatever is not 
identical with it. This is what dialectics holds up to our consciousness as a contradiction [...] 
Contradiction is nonidentity under the rule of a law that affects the nonidentical as well. This 
law is not a cogitative law, however. It is real [...] Its agony is the world's agony raised to a 
concept.' (ND: 5 -6 / 17 - 18). Contradiction is constituted by the law of the external world, 
which also compels thought to 'strive for unity' (i.e., a seamless, wholly conceptual control of 
the world). 
48
 This idea (of the falsity of the totality)  is most concisely expressed in Adorno's crisp rebuke 
to Hegel in Minima Moralia that '[t]he whole is the false' (MM: 50). 
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preservation. Assertions concerning colour, mass, and so on are sufficiently basic that 
the interest of self-preservation, as relevant to concept formation, does not introduce 
any delusive relationship to the object – it instead provides a satisfactory window onto 
how the object in fact is. Taken in isolation, then, this proposition is unqualifiedly true. 
 However, the proposition is not, in fact, in isolation. The proposition is bound up 
with a conceptual array and form of thought (identity thinking) which made it possible. 
 Knowledge of the object was gotten by virtue of the agent employing concepts 
in accordance with identity thinking. The same form of thought which  in this instance 
mapped onto the world, will entail the falsity of any number of other propositions held 
by the agent. It will also entail latent contradictions and antinomies in the agent's body 
of thought taken as a whole. The agent's system of thought, taken as a whole, is false, 
by virtue of being internally contradictory. Considered as an element of this body of 
thought, which was made possible and acquired through this body of thought, the 
assertion is ultimately false.  
 In essence, then, Adorno has what one might term a 'holistic theory of falsity'. 
Adorno can allow that conventional propositions on the model of 'grass is green' do in 
fact, in themselves, obtain and truthfully refer to objects in the outside world. This can 
be cashed out in one of two ways, dependent on the object. In the example of 'grass is 
green' we can, I think, allow that this statement is true in an uncomplicated, 
conventional way. Its truth-maker is the fact that the grass in fact bears the property of 
greenness. This would be a simple, 'genuine' proposition, in that the grounds of its truth 
are not wholly fabricated by a human form of life or practice. Alternatively, simple 
propositions like 'gold is valuable' can also be held to be made true in a conventional 
manner (as gold actually does bear a property of being valuable), with the caveat that 
this property of the object is contingent on the form of life within which the object is 
being encountered. ('Value' is empirically discoverable, but nonetheless culturally 
relative). In either case, then, Adorno can allow the usual, conventional theories and 
manners of discussing truth.  
 However, this comes with a caveat. As already explained, due to the collective 
conceptual mediation of experience, these assertions, and the grounds of the 
possibilities of these assertions, are agonic and delusive. As such, they are imbricated 
in a larger epistemic context which serves to occlude and obfuscate truth. Even if the 
proposition in question is not in-itself problematized by its epistemic context (i.e. there 
is no meaningful way to see 'grass is green' as false when taking this proposition in 
isolation), this proposition was made possible by, and perpetuates a socio-historical 
totality which entails falsity in any number of any other epistemic areas and 
applications of propositions. Adorno has a holistic theory of falsity, then, just in so far as 
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individually true propositions are ultimately false due to their imbrication with and 
maintenance of a generally delusive epistemic whole.   
 As such, then, Adorno can simultaneously 'construe and deny' (ND: 320 / 314) 
the philosophical project of beginning with and focusing on individual propositions. 
Adorno is in no way committed to denying the coherence, explanatory value or use of 
the analytic project (and attendant truth of basic propositions). However, he is 
committed to this project being one-sided and not sufficiently exhaustive. This analytic 
form of investigation of truth is made false by virtue of its more general imbrication – in 
this sense, these propositions are false by virtue of their being holistically incorporated 
in a false system. As such, basic propositions can be seen as both meaningfully false, 
and true in a way which does not compromise the universality and integrity of the 
negativity of Adorno's theory of truth. This satisfies both of the desiderata outlined at 
the end of the previous section. 
  
3.9 An Objection 
So, we have preserved Adorno's negative theory of truth by demonstrating that it is, in 
fact, able to posit apparently unproblematic assertions ('grass is green', etc.) as false in 
a meaningful and (given the rest of Adorno's theoretic commitments) compelling 
manner. It was also important that we, nonetheless, were able to accord some type of 
truth to these (ultimately false) simple propositions. This was important simply as a 
condition of Adorno's theory being intelligible and, moreover, compelling. However, 
while we may have found a coherent solution to Adorno's problem, its terming basic 
propositions as false still seems open to objection. 
 By alleging that immediately unproblematic propositions are false due to their 
mediated imbrication with a false whole, we open ourselves to the objection that we are 
moving illegitimately between two types of truth. 'In asking about the truth of the 
proposition “grass is green”', our antagonist might say, “I just wanted to know about that 
– the truth or falsity of the proposition's mediation, grounds of the possibility of the 
proposition, etc., were not at issue. I wanted to deal with a type of truth limited to the 
immediate objects at hand.' While not especially complex, this objection does have 
force. There is a justified suspicion that translating all questions about simple, 
immediate propositions into complex webs of mediacy is a feat of legerdemain, rather 
than compelling theoretical analysis. 
 There is a simple way of dealing with this objection, the core of which is the 
antagonist's demand for the theory of truth to rest with immediate propositions. In 
making this objection, the antagonist is tacitly appealing to an atomistic picture of 
propositions. As explained in section 3.8, we are dealing here with an epistemological 
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picture which confines itself to speakers, sayings and objects. Each of these elements 
is self-contained, in terms of its content – analysis of the speaker's  constitution (as 
relevant to the truth condition of his propositions) will ultimately end with the speaker. 
Which is to say, that the way in which the speaker's constitution can interfere with the 
truth-value of his propositions is confined to facts about the speaker simpliciter – his 
physical integrity, vulnerability to delusion, etc. Similarly, the content of the object can 
be cashed out solely in terms of that object. (A wrinkle here is introduced with regards 
to cultural properties of objects, but cf. section 3.8). There is no meaningful way, on the 
antagonist's picture, that the comprehension of the constitution of each of these objects 
is not ultimately arrested with that object. This picture of the constitution of the 
elements of a propositions truth or falsity – speakers, sayings and objects – is 
coherent, but it is not in accord with  Adorno's theoretical context. 
 The last two Chapters have been a display of the speaker and object's being 
constituted not wholly by themselves, but in fact by a mediating whole. Neither the 
speaker nor the object has any content which can be isolated as belonging solely and 
unproblematically to the speaker, or to the object. As such, exhaustive comprehension 
of any proposition will necessarily lead to comprehension of the mediated context of 
these immediate propositions. When our antagonist complains he wanted to know 
about 'that', meaning an immediate and self-constituted situation, containing only self-
constituting speakers, sayings, and objects,  we can cogently reply that 'that' does not 
in fact exist, according to Adorno's theory of mediation. Adorno simply does not 
recognize, and goes to some lengths to argue against, the idea that the comprehension 
of agents, sayings or objects can be meaningfully conducted without reference to their 
mediating context. This serves to defeat the objection, as its theoretic grounds are, in 
an Adornian context, illegitimate. It appeals to a self-constituting immediacy which 
simply does not exist in Adorno's philosophy. 
 The defeated objection, however, can be finessed. One can grant the existence 
of the mediating context, but allege that the move from immediate propositions to 
mediating context was illegitimate. We might cash out this putative illegitimacy like so – 
even if the mediating context exists, and imbricates the immediate proposition, the 
falsity of the former does not translate into the falsity of the latter in any meaningful 
way. This refined objection, then, would allow for the existence of a mediating whole 
which is both determinative and the grounds of the possibility of the immediate 
proposition. However, it would allege that the falsity of that mediating context should 
not be seen to be in any way relevant to the truth or falsity of the immediate 
proposition.  
 In order to be coherent, this refined objection cannot deny that the exhaustive 
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and ultimate comprehension of any immediate proposition leads to its mediating 
context. Our reply to the first objection has demonstrated that it must, given Adorno's 
account. As such, this refined objection must say that, while the proposition is false as 
an element of a whole, this does not entail that the immediate proposition is false in 
itself (i.e., comprehended just in its immediacy, without reference to its mediating 
context). In fact, this refined objection I take to hold, and to not be a problem for 
Adorno's theory of truth, but rather a welcome elucidation of it. In fact, one can go 
further – the lack of autonomy in immediate propositions does not entail their falsity, 
and nor does it harm their analyticity, either. Which is to say, while these immediate 
propositions are ultimately determined not by themselves, but by a mediating context, 
nonetheless one can still hold that analytic truths, like those of mathematics and 
propositional logic, hold. Adorno himself expands on this in Negative Dialectics -  
 
To dialectics, immediacy does not maintain its immediate pose. Instead of 
becoming the ground, it becomes a moment. At the opposite pole, the same 
thing happens to the invariants of pure thought. Nothing but a childish 
relativism would deny the validity of formal logic and mathematics and treat 
them as ephemeral because they have come to be. Yet the invariants, 
whose invariance has been produced, cannot be peeled out of the variables 
as if all truth were at hand, then.  (ND: 40 / 50) 
 
Here we see that Adorno believes that the analytically true propositions of mathematics 
and logic are in fact mediated, and do not possess the universally necessary nature 
they believe themselves to. They are 'produced' (ND: 40 / 50). However, Adorno does 
not hold that this compromises their present status as analytically necessary in 
themselves. As he puts it, only a 'childish relativism' would do so. What Adorno is 
denying, then, is that the truth of these invariants holds outside of their mediating 
context. As he puts it, they cannot 'be peeled out of the variables' – the invariants are 
'produced' just by the epistemological contents they rule over. They cannot be 
extracted and held up as universally true, in any epistemological context whatsoever -  
as Adorno puts it, 'immutability of truth is the delusion of prima philosophia' (ND: 40 / 
50). However, within their context they remain true, despite the falsity of that context, in 
themselves (i.e., seen in a limited perspective) and simultaneously ultimately false. 
 What it is vital to note here is that Adorno posits analytic truths as mediate. This 
mediacy falsifies analytic truths both because they are mediated by a false totality, but 
also because this mediacy breaks the universal necessity which analytic truths 
arrogate to themselves, by positing them as in fact historical. However, this falsity is not 
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held to overwhelm the truth of the proposition – rather, these truths remain invariant 
and true in their contingent context. In their case, 'truth has coalesced with substance', 
(in other words, they are invariant just due to the foundations of their contingent 
epistemological context), 'which will change' (ND: 40 / 50,  emphasis mine). This 
mutability, however, does not detract from the fact that Adorno posits them as true.  
 It would seem, then, that we should agree with our antagonist. Adorno should 
not, and in fact does not, see the mediating false totality as completely falsifying the 
immediately true. However, it is important to note that the truth of the immediate is 
always qualified – it exists just on the incomplete epistemological level of the 
immediate. We remain committed to the idea that exhaustive and complete 
comprehension of the immediate proposition leads to its status as a part in a false 
whole. As such, the immediate can be true within its limited perspective. This truth is 
possible only due to this restriction of the perspective such that the mediating context is 
'blocked out'.  
 This being so, the truth of the immediate is necessarily always over-ruled by the 
falsity of its imbrication with a false totality. The immediate proposition only shows up 
as 'true' when not fully comprehended. As such, to return to a thought expounded in the 
previous two sections, the truth of immediate propositions is not ultimately compelling. 
It falls below the standard of truth we should want to use, just because it is predicated 
on the agent's being ignorant of the proposition's full constitution (i.e., its being 
constituted by a false determining whole). 
 At the close of this examination, then, we have counted out primitive 
correspondence as an eligible avenue for the positive expression of the true. The true 
cannot be expressed positively through simple propositions or primitive 
correspondence – however, those false propositions can be seen and treated as true 
(although ultimately false), so long as the mediating context which determines them as 
false is ignored. This form of truth is not, however, incompatible with Adorno's theory of 
the truth as wholly negative, as has been shown. These immediate propositions, and 
the lower form of truth associated with them, inherently point toward the highest level of 
the truth (as negative), thus ultimately necessitating that any serious attempt to cognize 
them will lead to the negative theory of truth which has been outlined. 
 
3.10 Negativity Consolidated 
This concludes our examination of the three plausible ways in which Adorno's theory of 
the true as negative could be defeated. Each of them has been nullified. We cannot 
plausibly interpret Adorno's theory of mediation and determination, and the resultant 
negativity of the true, as in any way hyperbolic, as shown in section 3.5. As a result of 
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the categories of reification, self-preservation and thin determination, it is not possible 
to create new concepts which are able to positively express the true, as shown in 
section 3.6. And finally, we are not able to express the true positively through basic 
statements about objects ('primitive correspondence'), as has just been shown in 
section 3.9. Given this comprehensive prevention of any positive attempt to express or 
grasp the true, Adorno is forced to transfer his theory of truth from positivity to 
negativity.   
 At the outset, we asserted that, as is universally recognized, Adorno operates 
with a negative theory of truth. By systematically demonstrating the theoretical grounds 
for this negativity, we can now confidently posit Adorno's theory of the truth as negative 
as following necessarily from these theoretical grounds. Moreover, we have been able 
to trace the intricate relationship between this negativity and the types of truth we can 
attribute to immediate propositions.  
 We have now finished setting out, examining and supporting the first element of 
Adorno's textural theory of truth, the second being the performativity of truth. However, 
before we move to consider the performative element of Adorno's theory of truth, we 
first need to consider an apparent contradiction in Adorno's work. 
 
3.11 Negativity and Rich Analysis 
Up to this point, we have been preoccupied with establishing that Adorno's theory of 
the truth as negative is not an unsupported position, but in fact follows directly from his 
theoretical commitments. We established this by showing how Adorno's views on the 
nature of the concept, agent and society forcibly falsified all positive forms of the 
expression of truth. As presented, this was a coherent account.  
 As we have established that this negativity characterizes the truth, we must 
identify negativity with the non-identical, which Adorno takes to be the true. As this non-
identical is negative, we can at this point say that the true cannot be expressible in 
either primitive correspondence (cf. section 3.9) or proposed modifications in the 
concepts which govern experience (cf. section 3.6). To anticipate a detailed account to 
be given in sections 3.12 – 3.20, the truth  that is expressed negatively through the 
non-identical will be nothing over and above the display of the insufficiency of the 
concepts which mediate one's experience. This 'display' will be differentiated from the 
proposed modification of concepts discounted in section 3.6 by virtue of its not 
immediately expressing the insufficiency of concepts, in a statement, but rather by 
virtue of engaging these concepts and forcing them to break down. 
 A problem for this picture of the non-identical as being constituted as purely 
negative is that Adorno's interpretive practice, the expression which he gives to the 
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non-identical, would appear to violate the rules against expressing the truth positively 
which we have just expounded. Instead of neatly drawing limits to what can be 
expressible of the true, Adorno often seems to make sets of very complex, positive 
assertions in service of his negative theory of the true. As most of Adorno's analyses 
are complex, and sustained across a good number of pages, it is difficult to find neat 
examples of this. Minima Moralia often serves as a fair demonstration of this 
phenomenon; Adorno frequently gives an account of various phenomena which is 
largely constituted by positive assertions. For example, Adorno gives an analysis of the 
individualism which pervades modern working life. While it terminates in a familiar 
presentation of a contradiction ('Their belated individualism poisons what little is left of 
the individual.' (MM: 24)), it is largely constituted by positively stated observations 
(presumably intended to be taken as true) - 
 
As the professions of the middle-man lose their economic basis, the private 
lives of countless people are becoming those of agents and go-betweens; 
indeed the entire private domain is being engulfed by a mysterious activity 
that bears all the features of commercial life without there being actually any 
business to transact. All these nervous people [...] believe that only by.. 
tradesman's qualities, can they ingratiate themselves [...] and soon there is 
no relationship that is not seen as a 'connection', no impulse not first 
censored as to whether it deviates from the acceptable. (MM: 23) 
 
The upshot of this example is that the content and truth of Adorno's analysis does not 
seem to be entirely contained in the display of a contradiction inherent in individualism. 
Adorno seems to also be making certain positive analyses, statements of fact, which 
are intended to be seen as true. In these elements of his analysis, Adorno appears to 
content himself with laying out what was termed the 'revelatory determination' of the 
object. He expresses, through disagreement about the constitution of the object and 
flagging up problems in the applications of concepts, ways in which the apparent 
immediacy of the object is in fact constituted by its mediation. (The way in which 
current forms of private life are in fact reflective of and determined by developments in 
the social structure). The problem presented by this is twofold – first, it would seem to 
be a positive, rich account which is not merely negative and secondly it would seem to 
split Adorno's theory of the true into a 'two-tier' account. I should like to lay out these 
two problems in turn. Once this is done, these two problems can be solved 
simultaneously. 
 I will first deal with the ostensible problem of Adorno's positivity. The most 
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obvious response is that I am simply mistaken – Adorno is recognizably engaged in a 
negative project, the demolition of an account of the object which relies merely on 
immediacy. However, this response falls into the trap, outlined above in section 3.4, of 
conflating two forms of negativity. There is little question that Adorno's analyses, as 
shown above, are negative in the 'political' sense – they all busy themselves with the 
rejection of a given account, a putative set of beliefs in an antagonist, etc. This political 
negativity is irrelevant. Our examination of Adorno's theory of the true as necessarily 
negative, showed this negativity as a Hegelian negativity, which is to say that it is 
unable to put forward any assertion beyond the display of the falsity of the pre-given. 
This was bolstered by our discovery that this negativity also excluded primitive 
correspondence-type statements as true. Adorno's analyses, as found above, would 
not be in difficulty, then, if they confined themselves merely to analyses of 
methodological and theoretical antinomies, contradictions and presuppositions. Such 
analyses would be wholly negative, in the relevant sense we have outlined.  
 However, the problem we find in Adorno's analysis excerpted above is that the 
political rejection of the pre-given exceeds a Hegelian version of negativity. Adorno 
does not merely tell use what we cannot say about an object, but in fact unfolds a 
positive set of assertions concerning the object's true imbrication with other social facts 
and processes. In this sense, Adorno can appear to be merely replacing one empirical 
account of objects with another, the only difference being that Adorno's empiricism 
allows for and includes a complicated social ontology. Essentially, then, it can seem as 
if Adorno is replacing one positive account of the object for another, more complex 
account of the object which is equally happy to make positive assertions. Were this to 
in fact be the case, Adorno's theory of truth would no longer seem to be truly negative, 
contradicting both Adorno's own statements (e.g. ND: 158 / 161) and the account that 
we have just given of the necessity of Adorno's holding the truth to be negative. There 
seems to be a serious inconsistency between Adorno's philosophy and its application. 
Please note, and this is a point which will shortly become absolutely vital, this difficulty 
only stands as long as we take Adorno to be thinking that the true can be discursively 
expressed. 
 The second, more serious, difficulty which I identified is that Adorno seems to 
be introducing a two-tier account of truth. This difficulty can be shown quite quickly, 
simply by citing some assertions that Adorno makes concerning the non-identical - 
 
[T]he function of riddle-solving [i.e., dialectical philosophy] is to light up the 
riddle-Gestalt like lightning and to negate it (aufzuheben), not to persist 
behind the riddle and imitate it. Authentic philosophic interpretation does not 
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meet up with a fixed meaning which already lies behind the question, but 
lights up suddenly and momentarily, and consumes it at the same time. 
(Adorno 1977: 31 -32). 
 
Here, we see that Adorno is positing the end goal of philosophy to be a momentary 
('suddenly and momentarily') revelation of the true which also serves, he says, to cause 
the question to 'disappear' (Adorno 1977: 32). This is a clear re-iteration of the line of 
thought we identify (and examine below) in Negative Dialectics, written over 30 years 
later, in which Adorno again claims that philosophical comprehension of the true was a 
momentary, non-discursive experience.49 We can see above that Adorno has identified 
cognizance of the non-identical as taking place in a flash of comprehension. Moreover, 
this flash of comprehension would appear to be identified with some epistemological 
event which is not in conformity with conventional modes of cognition which proceed 
according to the concept. This appears to contradict Adorno's positive exposition of the 
truth in the analysis of  individualism excerpted further above. In that excerpt, it would 
appear that the truth was being identified not with an extra-conceptual 'flash' of 
cognition, but rather with a culturally rich and extended display of an object's true 
mediation. This splitting of the truth into two tiers is undesirable firstly because Adorno 
does not present himself as having a theory of truth which is multifarious. Rather, his 
assertions concerning the non-identical appear to be unified. Moreover, should we 
impute an implicit two-tier theory of truth to Adorno, we would instantly put ourselves 
into the position of needing to go over his assertions concerning the true and parse 
them out as applying to either the non-identical as a negative flash of cognition, or as 
positive and rich explanation of mediation. This would be undesirable just because we 
would have little exegetical material to help us in this task, and so it would introduce a 
significant degree of uncertainty into our dealings with his work. As with the previous 
objection, it is important to note here that this difficulty is dependent on our 
understanding Adorno as taking the analyses given above as in some way identical 
with or equal to the non-identical, or true, which they are intended to express. Once 
more, then, the equation of the truth's expression with the true itself is causing this 
                                                 
49
  '[I]n philosophy the authentic question will somehow almost always include its answer. 
Unlike science, philosophy knows no fixed sequence of question and answer [...] This 
distinguishes the relation of understanding and judgment from the usual order of time [...] What 
is transmitted here is the fiber of the so-called philosophical demonstration, a mode of proof 
that contrasts with the mathematical model. And yet that model does not simply disappear, for 
the stringency of a philosophical thought requires its mode of proceeding to be measured by 
the forms of inference. Philosophical proof is the effort to give statements a binding quality by 
making them commensurable with the means of discursive thinking. But it does not purely 
follow from that thinking: the critical reflection of such cogitative productivity is itself a 
philosophical content.' (ND: 63 – 64 / 71 - 72) 
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difficulty. 
 So, as long as we identify the discursive expression of truth in analyses of 
mediation, etc., written by Adorno with the true itself, we have two main problems. First, 
there seems to be a contradiction between the negativity which Adorno allots to the 
true, and the positivity which we find in the analyses of the true. Secondly, this 
introduces a two-tier theory of truth, with truth being constituted by a discursive, 
positive analysis of revelatory determination on the the one hand, and a wholly 
negative display of the non-identical which is not discursive but in fact takes place in a 
'flash' of comprehension, on the other. These two difficulties can be dismissed 
simultaneously, if we find a way of relating the expression of the true (in its positive, 
discursive form) to the true itself (a flash of non-discursive cognition) in such a way that 
the former is not identified with the latter. Remarkably, this difficulty is completely 
solved by Adorno in a rather compressed extract from Negative Dialectics -  
 
[I]n philosophy the authentic question will somehow almost always include 
its answer. Unlike science, philosophy knows no fixed sequence of question 
and answer [...] This distinguishes the relation of understanding and 
judgment from the usual order of time [...] What is transmitted here is the 
fiber of the so-called philosophical demonstration, a mode of proof that 
contrasts with the mathematical model. And yet that model does not simply 
disappear, for the stringency of a philosophical thought requires its mode of 
proceeding to be measured by the forms of inference. Philosophical proof is 
the effort to give statements a binding quality by making them 
commensurable with the means of discursive thinking. But it does not purely 
follow from that thinking: the critical reflection of such cogitative productivity 
is itself a philosophical content. (ND: 63 – 64, 71- 72) 
 
This extract contains the solution to these difficulties in germ. We must dedicate some 
time to expounding it especially because, as a further benefit, it will solidify the 
relationship between Adorno's theory of the true and his own method of instantiating 
the true in his works. 
 Adorno begins by asserting that philosophical comprehension is distinguished 
from the 'usual order of time' . This distinguishing is accomplished by philosophical 
comprehension knowing 'no fixed sequence of question and answer [...] Its answers 
are given, not made, not generated: they are the recoil of the unfolded, transparent 
question' (ND: 63 / 71). Philosophical comprehension, then, does not constitute a line 
of reasoning which is produced in response to a question, and thereby generates an 
100 
answer. Rather, 'in philosophy the authentic question will somehow almost always 
include its answer' (ND: 63 / 71). What Adorno is here clearly asserting is that the 
philosophical access of truth is not the product of a discursive, inferential or deductive 
line of reasoning. Rather, the question and answer are simultaneously disclosed. This 
seems to correspond to the 'flash' of comprehension identified earlier. The 
philosophical true for Adorno, then, is experienced directly, rather than being revealed 
through discursive lines of argumentation. Again, Adorno gives this thought direct 
expression – 
 
 Paradoxically, the more a philosophical thought yields to its experience, the 
closer its approach to an analytical judgment. (ND: 64 / 72)  
 
The true, then, is constituted by the experience of a philosophical thought which, in 
being experienced,  becomes akin to an analytic judgment. The experience of the truth, 
then, is not legitimated as true by valid lines of argumentation, but is in fact legitimated 
as true by virtue of being experienced. So, this experience in itself is the affirmation 
and the presentation of the true. The philosophical experience, fully experienced, 
serves as the answer to the question posed by that experience.  
 Further sense will be given to the precise way in which we can comprehend the 
unification of the true and a specific experience in a 'flash' of comprehension below, in 
sections 3.12 – 3.20. However, what is significant here is that Adorno provides an 
account of the relationship which obtains between this self-certifying flash of 
experience and Adorno's other treatment of truth, in which he appears to lay out 
discursively true assertions.  
 Adorno does contrast the flash of truth in the 'analytic' experience from the 
'mathematical model' (ND: 64 / 72). By 'mathematical model', Adorno is referring to the 
discursive presentation of truth in which a problem is posited separately from its 
answer, and then an answer is sought (ND: 63 / 71), using forms of inference, etc. (ND: 
64 / 72). At this point in Adorno's explanation, then, the problem of relating the flash 
model of truth to the discursively rich model remains. Adorno is drawing a contrast 
between the flash of comprehension we find in his theory of truth (the 'analytical 
judgment'), and the discursive account of truth given in inductive / deductive chains of 
reasons  which we often find in Adorno's own practice (the 'mathematical model'). 
However, having drawn this contrast, Adorno provides a solution. After contrasting the 
philosophical mode of immediate comprehension of truth to the 'mathematical model', 
Adorno asserts - 
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And yet that [mathematical] model does not simply disappear, for the 
stringency of a philosophical thought requires its mode of proceeding to be 
measured by the forms of inference. Philosophical proof is the effort to give 
statements a binding quality by making them commensurable with the 
means of discursive thinking. (ND: 64 / 72) 
  
At this point, then, Adorno is relating the initial, non-discursive experience of truth to its 
discursive manifestation. While philosophical experience excludes discursive modes of 
thought, such as inference, etc., nonetheless 'the stringency of philosophical thought 
requires its mode of proceeding to be measured by the forms of inference' (ND: 64 / 72, 
emphasis mine). Adorno is positing here that although the initial presentation of truth is 
effected by a philosophical judgment or cognition which is not discursively expressible, 
this truth in itself requires, just by its own stringency, the expression in discursive terms. 
Moreover, this discursive expression is posited by Adorno as a 'philosophical proof' 
which seeks to make this initial, non-discursive truth 'commensurable with the means 
of discursive thinking'.  
 It seems here that Adorno is solving the relation between the negative, non-
discursive form of truth and positive, discursive form of truth by saying that the latter is 
simply an expression of the former. The former, then, seems to be posited as primary, 
with the latter, discursive expression coming afterwards, serving as a recapitulation in 
communicable, discursive terms of what the agent originally perceives immediately and 
non-discursively. 
 This would certainly seem to solve the issue of relating the two forms of truth, if 
the discursively conceptual and positive was simply an instantiation of (and hence 
equivalent to) the non-discursively non-conceptual and negative. However, this 
understanding of their relation cannot obtain. As we have already seen above in 
section 3.11, an attempt to draw an equivalence between these two types of truth is 
incoherent – if the discursive is truly compatible with the non-discursive, if the non-
discursive's content is ultimately reducible to the discursive, then once again there 
seems to be a contradiction between Adorno's theory of the truth as negative (and the 
strong theoretic reasons there are for why Adorno should want to keep the truth as 
negative, as explored in sections 3.4 – 3.10) and the positive nature of his discursive 
analyses. The two appear to be incompatible. As such, then, if this was Adorno's theory 
of the relationship between the two types of truth, we should reject it. 
 Thankfully this is not, in fact, the entirety of Adorno's theory. He denies that the 
two forms of truth are straightforwardly equivalent, and in fact posits a complex 
relationship obtaining between the two. He goes on to say - 
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Philosophical proof is the effort to give statements a binding quality by 
making them commensurable with the means of discursive thinking. But it 
does not purely follow from that thinking: the critical reflection of such 
cogitative productivity is itself a philosophical content. (ND: 64 / 72) 
 
We have here the direct statement that this 'discursive thinking' – which is, if you like, 
the post festum translation of the 'flash' of comprehension into chains of inferences and 
assertions – is in itself insufficient. This is a flat denial that the two forms of truth are, in 
themselves, equivalent. The discursive outlay of what the flash of truth has revealed is 
insufficient. To it must be added, Adorno claims, 'the critical reflection of such cogitative 
productivity' which is in itself a 'philosophical content'.  
 This is of course far from clear; however, this assertion is absolutely 
fundamental to comprehending the solution to the two problems laid out above, and so 
we must apply careful exegesis to this sentence and lay out precisely what Adorno is 
saying. The first, and most important, thing we must note is that this discursive outlay 
of the truth stands in need of an extra 'philosophical content' to make it truly adequate 
to the 'flash' form of truth. The discursive and flash forms of truth, then, are not 
necessarily estranged, or incapable of being put into a relation of equivalence or 
adequacy – rather, the discursive outlay of the truth is, on its own, missing a single 
philosophical content which will render it an adequate translation of the flash form of 
truth. 
 Adorno identifies this necessary extra philosophical content with 'that thinking 
[…] the critical reflection of such cogitative productivity'. As is apparent from the original 
German, here Adorno is referring to that 'thinking' not in the static, depersonalized 
sense in which we might refer to the laws of geometry as a body of thought (i.e., not as 
a series of propositions which are not being entertained by any specific speaker), but 
rather to that 'cogitative productivity' as an ongoing activity; as the cogitative 
engagement of a given, actual agent which is being undergone at a specific time.50 
This is reinforced by Adorno's identification of this with 'critical reflection' which, again, 
is apparently a reference to a performed epistemological activity. 
 We have the claim from Adorno, then, that discursive thinking cannot be 
                                                 
50
 'Es folgt aber nicht rein aus diesem: die kritische Reflexion solcher Produktivität des 
Denkens ist selbst ein Inhalt der Philosophie.' (Adorno 1997b : 72) The 'Produktiviät des 
Denkens' –  translated  by Ashton as 'cogitative producitivity', literally 'productivity of thought' 
– refers to the thought of agents, rather than impersonal bodies of thought, due to the term 
'Denkens''s reference to thought in the process of being executed. The far more natural term 
for impersonal thought would be 'Gedanke'.  
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adequate insofar as it is merely a set of theoretical assertions. Put differently, this 
discursive attempt to instantiate the true is insufficient insofar as it simply gives rise to 
discursive assertions. This is, of course, thoroughly unusual. Adorno is asserting that 
these chains of inference, deduction, etc., do not in themselves attain the condition of 
truth. This inadequacy has to be alleviated by the engagement of the agent's 'critical 
reflection' which is accomplished while engaged in 'discursive thinking'. Already hinted 
at here is that this discursive translation of the true, cannot be true simply 'on the page', 
as it were – it cannot be true simply by virtue of its propositional qualities. Rather, it 
must be thought, take place as an activity. 
 Adorno is asserting, then, that the discursively true cannot be adequate to the 
'flash' form of truth unless it is performed by the agent. We have seen that the 
discursively true does not attain the truth when it is, say, written on the page. Rather, it 
is the agent's active involvement with this discursive outlay of the true which adds a 
further 'philosophical content' and causes this discursive thinking to become sufficient, 
and sufficiently true.  
 The relationship between the direct 'flash' conduit to the true as non-identical, 
and the discursive, richer attempt to instantiate the non-identical would be appear to be 
one of estrangement. The latter cannot, in itself, be sufficient to the former. They are 
brought into a relationship of equivalence by the agent's engaged activity of critical 
reflection. It is important to note, here, that this activity is not limited to merely 
registering what is written on the page. Rather, Adorno asserts that this engagement of 
the agent's is a 'philosophical content' – it is equipollent with the discursively written 
itself, and plays an equal determining role in the truth or falsity of that discursively 
written material. What must be noted, then, is that this activity of the agent cannot be 
plausibly termed or understood as a simple act of recognizing, affirming or bringing to 
notice something already present. Rather, the agent's extension of his regard and 
engagement of his 'critical reflection' while thinking is itself a philosophical element, 
which has a role over and above mere recognition of what is already true. 
 This idea, that the agent's cognitive engagement is an element in the truth-
conditionality of the assertions with which the agent is engaged, is highly unusual. I will 
term this position of Adorno's 'performativity'. This performativity suffices to close off the 
problems identified at the head of this section – the truth of the non-identical is no 
longer identified with its textual expression. Rather, that expression is necessary but 
not sufficient – it is the material for the agent's performance, which itself will constitute 
something which is adequate to the negative, non-conceptual true. Adorno is not, then, 
drawing an equivalence between the true as negative, and his instantiation of the true 
as positive, discursive analyses. Rather, he holds that it is the combination of these 
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discursive analyses with the agents own performance which will result in an 
instantiation of the negatively true. This is of course a highly odd position for Adorno to 
take, and as yet I have not given very much detail to precisely what Adorno means by 
this 'performance' of the agent. However, we have now, in the course of our 
investigation, come onto the second element of Adorno's textural theory of truth, 
namely its performativity. I will explore and explain this performativity at length in the 
following section. 
 
3.12 Performativity 
Adorno's theory of the truth as 'performative' is highly complex. At the outset it would be 
helpful to provide a brief gloss of what is intended, in this context, by 'performativity'. I 
stipulate a theory of truth which is 'performative' to hold that the true cannot be simply 
expressed or instantiated discursively. Which is to say, that the true cannot be cashed 
out merely as a set of assertions and arguments. Rather these assertions and 
arguments are used, by the agent, as the grounds for a performance, this performance 
being a spontaneous, cognitive activity. For a performative theory of truth, the true is 
nothing over and above this performance. This gloss will be filled in with more detail as 
we go on. Adorno's theory of truth is performative in a two-fold sense. In the first, weak, 
sense, Adorno's theory of the true is performative as it posits the necessity of the 
engagement of the agent. The second, stronger, sense of this performativity lies in 
asserting that the true is nothing over and above this engagement of the agent. I 
should like to deal with these two components in order. 
 The first, weak, performative element to Adorno's theory of the true was laid out 
at the close of the previous section. We found that Adorno asserted that the truth was 
not limited to the concrete instantiations of that truth (in written assertions, etc.) but in 
fact also required the active attendance of the agent to cognize that truth (ND: 64 / 72). 
This may seem so trivial as be trite – after all, on any theory of truth the perception of 
truth requires the engagement of the perceiver's regard. On this reading, then, the 
'critical reflection' which is necessary is simply the requirement that there be a 
competent reader to see that the truth is so instantiated. Interpreted in this way, the 
weak performativity which Adorno allots to his theory of truth is weak indeed, 
amounting simply to the assertion that the perception of truth requires a competent 
agent. However, this reading is incorrect. Adorno is not simply drawing our attention to 
the fact that a competent perceiver is required. This is intimated by Adorno's terming 
the engagement of the reader a further 'philosophical content'. By asserting that the 
'critical reflection' is 'itself a philosophical content', Adorno has asserted that the agent 
must not merely epistemologically reflect what is already present in the set of 
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assertions before him, but in fact add the further content of his own performative 
engagement.  
 The difference, while apparently slight, is in fact considerable. It would seem 
that the attendance of the agent is not merely a condition on the accurate registering of 
a pre-existent philosophical content (as on a conventional reading) but is in fact an 
integral component of the resultant truth itself. The weak version of performativity, then, 
is in fact the assertion that the agent's spontaneous engagement with the propositional 
lay-out is itself a further component of the truth of that propositional lay-out, beyond the 
explicitly stated content of the propositions themselves.  
 This is an assuredly odd idea. The agent has to, as it were, perform the truth 
internally, this performance itself being not a form of access to the truth contained in the 
material (the text) but in fact an element of that truth itself. This first, weak, form of the 
performativity of Adorno's theory of truth allowed us to escape the problem outlined in 
the previous section, as it prevents the textual expression of the true being exhaustive 
of the true itself. Rather, this textual expression of the true has to be conjoined with the 
further philosophical content provided by the agent's spontaneous engagement. 
However, now I have set out this first level of the performativity of Adorno's theory of 
truth, I should now like to move to consider the richer account which we can derive 
from Adorno's work. This richer account will provide an explanation of what the true 
actually is for Adorno, as well as give content to the assertion that the agent's 
engagement somehow serves as a philosophical content and truth-maker. 
  
3.13 Full Performativity 
In the previous section, then, we saw that Adorno incorporated an element of 
performativity into his theory of truth, in that he asserted that the textual instantiation of 
the true is not sufficient, in itself, but in fact must be accompanied by the agent's own 
internalization and 'critical reflection' of that text. As we saw, this engagement of the 
agent went beyond the mere registering of what was already present in the text, but in 
fact was a constituent of the truth-value of the text itself. This in itself was sufficiently 
unusual to warrant comment, and we spent some time examining and making sense of 
this 'weak performativity' which was present in Adorno's work. However, it is my belief 
that this performativity which we identified in Adorno's work in fact warrants further 
examination, and in fact constitutes Adorno's theory of truth. This performativity, of the 
agent's performing the content present in the text, should in fact stand as an exhaustive 
account of Adorno's theory of truth.  
 In order to begin making clear how this weak performativity can ramify into a full 
account of the true as performative, I first need to make clear what cause we have to 
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think that Adorno's theory of the true should be identified with a performance which is 
undertaken by the agent. In fact, there is a good deal of exegetical support for reading 
Adorno's theory of truth in this way. This exegetical support derives from two lines of 
thought in Adorno's work. First, we have expounded at length in the previous Chapters 
the universal delusive influence of the epistemological whole. At the opening of this 
Chapter, we discovered that this strong delusive influence of the epistemological whole 
was such that Adorno was obliged to posit the truth as negative (sections 3.4 – 3.10). 
However, Adorno does not rest simply with the assertion that the truth must be wholly 
negative, and consist merely of the critique of the pre-given. Adorno advocates creating 
a break in the false epistemological whole. Vitally, Adorno asserts that the break must 
not be produced by attempting to move outside of that whole, but in fact by engaging 
with that false epistemological whole. Adorno is asserting, then, that the inherently false 
set of concepts, theoretical positions, beliefs, etc., should not be jettisoned or 
discarded, but fully engaged and employed, and thereby induced to 'break' and display 
the true. This is an odd idea, which he expounds in a variety of places in Negative 
Dialectics - 
  
Yet the appearance of identity is inherent in thought itself, in its pure form. 
To think is to identify. Conceptual order is content to screen what thinking 
seeks to comprehend [...] Aware that the conceptual totality is mere 
appearance, I have no way but to break immanently, in its own measure, 
through the appearance of total identity. (ND: 5 / 17, emphasis mine) 
 
Here Adorno asserts that 'identity' (serving here as shorthand for the false identification 
of a concept with its object) is not a contingent element of thought, but is in fact 
constitutive of thought. This is in complete accord with the inherent delusiveness which 
our investigation of the concept and its mediating influences discovered. Adorno 
asserts that this epistemological error of thought is not simply erasable, but must be 
engaged – broken 'immanently, in its own measure'. The 'appearance of total identity' 
must be employed and used in order to break this appearance – in order to display that 
total identity does not in fact obtain. The same 'conceptual order' which 'screens' 
thought, closing off access to the truth, must be used in order to undo this 'screening' 
effect. Adorno is asserting, then, that the conceptual form of thought which  inherently 
takes itself to exhaust its object must be used in order to display that it in fact does 
not.51  
                                                 
51
 Adorno often uses an odd locution whereby concepts and other impersonal philosophical 
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Objectively, dialectics means to break the compulsion to achieve identity, 
and to break it by means of the energy stored up in that compulsion and 
congealed in its objectifications [...] As a sense of nonidentity through 
identity, dialectics is not only an advancing process but a retrograde one at 
the same time. (ND: 157 / 159 -160, emphasis mine) 
 
This serves as a reinforcement of the thought expressed in the previous extract. Rather 
than attempting to voluntarily transfer our thought away from 'identity', we must employ 
the innate, delusive 'compulsion to achieve identity' (i.e. compulsion to have the 
concept exhaust the object) and thereby use 'the energy stored up in that compulsion' 
in order to display the impossibility of the object of that compulsion. Once more, then, 
we see that Adorno intends to use an inherently false tool in order to achieve a display 
of the truth. 
 
'Dialectics is the self-consciousness of the objective context of delusion; it 
does not mean to have escaped from that context. Its objective goal is to 
break out of the context from within. The strength required from the break 
grows in dialectics from the context of immanence; what would apply to it 
once more is Hegel's dictum that in dialectics an opponent's strength is 
absorbed and turned against him, not just in the dialectical particular, but 
eventually in the whole. By means of logic, dialectics grasps the coercive 
character of logic [.]' (ND: 406 / 398, emphasis mine) 
 
In this final extract we have this same line of thought reiterated and made explicit – the 
role of dialectics is not to '[escape its] context' but to 'break out of that context from 
within'. It is important to note that Adorno is in fact making two equally vital strands of 
thought explicit here. First, dialectics must not arbitrarily escape from its 
epistemological context. As such, it cannot merely posit an extra-conceptual 
epistemological set-up, or attempt to voluntarily do away with the problems of 
epistemology by setting up new concepts, forms of thought, etc. This accords well with 
the analysis given in section 3.6. Vitally, having shown that dialectics cannot escape a 
                                                                                                                                               
phenomena are personified (e.g., 'What the philosophical concept will not abandon is the 
yearning that animates the nonconceptual side of art' (ND: 15 / 27)). I have often taken up 
this locution in this thesis. For example, I repeatedly talk of concepts 'taking themselves' to 
exhaust the object. This should be understood as shorthand for the assertion that 'the 
concept, as employed and understood by the agent, is seen by the agent as exhausting the 
object'. Other assertions using this locution should be interpreted in the same way. 
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delusive epistemological context through mere will, he then adds that its 'objective goal 
is to break out of the context from within'. While dialectics cannot voluntarily escape its 
delusive epistemological context, then, it does not thereby have to content itself with 
merely tracing the imperfections in that context. Adorno still feels that dialectics can not 
only criticize pre-given bodies of thought, but in fact 'break out' of them. This shows 
that Adorno rejects mere scepticism, as our analysis shows below in section 3.18. This 
is also made explicit here - 
 
What the philosophical concept will not abandon is the yearning that 
animates the nonconceptual side of art, and whose fulfillment shuns the 
immediate side of art as mere appearance. The concept – the organon of 
thinking, and yet the wall between thinking and the thought – negates that 
yearning. Philosophy can neither circumvent such negation nor submit to it. 
(ND: 15 / 27, emphasis mine) 
 
Adorno, then, while noting that the concept is necessary for thought ('the organon of 
thinking') and also that it is inherently problematic ('the wall between thinking and the 
thought') – for the reasons that we have noted at length in our analysis of thin 
determination, reification, etc. – is not content to 'submit to' the concept's prevention of 
the satisfaction of the urge to comprehend that which escapes the concept. He will not, 
then, submit to merely critical, sceptical analyses of philosophical positions, but desires 
a further epistemological practice which can provide a break with this falsifying 
influence, as the above extracts have shown. As such, he has in mind a further form of 
dialectical behaviour, different to mere immanent critique or scepticism. I claim that this 
further form of dialectical behaviour can only be the performance.  
 While I believe I have established that Adorno requires and posits a dialectical 
activity which exceeds mere immanent critique and scepticism, and have suggested 
that performativity satisfies this condition, I have perhaps yet to provide demonstrate 
sufficient exegetical support for the idea of performativity. While I will go on to delineate 
exactly what the performance consists in below, I first want to make clear that this idea 
of performativity is supported in Adorno's work. Drawing again on Negative Dialectics, 
we have the following example - 
 
On its subjective side, dialectics amounts to thinking so that the thought 
form will no longer turn its objects into immutable ones, into objects that 
remain the same. Experience shows that they do not remain the same. The 
unstable character of traditional philosophy's solid identity can be learned 
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from its guarantor, the individual human consciousness […] [When 
dialectically treating problems of identity,] technical terminology stands 
ready with the customary formula […] [But, a] purely formal [dialectical] 
reversal would leave room for the subreption that dialectics is prima 
philosophia after all, as “prima dialectica”. The test of the turn to nonidentity 
is its performance; if it remained declarative, it would be revoking itself. (ND: 
154-155 / 157)  
 
In the extract just cited, Adorno opposes the agent's experience of the failure of identity, 
with a formalized dialectics which treats its subject matter according to preset formulae. 
In Adorno's opposition of the performance to the merely declarative, there is the 
opposition of that which calls itself dialectics by virtue of formalized standards (as in the 
straw-man Hegel who allegedly philosophized always in triads of thesis-antithesis-
synthesis) to that dialectics which performatively instantiates a turn to non-identity. This 
can be clarified by looking at Adorno's assertion, earlier in the extract, that the 'human 
consciousness' is the 'guarantor' of the failure of philosophical identity. Adorno strikingly 
locates the justification of a critique of conventional identity thinking not in formal 
argument, but rather in experience. This seems to associate the alternative to merely 
declarative, formal, types of proof with the consciousness. The performance would 
seem to be posited as having a role in inducing this experiential 'guarantor' of the falsity 
of experience. Adorno is claiming that dialectics cannot conduct itself by means of 
preset formulae (as it would then become 'prima philosophia', or 'first philosophy'), but 
instead must performatively engage with its subject matter, this performance entailing 
some guarantor in the experience of the agent, which demonstrates the success of this 
'turn to nonidentity'. 
 Here we have a clear separation being drawn by Adorno between the 
'declarative' and 'performance', both of which are entailed by his philosophy's 'turn to 
nonidentity'. This duality, between declaration and performance, has been anticipated 
by our analysis in section 3.11. Therein, we discovered a differentiation between 
Adorno's rich, rhetorical texts and the 'critical reflection of cogitative productivity' (ND: 
64 / 72). We discovered that the discursive lay-out of Adorno's analyses (the 
'declarative') was posited by Adorno as insufficient – rather, it had to be accompanied 
by the agent's own conceptual performance of that written material (the 'performance'). 
Linking up with the analysis in section 3.11, then, we can  see that this is a clear and 
explicit support of the idea that the true requires a performance. 
 
What must be said methodologically, in the form of general reflection, in 
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order not to be defenseless against the philosopher's philosophy, can be 
legitimized solely in its performance [Durchführung], thus denying the 
method in turn [...] The philosophical ideal would be to obviate accounting 
for the deed by doing it. (ND: 48 / 58, translation modified) 
 
We see here a repetition of Adorno's central thought that the genuine philosophical 
thought cannot be legitimated merely by the 'mathematical model' of the assessment of 
inductive and deductive validity, etc. Rather, it must be legitimated in the course of its 
'performance'. Once again, then, there is introduced a distinction between conventional 
modes of justification, as associated with the 'discursive' or 'declarative' modes of 
philosophy, and a different, active form of justification – here associated with 
'performance'. Our analysis in the previous section has already demonstrated that the 
agent's own 'critical reflection' is an integral component in this performance.  
 With this exegetical support, then, we have begun to make plausible the thought 
that the dialectical procedure which serves to instantiate the true is nothing over and 
above a performance of the agent, which takes place in a dialectical relationship 
obtaining between the text and the agent himself. This 'performance' would in itself 
institute the 'break' which Adorno outlined as a desideratum above, and thereby finally 
provide a method of escaping Adorno's holistic theory of falsity, and provide a method 
of instantiating the true. 
 If we are to posit this performance as constituting the solution to the negativity 
of the true entailed by Adorno's theoretic commitments, three questions arise. These 
are 1) How does this performance effect the 'break' which Adorno identified as the 
desideratum of a dialectical instantiation of the true? 2) How is this performative 
creation of a 'break' true? 3) If this account of the true as a performative break effected 
by the agent in a dialectical relationship with the text is coherent, what is there to be 
said for it? In other words, why should we want to interpret Adorno's theory of the true 
in this way? I will answer these three questions in turn. These questions having been 
answered, Adorno's theory of truth will have been established as performative. 
 
3.14 Problem 1) How does this performance effect the 'break' which Adorno 
identified as the desideratum of a dialectical instantiation of the true? 
To begin seeing how the agent's performative interrogation of the philosophical text 
amounts to the creation of the immanent break which Adorno identified as the goal of 
dialectical practice, we first need to briefly go over the specific features of the manner 
in which Adorno wrote his philosophy. 
 Adorno's rhetorical method is intricate and unusual. As per his own assertions 
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concerning philosophy's rejection of the 'mathematical model' extracted above, Adorno 
refuses to provide simple lines of inferences and deductions in his work, instead 
analyzing the topic from any number of perspectives and disciplines. It is the apparent 
insouciance with which Adorno induces a purely meta-theoretical consideration of a 
given topic to render up reference to, for example, its socio-historical grounds which 
often produces the most memorable passages in Adorno's work. It is very difficult to 
give a concise example of this feature of Adorno's philosophy. However, a miniature of 
this tendency can be found in Adorno's analysis of Kant's theory of freedom - 
  
While Kant, in practical philosophy, rigorously proclaims the chorismos 
[separation] of what is and what ought to be, his is nonetheless compelled to 
resort to mediations. His idea of freedom turns into a paradox: it comes to be 
incorporated in the causality of the phenomenal world that is incompatible 
with the Kantian concept of freedom [...] But the paradoxical character of 
Kant's doctrine strictly corresponds to its location in reality. Social stress on 
freedom as existent coalesces with undiminished repression, and 
psychologically, with coercive traits. […] Like the idealists after him, Kant 
cannot bear freedom without compulsion. Its mere undistorted conception 
fills him with that fear of anarchy which later urged the bourgeois world to 
liquidate its own freedom [...] What became Kant's fearfully majestic a priori 
is what psychoanalysts trace back to psychological conditions. (ND: 231 – 
232 / 231) 
 
Adorno here analyzes internal contradictions in Kant's account of freedom (I have 
omitted much of this in the extract). However, these purely philosophical problems 
which Adorno identifies (the subordination of freedom to necessity in Kant's account) 
are swiftly related to extra-philosophical conditions; the paradoxical nature of Kant's 
theory of freedom is related to a contradiction internal to the nature of freedom in 
society. Kant's theory of freedom is engaged in a purely philosophical manner, and 
analyzed until it yields a contradiction. This contradiction is between Kant's conception 
of freedom, and what Adorno sees as Kant's disruption of this conception arising from 
his employment of necessity. Should we take Adorno's analysis to be compelling, he 
has forced Kant's work on freedom into a position of internal contradiction and hence 
unworkability. We might then expect this to be the end of Adorno's analysis of Kant. 
However, while this philosophical (as it were) engagement with Kant seems to have 
concluded, the analysis continues from a fresh perspective. Adorno now interrogates 
this philosophical problem of Kant's from a socio-historical perspective. Moreover, this 
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fresh perspective does not supplant the first, but rather contributes to a mutual project 
of explanation. The most distinctive element of the above analysis is its convulsive 
switch of perspective in the consideration of the given topic. It begins analysis from a 
tacit philosophical perspective and, in the course of this analysis, is forced to give up 
this perspective in favour of another. This perspectival restlessness appears to have 
two main features. First, each perspective employed in the course of the analysis 
nonetheless has in common its exclusive focus on the given topic under consideration. 
Secondly, this exchange of perspective is not presented as arbitrary, but as resulting 
from a insoluble contradiction encountered in the employment of the previous 
perspective.  Adorno explicitly thematizes this multi-perspectival analysis in his paper, 
'The Essay as Form' -  
 
The how of expression should rescue, in precision, what the refusal to 
outline sacrifices, without, however, betraying the intended matter to the 
arbitrariness of previously decreed significations [...] In the essay, concepts 
do not build a continuum of operations, thought does not advance in a single 
direction, rather the aspects of the argument interweave as in a carpet. The 
fruitfulness of the thoughts depends on the density of this texture. (Adorno 
1984: 101) 
 
The essay, however, has to do with that which is blind in its objects. 
Conceptually it wants to blow open what cannot be absorbed by concepts, or 
what, through contradictions in which concepts entangle themselves, betrays 
the fact that the network of their objectivity is a purely subjective rigging [...] it 
constructs the interwovenness of concepts in such a way that they can be 
imagined as themselves interwoven in the object. (Adorno 1984: 110) 
 
In these remarkably explicit methodological remarks, Adorno baldly asserts that the 
condition of correct comprehension (the 'fruitfulness of [thought]' (Adorno 1984: 101)) is 
dependent upon 'the interwovenness of concepts' (Adorno 1984: 110), this 
interwovenness being a direct product of the insufficiency of the concepts being 
employed (Adorno 1984: 110). From the example adduced above, together with 
Adorno's own explicit methodological remarks, we have pieced together the following 
picture of the way in which Adorno writes his philosophical texts. Adorno considers a 
given topic, and attempts to analyze it from within a given theoretical practice (whether 
that be philosophical, sociological, or whatever). This practice is employed until it 
reaches such a point that it visibly contradicts itself (Adorno 2000: 110), or Adorno is 
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able to present some given fact which either undermines the practice being employed 
(Adorno 2000: 110), or is merely a datum which that practice cannot include, and 
thereby undermines that practice's self-understanding as providing an exhaustive 
analysis of the topic at hand. Adorno does not merely present the inadequacies in each 
epistemological practice, but instead visibly employs that practice and leads it into 
displaying its own insufficiency. This insufficiency then summons a further concept or 
epistemological practice, which goes on to attempt to contain the results of this 
analysis (for example, the datum that arose which the first concept could not subsume). 
This further concept or epistemological practice is then itself critiqued until it reveals its 
insufficiency, and so on. The 'interwovenness' of concepts derives from the fact that, in 
the course of attempting to comprehend the object, each concept fails and, in its 
failure, summons other concepts. 
 It is this 'interwovenness' which Adorno elsewhere gestures towards in his 
assertions that the 'texture' (Gewebe) of dialectical thought serves as the criterion of its 
success (ND 35 / 45, 33 /44). The German term Gewebe is associated with fabric, and 
capable of being translated as 'tissue' or 'weave', as well as 'texture'. These 
connotations are informative. If one considers the weave of a piece of fabric, one sees 
that it is constituted by multiple strands, all of which go together to form the finished 
piece. Similarly, the 'texture' of thought is constituted by its bringing together, in the 
course of its comprehension of its subject matter, all of the relevant concepts and 
philosophical positions, in order to form a complex and complete instantiation of the 
subject matter.  Comprehension of the object is not merely a 'deductive or inductive 
course' (ND 33 / 44), but is in fact achieved in the 'density of [the] texture' (ND: 35 / 45) 
of the thought. Which is to say, the object is comprehended insofar as thought 
thoroughly elaborates the multiple conceptual connections which the object entails, 
instead of merely subsuming it under one concept, or one epistemological practice (be 
that philosophical, empirical, etc.).  
 This position of Adorno's, wherein genuine comprehension of the object entails 
conceptual constellations, or 'texture', I have called 'texturalism'. As was shown in the 
extract cited above (Adorno 1984: 110), Adorno believes that this 'interwovenness' of 
concepts – the fact that the object cannot be subsumed under one concept alone, but 
in fact  demands a 'texture' of concepts in order to be properly comprehended – is a 
property of the experienced object itself. As such, the rhetorical device of the 
convulsive leap from epistemological practice to practice in consideration of a topic is 
not mere rhetoric but in fact a philosophically significant constituent in Adorno's work - 
 
Dialectics – literally: language as the organon of thought – would mean to 
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attempt a critical rescue of the rhetorical element, a mutual approximation 
of thing and expression, to the point where the difference fades [...] In 
dialectics, contrary to popular opinion, the rhetorical element is on the side 
of content. (ND: 56 / 66, emphasis mine) 
 
The rhetorical texture of Adorno's work, then, is constituted by a kind of destructive 
phenomenology. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit  generated the breakdown of forms 
of consciousness (each of which was an attempt to know the world), simply by 
watching these attempts to know break down in the course of their application to the 
world. Crucially, for Hegel, 'truth is attainable by surveying the breakdown of each 
appearance into its successor […] until we reach absolute [knowledge]' (Inwood 2003: 
216). For Hegel, while his Phenomenology is a passive enterprise, it is also a positive 
one – each observed breakdown gives rise to a new, superior form of consciousness, 
and continues the advance towards absolute knowledge, in which concept and object 
are in perfect conformity. 
 For Adorno, by contrast, the phenomenological method does not generate new, 
improved concepts out of the observed breakdown of the old.  Each candidate 
epistemological practice or perspective in the topic object's 'constellation' is engaged 
and employed immanently in the text. However, in the course of this displayed 
engagement of the given practice, a difficulty arises which is only soluble by the 
transition from that practice (which, remember, understands itself as exhaustive) to 
another. This process is repeated until each of the candidate practices has revealed 
itself to be, in itself, insufficient (or, as Adorno puts it, 'purely subjective rigging' (Adorno 
2000: 110)). Adorno's phenomenology is destructive, then, as it terminates in a display 
of falsity, rather than an improvement in the conformity between concept and object. 
 The performativity of the text, then, derives from its performing, in its rhetorical 
'texture', the conceptual insufficiencies (antinomies, contradictions, etc.) which it refers 
to. The text does not merely refer to these conceptual difficulties, but in fact instantiates 
them by virtue of its phenomenological procedure. Each epistemological practice is 
engaged until, by virtue of its own constitution, it fails. The text rhetorically instantiates, 
then, the insufficiencies inherent in the concepts concerning the topic under 
consideration. 
  
3.15 From Rhetoric to Break  
We have established, then, that Adorno's philosophical works represent a textual 
instantiation of the conceptual insufficiencies found in the concepts and epistemological 
practices which are available to try and comprehend the topic of those philosophical 
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works. The 'texture' which Adorno posited as the arbiter of the philosophical work's 
accuracy, then, turns out to refer to the work's instantiation of the failure and mutual 
entailment of all of the available practices which refer to and attempt to exhaust a given 
topic. But how does this texture of the work give rise to the desired 'break'? As we saw 
above, Adorno posited that the end of his dialectical procedure was not merely to 
register the failures of the existing epistemological whole, but to break out of this 
epistemological whole. At present, the destructive phenomenology of Adorno's 
philosophical texts would appear to provide only an unusual way of giving an account 
of the present epistemological failures – it would not appear to present any way of 
breaking with the epistemological set-up which gave rise to them. 
 This difficulty is solved by reconsidering the role of the agent. We have already 
seen in section 3.11, that the agent's performative vitalization of the given philosophical 
text is not merely a registering of what is present in that text, but in fact a constituting 
element in the truth of that text itself. This role of the agent can be seen as providing 
the extra ingredient which translates the text's rhetorical mirroring of existing 
conceptual insufficiencies into the desired 'break'.  
 The agent and text are conceptually isomorphic. We saw from our examination 
of the social universality of conceptual arrays that, at a given time, all agents will 
possess the same conceptual array. As such, then, the author of Negative Dialectics 
and the reader possess the same conceptual array, with the same conceptual 
difficulties, inconsistencies and insufficiencies inhering in that array. The author of 
Negative Dialectics traces the immanent insufficiencies in each of the epistemological 
practices which purport to analyze the given topic, and instantiates these in the text. 
The text, then, constitutes a destructive phenomenological display of the available 
epistemological material which describes and appeals to identical concepts owned by 
the reader. As such, the reader has the same conceptual structure, with the same 
latent contradictions, as the text. 
 If we combine this isomorphism with what we already know about the text and 
agent, we can see clearly how a break results. We saw that the text does not merely 
assert these conceptual break-downs – it performs them, immanently in a destructively 
phenomenological approach (section 3.14). Furthermore, the reader does not merely 
passively register what is present in the text – rather, he internalizes it, and performs it 
(section 3.11). As such, then, the agent internally performs what is in the text – namely, 
an exhaustive display of the insufficiency of all conceptual material available to cognize 
the topic of the text.  
 The agent, then, employs his concepts (in accordance with the text's 
performative immanent employment of the concepts) and discovers that the concepts 
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fail. The concept fails in the course of its employment, just due to its own constitution. 
This is repeated for each of the concepts presented in the course of the text's analysis. 
The conceptual breakdown which is instantiated in the text's theoretic context is re-
instantiated in the course of the concept's actual employment by the agent. The agent 
attempts to cognize the object, using his concepts (which, remember, take themselves 
to be able to exhaust their object) and discovers that all of his available epistemological 
practices fail. It is important to note here is that the agent is not told that his concepts 
fail – the concepts themselves fail, in the course of their employment. The break is 
effected via a dialectic between the performativity of the text (the text's rhetorical, 
phenomenological instantiation of the failure of concepts) and the performativity of the 
agent (whose concepts are engaged by the text's presentation of its material, and 
induced into failing). 
 
3.16 Break 
But how does this failure in the agent's concepts in the course of their employment 
serve to effect a break with the false epistemological whole? For Adorno, there is no 
apparent distinction, as there is for Kant, between transcendental and empirical 
concepts. Which is to say, all concepts play an equal role in the mediation of 
experience. Just this is presupposed by Adorno's commitment to the idea that all 
immediacy is in fact constituted by and determined by mediacy. As the agent's 
experience of any given object is occluded by the effect of identity thinking on his 
concept of the object, it stands to reason that this concept is not only theoretically 
employable, but in fact mediates his experience of that object. The concepts which the 
agent employs, then, in the course of attempting to cognize an object serve both as a 
means of acquiring knowledge and as that which mediates experience and makes 
continuous experience possible. We saw in the previous section that the agent's 
internal performance of the philosophical text entails that his concepts fail in the course 
of their employment. When the agent performatively interrogates the philosophical text, 
the conceptual failures present in the text are isomorphic to conceptual failures latent in 
the agent's own conceptual array. The agent's performance of the text internally leads 
to these conceptual failures which are displayed on the page being effected internally, 
in the agent's conceptual array. His concepts, which  mediate his experience, fail: 
which is to say, they fail to subsume their object. 
 As such, then, the theoretical conceptual failure which is instantiated in the 
philosophical text is, by virtue of the performative role of the agent, re-instantiated in 
experience. This is how the flash of comprehension is differentiated from the 
discursive, 'mathematical model' which Adorno refers to (ND: 64 / 72). Rather than 
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being confronted with a complex of assertions (which assert that concepts fail) that are 
justified by standards of induction, deduction etc., the agent experiences this 
conceptual failure. Adorno provides clear exegetical support for this account of the non-
conceptual being accessed experientially (as opposed to theoretically), by means of 
failing concepts - 
 
We might say that the non-conceptual itself, when we approach it for the 
first time, when we grapple with it, is already mediated by concepts in a 
negative sense – it is the neglected, the excluded; and the fact that the 
concept has not granted it access tells us something about [...] the 
obstacles imposed by the concept. (Adorno 2010: 69) 
 
The concept's being confronted with an object which resists conceptual subsumption, 
then, serves as an encounter with the non-conceptual (non-identical). This failure of the 
concept is for the agent not merely a theoretical break but also a disruption of the 
transcendental grounds of his continuous experience. The object is experienced as 
uncapturable by the agent's conceptual array. The agent, then, experiences an object 
which cannot be exhausted by his concepts. This constitutes the desired breakout of 
the false epistemological whole just because the constitutive element of the false 
epistemology –  the identification of the concept with the object –  is made impossible. 
The agent is confronted with an object completely resistant to conceptual subsumption. 
As such, he will experience the complete insufficiency of his concepts, with regards to 
the considered object. 
 All of the concepts in the agent's conceptual array relevant to the object under 
consideration are engaged, and induced to fail. This does not entail a display of the 
falsity of the entirety of the conceptual array; there will remain any number of concepts 
possessed by the agent which will not have been engaged by the dialectical critique in 
question. (Dialectical constellations are finite – they only include those concepts related 
to comprehension of the topic). However, it will serve to acquaint the agent with the 
insufficiency of an area of his conceptual array. All of the candidate concepts for 
comprehension of a given object will prove unable to subsume that object. This serves 
as a hammer blow to the constitutive idea of identity thinking – that concepts can 
exhaust their objects without remainder.  
 The combination of the performativity of the text (its phenomenological display 
of the inherent insufficiency of concepts) and the performativity of the agent (the 
agent's mirroring the text in the actual employment of his own conceptual faculties) 
results in a break. The conceptual contradictions in the text are by themselves 
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insufficient for a break – this is due to the holistic theory of falsity outlined earlier. If the 
agent were merely to read and register a set of assertions concerning the fallibility of 
concepts, his experience of these assertions (as mediated by concepts) would entail 
the ultimate falsification of these assertions. The agent's performance, however, 
dodges the problem of the holistic theory of falsity by not taking place by virtue of 
assertions or explicit theoretical programmes (which are vulnerable to the delusive 
influence of the concept, reification, etc.) but instead by effecting a break in the concept 
itself, and thereby not being subject to its delusive influence. Performativity, then, 
satisfies Adorno's desideratum that dialectics result in a break with the false 
epistemological practice by virtue of the strength of that false epistemological practice. 
As such, it would appear to be a plausible explanation for Adorno's theory of the true. 
However, we now need to explain how this performative break can be meaningfully 
termed true. 
  
3.17 Problem 2) How is this performative creation of a 'break' true? 
As explained above, the break is constituted by the agent's experience of an object 
which causes all of his available relevant conceptual tools to fail. The agent's concepts, 
as has been explained, have a twofold role – that of making knowledge possible (their 
theoretic role) and that of making continuous experience possible (their transcendental 
role). Accordingly, the truth of the performative break with these concepts is twofold. It 
is true by demonstration, and it is true by acquaintance. 
 First, then, we see that the agent has demonstrated to him, through his 
performative engagement with the text, that any presently possible conceptual practice 
is incapable of exhausting the currently considered object. This demonstration is true 
because it demonstrates to the agent that the socially universal conceptual array is in 
fact inherently incapable of grasping the considered object – the conceptual array 
presents itself to the agent as exhausting that object, but is in fact completely unable to 
do so. However, it is important to note again that this truth is made possible by virtue of 
its being performative and not assertoric or theoretical. As we saw in sections 3.4 – 
3.10, any positive assertion (including 'the epistemological whole is false') is ultimately 
falsified by Adorno's holistic theory of falsity, due to the delusive influence of the 
governing concepts, reification, etc. As such, any assertion of the falsity of the socially 
universal conceptual array would itself be falsified by virtue of the conceptual mediation 
which allowed that assertion to be comprehended. The performative demonstration of 
this falsity, however, escapes this difficulty and allows for the diremption between all 
presently available concepts in the socially universal conceptual array and the 
candidate object to be comprehended without thereby being falsified by the concept. 
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This break, then, is true as it allows for the genuine comprehension of the falsity of the 
part of the epistemological whole relevant to the considered object. The performative 
break is the only medium for an escape from the falsifying influence of the 
epistemological whole, and the only medium for the perception of its falsity, its 
insufficiency in relation to the object in question. It is true, then, by virtue of 
demonstrating (and being the only way of demonstrating) the falsity of all other, 
presently available, non-dialectical forms of knowledge with reference to the 
considered object.  
 Secondly, we come to knowledge by acquaintance, which is entailed by the 
concept's transcendental role. As has already been explained in the previous section, 
the continual breakdown of each concept successively applied to the object being 
cognized not only prevents the application of the concept in a theoretic sense, but also 
prevents that concept's successfully mediating the agent's experience of that object. As 
such, the agent's experience of that object, which induces concepts to fail in the course 
of their attempt to cognize that object, is not wholly conceptually mediated. The agent, 
then, is experientially acquainted with something which cannot be subsumed or 
experientially mediated by the concept. In other words, then, the agent has an 
experience of something non-conceptual – viz., the non-identical.  
 The performative break, then, serves to acquaint the agent with the non-
identical. The effect of this acquaintance assuredly reinforces the demonstrative effect 
of the performative break – viz., informing the agent that his concepts are not in fact in 
this case sufficient – by virtue of acquainting the agent with something which is not 
capturable by the concept. As such, this acquaintance with the non-identical also 
stands as true in the same sense as the demonstrative element of the performative 
break. It displays the falsity of the governing conceptual array without this display being 
subject to the delusive influence of that governing array.  
 Now that we have established that the performative reading of Adorno's theory 
of truth is plausible, we must now turn to the third problem – why should we want to 
read Adorno in this way? 
 
3.18 Problem 3) Why should we want to construe this as Adorno's theory of the 
true? What is the benefit? 
While I believe I have demonstrated that my reading of Adorno's theory of the true as 
performative is coherent and consistent with his work, which is recommendation in 
itself, I believe there is a further, pressing reason that we should want to read his theory 
of the true in this way. To see why this is so, we first need to review what we discovered 
in the previous two Chapters. Namely, that all experience is conceptually mediated and 
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that those mediating concepts are inherently delusive. As we saw in sections 3.4 – 
3.10, this entails that the truth cannot be positively expressed in any form. Any attempt 
to express the truth positively will ultimately become false, due to its imbrication with a 
wholly false totality, which serves as the grounds of the possibility of any assertion 
whatsoever. The strength of these falsifying forces, and the attendant impossibility of 
the positive expression of the true, would appear to leave us with two choices. First, 
one could jettison conceptuality altogether, and posit the true as accessible through 
some unorthodox, privileged medium which, being non-rational and non-conceptual, 
would be free of the baleful effects of the delusive concepts. This would amount to 
irrationalism. This is not a viable reading of Adorno; Adorno vituperatively rejects 
irrationalism.52 Secondly, one could abandon any theory of the truth as expressible in-
itself, and instead confine oneself wholly to the negative philosophical project of 
demolishing all positive philosophical projects. This would result in Adorno's philosophy 
being arrested in a state of scepticism, with its role being only the identification of 
internal inconsistencies, antinomies, and so on. 
 This latter reading of Adorno is also unworkable, although less incompatible 
with Adorno's philosophical project than irrationalism. While Adorno's philosophical 
project is assuredly negative, and does conduct itself as a search for inconsistencies, 
antinomies, and so on, it does in fact also exceed this merely sceptical project. One 
example of Adorno's apparent reversion to positivity was investigated above, in section 
3.11. It must also be noted that Adorno did not understand his philosophical project as 
merely sceptical, and in fact explicitly rejected scepticism - 
 
In principle, philosophy can always go astray, which is the sole reason why 
it can go forward. This has been recognized in skepticism and in 
pragmatism, most recently in Dewey's wholly humane version of the latter; 
but we ought to add it as a ferment to an emphatic philosophy instead of 
renouncing philosophy, from the outset, in favor of the test it has to stand. 
(ND: 14 / 25) 
 
Bourgeois scepticism, which relativism as a doctrine embodies, is perverse. 
(ND: 37 / 47, translation modified). 
 
It would seem, then, that Adorno did not construe his critical project as merely an 
ongoing project of the demolition of other philosophical positions. Rather, he held his 
                                                 
52
 See particularly (DE: 71 -72) 
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philosophy to be an attempt to construe and comprehend the true – that is, the non-
identical. He posits this expression of the non-identical as exceeding the mere negative 
criticism of other philosophical positions - 
 
Just as riddle-solving is constituted, in that the singular and dispersed 
elements of the question are brought into various groupings long enough for 
them to close together in a figure out of which the solution springs forth [...] 
so philosophy has to bring its elements [...] into changing constellations [...] 
until they fall into a figure which can be read as an answer. (Adorno 1977: 
32, emphasis mine). 
 
In this extract, Adorno is alleging that the negative philosophical project does not arrest 
itself merely with the negative criticism of the inconsistencies in other positions, but in 
fact serves as a method of instantiating and comprehending the non-identical; of 
delivering 'an answer'. However, our examination of negativity in section 3.4 – 3.10 
would appear to rule out the positive expression of anything true, due to the falsifying 
influence of the concept. We would appear to be without any method of making sense 
of Adorno's belief in this flash of comprehension. Either, it would seem, this flash is 
comprehended by means of the concept, in which case it is false, or it takes place 
outside of the concept, in which case it is irrational and hence, for Adorno, false also. 
We appear, then, to be caught in a dilemma. This dilemma is recognized obliquely by 
Adorno in Lectures on Negative Dialectics - 
 
[I]f we have no confidence in the feasibility of such a break-out from the 
sphere of the manufactured concept into the non-conceptual realm 
essentially belonging to that concept, this would rule out philosophizing of 
any kind [...] we would achieve the utopia of cognition [i.e., circumvent this 
problem] not by means of some allegedly superior non-conceptual methods, 
but by unlocking the non-conceptual by means of the concept, and the self-
criticism of concepts – without reducing what has been comprehended, the 
non-conceptual, to concepts by main force. (Adorno 2010: 73 – 74) 
 
Adorno himself, then, recognizes this fundamental dilemma which is produced by his 
unequivocal positing of concepts as falsifying. It leaves two apparent possibilities, the 
skeptical (ruling 'out philosophizing of any kind') or the irrational (positing 'some 
allegedly superior non-conceptual methods'). Adorno posits the escape from this 
dilemma as 'unlocking the non-conceptual by means of the concept'. In the foregoing, 
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we have been able to fill in the detail of this proposed escape from the dilemma, by 
means of a third epistemological category – namely, that of the performance. By 
identifying access to the true with the performance, Adorno allows us to employ the 
delusive conceptual make-up of experience not merely in order to construct negative 
critiques of other positions, but in fact in order to allow for an access to the true, viz. the 
non-identical. As such, my reading of Adorno as holding the true to be effected by a 
performance allows for the expression of the true in a flash of comprehension (i.e., the 
agent's experience) while avoiding positing Adorno's work as merely sceptical or 
irrational.  
 We should want to understand Adorno's theory of truth as performative, then, as 
it allows us to circumvent the most fundamental and serious dilemma of his philosophy 
– namely, the dilemma of scepticism and irrationalism. 
 
3.19 Partiality and Ongoing Critique 
There are two issues with this picture of Adorno's theory of the true which I will now 
clarify before ending the Chapter. The first, considered in this section, is an issue 
concerning the scope of the conceptual critique effected by the performatively true. The 
second, in the following section, will concern the compatibility of my picture with 
Adorno's understanding of truth as socio-historically relative. 
 Mentioned above in sections 3.16 – 3.17, but not explored in full detail, was the 
fact that this performative break with conceptuality does not entail an experience of the 
falsity of all concepts, but merely those relevant to the object under consideration. Put 
differently, this performative break does not acquaint one with the falsity of all 
conceptuality and identity thinking simpliciter: Rather, it serves to demonstrate the 
unworkability of the available concepts, employed in accordance with identity thinking, 
insofar as they attempt to subsume without remainder the subject of the considered 
philosophical critique.  
 This might seem somewhat unambitious. Adorno held out the promise of 
breaking with identity thinking 'in its own measure' (ND: 5 / 17). However, the picture I 
have given is somewhat more partial – rather than breaking with identity thinking as a 
whole, once and for all, we have instead an experience of its insufficiency in one area. 
The delusive conceptual array is not, as a whole critiqued – rather, its specific 
insufficiency in one area (be that philosophy of mind, freedom, etc.) is experienced. As 
such, the end result of Adorno's theory of performative truth (on my reading) is not a 
complete critique of identity thinking as it obtains in its entirety, but rather the display of 
the unworkability of a given section of the conceptual array created by identity thinking.  
 While the experience of the non-identical could not facilitate a one-place 
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inference to the intrinsic insufficiency of all identity thinking and conceptuality, it does 
serve to weaken the claim of identity thinking. It displays that concepts are in fact 
unable to subsume given phenomena and therefore begins to build a case against the 
presumption of the adequacy between concept and object. As a result, this theory of 
the performatively true entails an ongoing project of dialectical critique and 
performative engagement, which continually engages differing areas of knowledge and 
displays the failure of the available concepts.  
 This partiality – the inability of the performatively true to indict the whole of the 
conceptual array, to indict identity thinking simpliciter – entails a continual undermining 
of identity thinking by repeatedly performatively demonstrating the breakdown of 
concepts. This is not problematic, simply because it properly models Adorno's 
philosophical project. The voracious nature of Adorno's work – taking in metaphysics, 
moral philosophy, epistemology, etc. – demonstrates his commitment not to a single 
display of the falsity of identity thinking, but an ongoing project of aiming blows at 
identity thinking in an attempt to undermine it, and loosen its grip. 
  
3.20 The Historicality of the True 
In closing, I should just like to demonstrate the compatibility of the account here given 
with Adorno's theory of the socio-historical sensitivity of the true. Adorno repeatedly 
asserts that the true cannot be ahistorically grasped, and that no assertion or set of 
assertions can be said to hold indefinitely. Rather, all truths are vulnerable to socio-
historical changes which may render them false. Now that we have laid out Adorno's 
theory of the true in its full structural complexity, and moreover established the true as 
an experience of the break-down in one's conceptual array, where can we locate this 
socio-historical sensitivity? This concern may be exacerbated by the fact that we have 
posited the true as an experience. If truth is meaningfully socio-historically sensitive it 
must be able to both come into being and cease to obtain.53 However, if the truth is an 
experience, it appears to be immediate, and to not be meaningfully dependent for its 
truth-status on its discursive grounds. As such, it might appear to be difficult to 
introduce a socio-historically sensitive element to the truth-conditionality of that 
experience. The following may be an informative analogy. A sense-datum theorist takes 
the meaning of the experience of redness to be exhausted just by the experience of 
redness, this experience having no necessary (or even necessarily explanatory) 
relationship to its ground (to that which caused the experience to have the property of 
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 'We do not stand by everything we said in [Dialectic of Enlightenment ...] in its original form. 
That would be incompatible with a theory which attributes a temporal core to truth instead of 
contrasting truth as something invariable to the movement of history.' (DE: xi) 
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redness). The experience of red retains its status (as a red experience) just by virtue of 
its nature as being an experience of red.  Once a given experience at time t has been 
identified as being of red, and was in fact so coupled with a redness experience, there 
would seem to be no way to make this truth temporally sensitive. 
 Analogously, then, the worry for the experience of the true at time t would be 
that an experience of the true, qua experience which includes an acquaintance with the 
true, legitimates itself as true in a way which was not historically sensitive. Its truth 
would be predicated simply on its being an experience of its object, the non-identical. 
As such, there would seem to be no meaningful way in which to assert that it could 
forfeit its truth over time, just as my having an experience of redness at time t would 
seem to be invulnerable to becoming false over time. This difficulty can be overcome, 
however, if we consider once again the relationship which Adorno posits between 
immediacy and mediacy, and between the 'flash' experience of the true and its 
discursive grounds. 
 As we have seen above, the immediate experience of the true bears a 
determinate and necessary relationship to its discursive grounds (section 3.11). These 
grounds are a textual instantiation of a destructively phenomenological analysis of the 
aporias, contradictions, etc. which obtain in a conceptual array. It is this textual 
performance which is isomorphic to contradictions, aporias, etc. obtaining in the agent's 
own conceptual array which provide the materials for the agent's internal performance 
of these conceptual contradictions. As we have seen repeatedly in the course of this 
examination (see Chapters 1 and 2) concepts are not autarkically constituted, but in 
fact constituted by extra-conceptual processes, such as socio-historical developments, 
self-preservation as exercised in a social context, etc. As such, given any development 
in any of these meta-logical determining influences on the concept, the conceptual 
array will alter, as will the constitution of the concepts which make up the conceptual 
set. As such, old contradictions will disappear and new ones will be produced. 
 Given this action of meta-logical determination on the concepts, we see that 
aporias, contradictions, etc., are in fact contingent and socio-historically specific. From 
this follows the obvious conclusion that a philosophical text which performatively 
instantiates a given conceptual contradiction or set of aporias, etc., will, given a shift in 
the conceptual array of the kind just detailed, cease to be effective. Which is to say that 
the conceptual contradictions and difficulties thus outlined in the text will cease to be 
isomorphic with the agent's own conceptual array. From this follows that, should the 
agent read the discursive philosophical text, he will not be able to induce it to 
performatively produce an experience of the non-identical. This follows simply because 
there is no longer any congruence between the material and the cognitive structure 
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with which which it is trying to engage. The text attempts to engage and manipulate 
concepts of a given form and array imbrication which simply are no longer present in 
the agent. As such, we can confidently build in socio-historicality on this level – 
philosophical texts, which are the basis for experiences of the true, can come to fail to 
produce that experience over time. 
 While we have built in socio-historicality at the level of the grounds of the 
experience of the true, and hence coherently satisfied the need for a systematic 
support for Adorno's statement that philosophical texts lose their truth over time (DE: 
xi), there still remains an objection, although I think it is rather thin. This objection is 
that while we have proved the grounds of the experience of the non-identical to be 
socio-historically sensitive, we identified the experience  of the non-identical as the 
carrier of truth. As such, the truth remains an experience with no necessary reference 
to its grounds (cf. our analogy with the sense-datum theorist) and as such remains 
ahistorically true. The statement 'the experience at time t was an experience of the 
truth, albeit one which is not now repeatable from the same grounds' remains 
ahistorically true, regardless of socio-historical grounds. 
 I believe there are two responses to this difficulty. The first, conciliatory one 
would be to simply agree with our antagonist. It is indeed the case that the experience 
of the truth at time t remains true, although it is now not producible from the same 
grounds. However, this putative atemporality is so attenuated and qualified that it does 
not provide a contradiction with Adorno's fundamental tenet that truth is historical. The 
historicality of the true does not entail that truths indexically linked to a given time 
cease to be true; rather, it entails that experiences of the true come to be unattainable 
via given texts and assertions over time. 
 However, while this response is adequate and coherent with Adorno's theory, I 
believe we should reject it, for the simple reason that it is untrue. The tacit assumption 
of such a response (and, indeed, of the critique itself) is that the grounds of the 
experience of the true function like Wittgenstein's ladder – being employed in order to 
acquire an experience of the true, and then being discarded and not showing up in that 
experience itself. However, I believe that this is a misreading of the relationship 
between the experience of the true and its grounds, which ignores the dialectical 
relationship which obtains between the two. 
 Now, we have been careful to sharply distinguish between the experience of the 
true and the grounds of that experience, and to clearly separate them, just because of 
the falsifying nature of conceptuality, for Adorno. Were we to leave any doubt that the 
experience of the true could in some way be subject to the conceptual grounds of its 
possibility, the suspicion would instantly arise that in fact Adorno's theory of truth was 
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first not truly negative, and secondly that it would be subject to his holistic theory of 
falsity. All this being said, however, we must take care not to obscure the dialectical 
relationship which obtains between this experience of truth and its discursive grounds. 
The experience of the true is both radically different to its conceptual, discursive 
grounds and constituted by them. 
 The experience of the true is predicated on and conducts itself by means of the 
conceptual, discursive grounds and their outlay of a given set of conceptual aporias, 
contradictions, etc. We saw that the experience of the insufficiency of concepts does 
not come into being as causa sui but in fact derives from the experience of the evident 
insufficiency of the concepts involved in the specific analysis contained in a given 
philosophical text. The experience of the true, then, is inherently one of a transition 
from a given realized conceptual breakdown, to a perception of a conceptual 
insufficiency. The experience of the insufficiency of the available concepts, then, is not 
segmented and separated from the particular discursive analysis, nor is it sustainable 
without it. Rather, this claim is constituted and conducted by means of the particular 
discursive analyses which give rise to it. As such, the experience of the true inherently 
refers to the particular, discursive claim.  
 Once we see that this experience of the true in fact comprises two moments, 
the particular conceptual analysis and the resulting experience of an object unmediated 
by concepts, we can see that it in fact is straightforwardly socio-historically sensitive. 
The experience is constituted by a transition from a particular set of conceptual 
difficulties to a perception of the conceptual insufficiency of the available conceptual 
materials. The particular set of conceptual difficulties is predicated on the conceptual 
analyses contained in the philosophical text. We have already seen above that this 
element of the true (the particular analyses contained in the philosophical text) is 
thoroughly socio-historically sensitive. The analysis fails to obtain as socio-historical 
developments take place and the attendant constitution of the conceptual array alters. 
Once this falsification takes place, the experience, comprising a twofold moment both 
textual and experiential, is partially falsified, resulting in the falsity of the experience as 
a whole. The experience, of moving from the particular performative conceptual 
analysis to the encounter with the non-identical is no longer legitimate. The particular 
moment of the experience (the analyses of conceptual aporias, etc.) no longer serves 
to create a transition to the moment of the experience of the non-identical. This is so 
just because the contradictions which caused the agent's concepts to fail no longer 
obtain. As such, the agent's available conceptual apparatus is no longer brought to fail 
in the course of analyzing the given object, and as such the object does not defy 
conceptual subsumption. As such, a  failure of conceptuality is not instantiated, and the 
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agent thereby does not experience an object unsubsumed by concepts.54 The 
movement between the particular and universal moment was warranted by the 
obtaining conceptual array; with the erasure of that array over time, that movement has 
become illegitimate and incomprehensible, rather than merely unrepeatable.  
 The experience is no longer intelligible, then, as it appeals to a transmission 
from conceptual critique to experience of the non-identical which is no longer 
comprehensible, given the change in the mediated nature of experience. While it 
remains true that one had that experience at time t, one's having had that experience is 
no longer comprehensible. The experience is inherently constituted by a transmission 
from particular analyses to an experience of the insufficiency of the relevant  
conceptual apparatus and, consequently, a breakdown of the conceptual mediation of 
one's experience. This transmission derives from the concrete analyses being 
isomorphic with the agent's own conceptual array. Once this isomorphism fails to 
obtain, the experience of that concrete analysis rendering up a conceptual break 
becomes unintelligible, as it appeals to a form of experience structured  in a way that 
no longer obtains. It is constituted by a conceptual array which no longer obtains.  
 The experience of the true is also socio-historically sensitive, then. While, unlike 
the conceptual analysis in the particular philosophical text, it is not made untrue simply 
by the absence of its referents, it is rather rendered incomprehensible, by virtue of the 
absence of the conceptual array it would have to appeal to for meaning. 
 
3.21 Conclusion 
The preceding two Chapters set out the complex conceptual mediation which Adorno 
held to be a necessary feature of experience, as well as the falsification which Adorno 
held to ineluctably follow from the employment of those concepts. This situated the 
unique problem of Adorno's theory of the true – namely, that the true appears to 
preclude its own expression, on pain of the true's becoming false. The present Chapter 
has been a consideration of how Adorno is able, despite these difficulties, to prevent 
his theory of truth being merely an account of truth's impossibility. As I hope has been 
shown, the reading of Adorno expounded in this Chapter is thoroughly consistent with 
the exegetical evidence. Moreover, it also appears to be a unique theory of truth, 
                                                 
54
 It is clear that the transition from the particular moment of the textual critique to the 
experience of the non-identical itself can only be accomplished if the entirety of the available 
and relevant conceptual apparatus is defied by the object of comprehension. If this is not so, 
the object will be subsumed  under a concept and, in merely experiencing an object which 
defies subsumption by a limited set of concepts, the agent will take himself to have 
experienced a contingent and small-scale conceptual difficulty, rather than taking himself to 
have experienced the fundamental insufficiency of all currently available conceptual 
employment as relevant to that object. 
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hitherto unencountered. It might appear, then, as if my consideration of Adorno's theory 
of truth is at a close. However, the discussion of Adorno's theory of truth is not yet 
complete, as one of the most unique features of Adorno's texturalism has yet to be 
examined. 
 The theory of truth treated in this Chapter has been related entirely to an 
explicitly theoretical form of discourse, namely philosophy. It has been considered 
insofar as it allows or prevents given assertions to be termed true. However, I hold that 
the theory of truth here outlined also applies outside of the explicitly discursive attempts 
to instantiate truth. In short, I hold that the textural theory of truth here outlined also 
provides a theory of aesthetic truth. Moreover, this theory of truth must be applied to 
Adorno's Aesthetic Theory.  
 In being so applied, there will be two core benefits. First, Adorno's criterion of 
aesthetic truth – the 'shudder' – and its relation to the non-identical will be made clear, 
as an aesthetic instantiation of the philosophical mode of instantiating the non-identical. 
This has the result, then, that Adorno's assertion that the artwork has truth-content 
receives a thorough explication, and philosophical support. Furthermore, it also serves 
simply as a thorough explanation of Adorno's aesthetic analyses considered in 
isolation. Secondly, the relationship between Adorno's philosophical and aesthetic 
analyses will be elucidated. Adorno's implicit reliance on the congruity between 
aesthetic and philosophical categories is notable, and stands in need of justification. 
This will provide a legitimation for Adorno's application of philosophical terminology to 
aesthetic analyses and vice versa. This also has the corollary that the two accounts, 
the philosophical and the aesthetic, which Adorno gives of truth will be brought into a 
mutually supporting relationship as two instantiations of the same theory of truth. As 
such, each account will support the other.  
 The following  final Chapter, then, will constitute an application of the theory of 
truth here outlined to Adorno's aesthetic philosophy. In successfully showing that 
Adorno's theory of aesthetic truth is merely the application of the theory of truth here 
outlined in an aesthetic mode, the centrality and explanatory value of my reading of 
Adorno's theory of truth will be consolidated.  
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4. –Aesthetic Truth-Content 
and Oblique Second Reflection 
 
4.1 Introduction 
At the close of Chapter 3, we had established a reading of Adorno's theory of truth 
which held the true, for Adorno, to be accessible only by the combination of a thorough 
critique of the delusive mediators of experience and the agent's own performative 
engagement with that critique. The result of this combination, it was argued, constituted 
access to the non-identical. In the present Chapter, I will be attempting to demonstrate 
that this account should be seen as germane not only to Adorno's philosophy 
simpliciter, but also to Adorno's aesthetics. In other words, I am going to attempt to 
show that Adorno has a unified (which is not to say undifferentiated) account of truth-
content, which is intended to apply both to philosophical texts and to artworks. 
 The attempt to demonstrate the unity of aesthetic and philosophical truth-
content is problematized by the rhetorically rebarbative organization of Adorno's 
Aesthetic Theory. Adorno employs a number of terms, derived from a number of 
aesthetic philosophies, without providing explicit definitions of these terms. Rather than 
receiving static stipulative definitions, these terms are intended to derive their meaning 
solely from the variety of ways in which they are employed, in the variety of contexts in 
which Adorno employs them. An exhaustive account of Adorno's application of these 
terms – 'expression', 'construction', 'semblance', etc. – would constitute a thesis in 
itself. Due to the constraints of space, I will have to bypass this, and thus much of the 
richness of Adorno's aesthetic philosophy, in order to focus solely on those elements of 
Adorno's aesthetics which are presently relevant.  
 As a consequence, in the course of my attempt to demonstrate the unity of 
aesthetic and philosophical truth-content, I will confine myself solely to the examination 
of Adorno's theory of aesthetic truth-content, and the relationship he establishes 
between art and the non-identical. The account given in the present Chapter, then, will 
bypass giving a full account of the constitution of the aesthetic, and instead jump 
directly into the problem of the relationship between aesthetic and philosophical truth.  
 
4.2 Art, Truth, and Knowledge 
In order to begin, however, we must note that the project of this Chapter – to explain 
the relationship between art and truth – stands in need of justification. What reason 
have we to theorize any relationship between art and truth, for Adorno? In fact, Adorno 
explicitly and repeatedly posits art as bearing truth-content - 
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[A]rt is nevertheless the truth of society insofar as in its most authentic 
products the irrationality of the rational world order is expressed. (AT: 111) 
 
In this initial extract, Adorno straightforwardly asserts that art is, in itself, 'truth'; 
moreover, this truth is seen to be socially critical. Adorno asserts that the truth of art is, 
in essence, criticism – it forms a critique of the 'irrationality of the rational world order'. 
It is important to note, here, that this social criticism provided by the artwork is always 
already epistemological simultaneously. Adorno makes it clear that the artwork does 
not merely criticize society, but the rationality of the underlying structure which makes 
that society possible. This combination of art's truth, and the translation of this truth into 
a simultaneously social and epistemological critique, will go on to be highly important 
(and problematic) later on in the present Chapter (cf. sections 4.5 – 4.17).  
 
[T]ruth content presents itself in art as a multiplicity, not as the concept that 
abstractly subordinates artworks. The bond of the truth content of art to its 
works and the multiplicity of what surpasses identification accord. (AT: 173) 
 
Again, here we have Adorno explicitly making the claim that artworks bear truth 
content. In addition, we have Adorno's assertion that the artwork bears this truth 
content through an accord to that which 'surpasses identification'. This, again, will 
become highly significant later on; it represents an example of Adorno's (often tacit) 
identification of the truth content of the artwork with the non-identical. Adorno is here 
clearly beginning to position the truth content of the artwork not merely as socially-cum-
epistemologically critical (cf. (AT: 111)), but also as an instantiation of the non-identical 
(cf. (AT: 173)). This combination of socio-epistemological critique and non-identical 
instantiation already puts Adorno's theory of art's truth content into close accord with 
his account of the relationship between philosophy and truth. This accord, which is 
already apparent, will be filled in with more detail as this Chapter progresses. 
 It is, then, quite apparent at this point that Adorno posits the artwork as true, 
and moreover, places this truth into a socio-epistemologically critical and non-identical 
instantiating context. It is important also to note that Adorno explicitly rules out the 
artwork's relationship to truth as being irrational. Rather, Adorno takes the artwork to 
constitutively take part in rationality – 
 
Art is rationality that criticizes rationality without withdrawing from it; art is 
not something prerational or irrational, which would peremptorily condemn 
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it as untruth in the face of the entanglement of all human activity in the 
social totality. Rational and irrational theories of art are therefore equally 
faulty. (AT: 71) 
 
The artwork for Adorno, then, maintains the critical function outlined in (AT: 111), but 
explicitly does so not by 'withdrawing from [rationality]'. Adorno makes it clear that art 
does not exit the problematic of rationality in order to effect its critique – 'art is not 
something prerational or irrational'. This is important to note just because it entails that, 
like philosophy, art is not able to exit the problematic of rationality, which is falsified by 
identity thinking.   
 It should be noted that Adorno does clearly state that the artwork is not merely 
rational, in his assertion that '[r]ational and irrational theories of art are [...] equally 
faulty' (AT: 71), but also clearly nonetheless rationally constituted ('Art is rationality that 
[...]' (AT: 71)). This raises the question of why, if art is rational, it cannot be captured by 
a rational theory of art. 
 Further sense will be given to this quirk of Adorno's theory of art (its being 
rational and yet not merely rational) when I demonstrate in sections 4.12 – 4.17, that 
the artwork is in fact a dialectical critique (just as philosophy is). As a consequence, 
while the artwork is rational, it is not merely rational, as it dialectically employs 
rationality in such a way that it gives rise to a break in concepts and access to the 
extra-conceptual non-identical. 
  
4.3 Knowledge and the Non-Identical 
While we have construed art as rational, and as knowledge, and come across some 
hints in Adorno's work that the truth of art coincides with an instantiation of the non-
identical, we still need to make this fully explicit in order to have sufficient justification 
for proceeding to attempt to take Adorno as having a unified theory of philosophical and 
aesthetic truth-content. Put differently, the congruity between Adorno's theory of 
aesthetic and philosophical truth will be clearer once we have a clear demonstration 
that, like philosophy, the knowledge of art is knowledge of the non-identical. Adorno in 
fact provides explicit confirmation of this thought - 
 
The new wants non-identity, yet intention reduces it to identity; modern art 
constantly works at the Münchhausen trick of carrying out the identification 
of the non-identical. (AT: 29) 
 
This extract serves as a direct statement by Adorno of the constitutive function of the 
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artwork – namely, attempting to instantiate, by virtue of the identity-thinking which 
governs its sphere of activity, the non-identical. While we will at a later stage interrogate 
how this instantiation is intended to be possible, it is important to note here the 
closeness of Adorno's articulation of the role of art concerning the true, to his 
articulation of the role of philosophy - 
 
To change [the] direction of conceptuality, to give it a turn toward 
nonidentity, is the hinge of negative dialectics. (ND: 12 / 24) 
 
Here, as in the case of art, we have the assertion that dialectical philosophy attempts to 
grasp the non-identical via the process of identification. This parallel is only intended at 
this point in my argument to be suggestive. It is suggestive just because it, first, 
explicitly posits art as not only a mode of knowledge, but, as in dialectical philosophy, a 
mode of knowledge of the non-identical. Secondly, as was demonstrated above, it is 
suggestive just because it posits the problematic of this knowledge of the non-identical 
in the aesthetic mode to be, just as in the philosophical context, governed by the 
antagonism between the identifying mode and the non-identical object of 
comprehension. In each case, Adorno alleges that the solution to this antagonism lies 
in the 'identification of the non-identical'. 
 At this point, then, we have established that art is not only a mode of knowledge 
of truth, which is rationally constituted, but moreover that this truth which is known by 
art is the non-identical. This clearly provides a strong basis upon which to begin 
arguing that the truth of philosophy and art can be seen as commensurate. In order to 
begin building on this basis, I should first like to demonstrate that, as in the case of 
philosophy, the truth of art is wholly negative and critical. This is best established by re-
examining the problematic of delusive mediation in the aesthetic context. 
 
4.4 Artistic Knowledge and Mediation 
As is acknowledged by Adorno's assertion (extracted above (AT: 29)) that the artwork 
has to 'identify the non-identical' (bearing in mind the pejorative loading which Adorno 
lends to the concept of 'identity'), art's status as knowledge is not unproblematic. 
Adorno's positing the artwork as a form of knowledge immediately causes his aesthetic 
philosophy to re-enter the problematic of delusive mediation explained in sections 2.12 
– 2.13. This is so just because art constitutively takes place in experience. This entails 
the re-introduction of the problem of delusive experience just because, as was 
explained at length in Chapters 1 and 2, continuous experience simpliciter is both 
made possible by, and determined by, a set of mediating epistemological influences. 
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The most obvious of these influences is the concept; Adorno takes conceptual 
mediation to be a condition of the possibility of continuous experience. However, this 
conceptual mediation of experience is itself determined by the delusive epistemological 
influences of reification, self-preservation, and thin determination. As a consequence of 
the unity of the concept with these delusive influences, the experience of the agent is 
falsified (cf. Chapter 2). 
 Now, as we know that art constitutively takes place in experience, we can derive 
two conclusions from Adorno's theory of experiential mediation. First, and importantly, 
the artwork (as experienced) will make use of, and be constituted by the employment 
of, concepts. This will become essential for the argument conducted in this Chapter. As 
a consequence of this conceptuality of aesthetic experience, and the attendant 
delusive mediation of that aesthetic experience, we can derive the second conclusion 
that any knowledge derived from the aesthetic must be negative. I will now 
demonstrate why this is the case.  
 As aesthetic experience is constitutively made possible by virtue of the 
employment of concepts, and the artwork is perceived by virtue of its interaction with 
concepts, the artwork cannot, for Adorno, constitute an escape from the problematic of 
false consciousness. Rather, it is itself, by virtue of taking place in experience, 
imbricated with these falsifying influences. Like philosophy, then, the artwork cannot 
provide knowledge in the form of an irrational exit from falsified, rational discourse. 
 This leaves two possibilities. The artwork can either attempt to provide positive 
knowledge, or it can provide negative knowledge. There is, of course, the problem that 
at this stage it is not apparent how philosophical positivity and negativity would 
translate into aesthetic positivity and negativity. While the concept of aesthetic 
negativity will become clearer in the course of this Chapter, as I demonstrate the formal 
and dialectical nature of the artwork, we can stipulatively define the aesthetically 
positive form of knowledge as any attempt by the artwork to transparently display the 
true, in such a way that the agent could take himself to have unproblematic, 
undialectical access to it by virtue of the conventional employment of his concepts. 
Should the artwork attempt to positively instantiate the true, and thereby provide 
knowledge, it would be falsified by virtue of its being imbricated in the false 
epistemological totality. For further explanation of this, please see the section on 
Adorno's holistic theory of falsity (cf. Section 3.8). So, if the artwork positively 
instantiates the true, it in fact fails to instantiate the true at all; rather, the true in turn 
becomes falsified. 
 As a consequence of this, it is clear that, if the artwork can be seen to be true at 
all, it must, like philosophy, attempt to present the truth in the midst of and by virtue of 
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the falsifying mediators of experience and, thereby, be negative and critical. Just as in 
our examination of philosophical truth, the artwork cannot present the truth positively, 
on pain of being falsified by the mediators of experience. So, then, the artwork must, as 
a form of genuine knowledge of truth, be constituted by a negative critique of those 
delusive mediators by which it is itself constituted.  
 While this has, up to this point, been a speculative argument for seeing the 
artwork's truth as negative, Adorno in fact explicitly endorses this view - 
 
The survival of mimesis, the nonconceptual affinity of the subjectively 
produced with its unposited other, defines art as a form of knowledge and 
to that extent as “rational” [...] The aporia of art, pulled between regression 
to literal magic  or surrender of the mimetic impulse to thinglike rationality, 
dictates its law of motion; the aporia cannot be eliminated [...] Art is 
rationality that criticizes rationality without withdrawing from it; art is not 
something prerational or irrational [.] (AT: 70 – 71)  
 
Here, Adorno not only explicitly endorses the negativity of art ('art [...] criticizes 
rationality') but also, importantly, locates this negativity in the same epistemological 
context as the negativity of philosophy. We saw in section 3.11 that philosophy was 
caught in a dilemma. It could not employ the 'discursive', merely rational model of truth, 
wherein the truth of philosophy would become assimilated by rational, identity thinking, 
and thereby falsified. However, an irrational escape from this problematic was equally 
impossible. This lead to philosophy's dialectical nature, as neither merely rational nor 
irrational. 
 The above extract finds art in an identical situation. Art is not reducible either to 
'magic' (the irrational), nor to 'thinglike rationality'. Like philosophy, art solves this 
problem through constituting itself as a rational critique of rationality. 
 This similarity in the negativity of art and philosophy could merely, of course, be 
skin deep. There is nothing to say that the negativity of philosophy and art relates to 
the same, identical problematic. Adorno, however, asserts that they do relate to the 
same problematic – 
 
[A]rt requires philosophy, which interprets it in order to say what it is unable 
to say, whereas art is only able to say it by not saying it. (AT: 94) 
 
This 'requirement' of philosophy, on the part of art, is so vastly significant as it clearly 
implies that, if philosophy is to speak for art, it must be capable of doing so. Which is to 
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say, that philosophy and art must share a common truth content which is, as it were, 
expressible across the two modes of knowledge. If this were the case, the negativity of 
philosophy and art would constitute two forms of knowledge, both of which serve as 
differing ways of knowing the same thing. And Adorno in fact endorses this reading - 
 
Philosophy and art converge in their truth content: The progressive self-
unfolding truth of the artwork is none other than the truth of the 
philosophical concept. (AT: 172) 
 
This unambiguous assertion from Adorno closes a potential explanatory gap. Art and 
philosophy are identically placed, epistemologically, in terms of conceptual and 
delusive mediation. Moreover, both art and philosophy deal with this situation 
negatively and dialectically. Finally, their truth content is held to be identical. This would 
appear to put us on a strong footing to claim, and proceed to detail, the unity of the 
theory of truth for art and philosophy. 
 
4.5 The Specificity of Art 
At this point, then, we have gone a long way towards demonstrating the equivalence 
between philosophical and aesthetic truth. We have established that both art and 
philosophy endeavor to negatively instantiate the non-identical through the use of 
constitutively false, 'identifying' processes. Moreover, we have Adorno's claim that the 
truth-content of each is identical.  
 It is at this point, however, that we should pause. The talk of unity between art 
and philosophy, and Adorno's own description, raises the danger that we are making 
art and philosophy homogeneous. It may seem as if we are in danger of negating the 
specificity of the artwork by virtue of collapsing art into philosophy. As such, it is 
important that some time is dedicated to making clear that, although I am attempting to 
unify Adorno's theory of truth across his philosophy and aesthetics, I still intend to 
maintain the differentiation between art and philosophy in Adorno's thought in general. 
The simplest way of demonstrating this differentiation is in examining how art and 
philosophy each deal with their delusive mediation. Although, as we saw above in 
section 4.4, both art and philosophy are, for Adorno, subject to the same delusive 
mediators of experience, it is the different ways in which art and philosophy engage 
and circumvent this delusive mediation that will best reveal the differentiation which 
obtains between art and philosophy. 
 In the case of philosophy, the concepts which mediate its experience also serve 
to make possible explicitly theoretical discourse. Which is to say, that the concepts 
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which mediate and make possible philosophical experience are also transparently 
available for employment in the course of that philosophical experience. As such, 
philosophy is able to negate its delusive mediation by virtue of an explicitly conceptual, 
destructively phenomenological practice. The delusive conceptual mediators of 
experience are ready at hand to be employed in the course of the philosophical text, 
and thereby an explicit, transparently conceptual critique of the delusive mediation of 
experience, and the delusive nature of conceptuality, is possible. It is also important to 
note, as a corollary, that philosophy is transparently concerned with the truth, and 
conducts itself in order to grasp the truth.55 
 While the artwork is, according to Adorno, also construable as a critique of the 
delusive nature of conceptuality and the conceptual mediation of experience, it is clear 
that it cannot comport itself in the same manner as philosophy. This differentiation 
between the methods in which art and philosophy produce a critique of the delusive 
mediators of experience and thereby afford access to the non-identical must be 
maintained in our account for two reasons. First, speaking exegetically, Adorno 
provides clear textual evidence that he conceives of art's truth as being produced, and 
as requiring to be interpreted, differently to philosophy. Secondly, leaving Adorno's 
assertions to one side, there are clear compelling philosophical reasons for taking 
pains not to merely reduce art's truth to philosophy's truth. These two reasons in fact 
are mutually constitutive and so are best considered jointly. The relation of the artwork, 
as Adorno conceives it, to autonomy provides the best way of doing so. 
 
4.6 Art and Autonomy 
The fundamental divorce between philosophy and art which was outlined above 
concerned the fact that although both philosophy and art instantiate the true through 
critique of the delusive mediators of experience, philosophy, unlike art, is able to have 
these same mediating processes appear explicitly in its medium. Put differently, 
philosophical truth is problematized by the delusive mediation of concepts; however, 
philosophy is capable of employing and manipulating these self-same concepts in its 
medium, in order to reveal their falsity. If we are to take Adorno seriously when he 
claims that art is autonomous (AT: 137), it is clear that art is unable to emulate 
philosophy's direct engagement with its delusive mediators. As Adorno puts it - 
 
The affinity of [aesthetic] construction with cognitive processes, or perhaps 
rather with their interpretation by the theory of knowledge, is no less 
                                                 
55
 This assertion made with the usual qualifications, and the usual exceptions in mind. 
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evident than is their difference, which is that art does not make judgments 
and when it does, it shatters its own concept. (AT: 74) 
 
Precisely what Adorno means by 'autonomy' is a sticky issue, which will be returned to 
in the remainder of this Chapter. Presently, it can be taken to mean that the artwork 
constitutes itself solely by means of aesthetic processes, and solely in relation to what 
Adorno calls 'aesthetic material' (AT: 201). It is not important (at this point) that we 
elucidate precisely the import of these terms. What is important, however, is to note 
that this entails that the artwork does not include, nor concern itself with, explicitly 
epistemological, truth-relevant, materials. On the contrary, it confines itself entirely to 
the aesthetic, with no explicit dealing with matters of truth. Adorno lends this aspect of 
the artwork emphasis - 
 
The mimesis of artworks is their resemblance  to themselves. Whether 
univocally or ambiguously, this law is posited by the initial act of each 
artwork; by virtue of its constitution each work is bound by it [...] By the 
autonomy of their form, artworks forbid the incorporation of the absolute as 
if they were symbols [...] Hermetic works do not assert what transcends 
them as though they were Being occupying an ultimate realm[.] (AT: 137) 
 
This confirms the assertions above; the artwork does not incorporate any explicitly 
epistemological material. Moreover, it does not constitute itself as a form of knowledge 
– which is to say, it constitutes itself solely as an artwork, with both its materials and 
constitutive practices having no intended reference to anything extra-aesthetic (society, 
concepts, philosophical problems, etc.). The artwork, rather, concerns itself solely with 
problems of aesthetic form and content. 
 Adorno thematizes this autonomous exclusivity of the artwork, variously terming 
the artwork 'hermetic' or 'blind' (cf. (AT: 96, 135, 137, 162), (AT: 237, 251) respectively). 
This serves to throw into relief the impossibility of collapsing the categories of art and 
philosophy. Rather than being a poetic, or poorly executed, form of philosophy, it would 
appear that art instead has no relevance whatsoever to the complex of philosophical 
problems, having only in common the fact that the positive presentation of any truth in 
art is problematized by the same delusive mediators. The severity of this divorce from 
the nature of philosophy, however, may seem to have the consequence that Adorno 
has in fact scuppered his project of seeing the artwork as a form of rational access to 
the non-identical. While he intends the artwork to be a form of knowledge, which 
breaks the falsifying compulsion of the concept in order to reach the non-identical (AT: 
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29), it would seem that his uncompromising insistence on the artwork's being 
autonomously constituted serves merely to rule this out. If the artwork takes place in 
experience, and is thus falsified by the mediators of experience, and moreover is 
constitutively incapable of directly addressing and critiquing these mediators, it would 
seem that the artwork is incapable of avoiding being falsified itself. Art's autonomy 
entails that it excludes, as content, the epistemological processes which falsify it. As it 
cannot address them (having excluded them), then, it would appear impossible that it 
could successfully critique them, and escape being falsified by them. 
 At this point, then, Adorno's laudable refusal to homogenize art and philosophy 
appears to have undermined any possibility of seeing art as rational knowledge of the 
true and, by extension, my thesis that artistic and philosophical truth are coeval. 
However, Adorno flatly denies that the artwork's hermetic status precludes its critical, 
non-identical instantiating, truth. Rather, he terms the artwork a 'windowless monad' 
(AT: 6) which, just by virtue of concentrating solely on its aesthetic properties, is able to 
effect the kind of critique and demolition of its falsifying mediators that is necessary - 
  
That artworks as windowless monads “represent” what they themselves 
are not can scarcely be understood except in that their own dynamic, their 
immanent historicity as a dialectic of nature and its domination, not only is 
of the same essence as the dialectic external to them but resembles it 
without imitating it. (AT: 6) 
 
In terming the artwork a 'windowless monad', Adorno is here drawing on Leibniz's 
philosophy for an analogy. For Leibniz, the universe is composed of monads, each of 
which reflects the others without causally interacting with them (Jolley 2005: 68 - 69). 
Solely by virtue of developing its own inner principle, each monad nonetheless reflects 
the entirety of the universe, without causal interaction with any other monad. As the 
above extract shows, it is this acausal, non-interactive reflection in Leibniz's 
monadology which is most salient for comprehending Adorno's 'windowless monads'. 
Without directly dealing with that which is external to the aesthetic (in fact, precluding 
the extra-aesthetic by virtue of its autonomy), the artwork nonetheless, Adorno claims, 
'resembles [...] without imitating' the state of the extra-aesthetic. In this sense, the 
artwork can be seen as analogous to Leibniz's monads – without causal interaction, 
the artwork nonetheless expresses the reality of that which is external to it. 
 The following extract reinforces the curious propensity of the artwork, despite its 
being 'closed' and 'blind', to reflect and criticize the extra-aesthetic - 
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Artworks are closed to one another, blind, and yet in their hermeticism they 
represent what is external. Thus it is, in any case, that they present 
themselves to tradition as that living autarchy that Goethe was fond of 
calling entelechy, the synonym for monad [...] As an element of an over-
arching context of the spirit of an epoch, entwined with history and society, 
artworks go beyond their monadic limit even though they lack windows. 
(AT: 237) 
 
We see both that Adorno posits the artwork as completely autonomous and yet, 
through this 'blind' autonomy, capable of addressing the extra-aesthetic. This 
introduces a gap between this autonomy and the extra-aesthetic which we will examine 
in the following section. This hermetic autonomy gives rise to what Adorno calls the 
'shudder' - 
 
Artworks are images as apparition, as appearance, and not as a copy. If 
through the demythologization of the world consciousness freed itself from 
the ancient shudder, that shudder is permanently reproduced in the 
historical antagonism of subject and object. The object became as 
incommensurable to experience, as foreign and frightening, as mana once 
was. This permeates the image character [of art]. (AT: 110 – 111)  
 
The artwork's enigmaticalness is the shudder, not however in its living 
presence but as a recollection. (AT: 367) 
 
To summarize the extracts above, then, just by virtue of the hermetic artwork's blind 
working, the 'windowless monad' of the completed artwork causes an experience in the 
viewer which Adorno terms the 'shudder'. As we saw in the penultimate extract (2004: 
110 - 111), Adorno asserts that this shudder recapitulates an experience which began 
the history of mankind, against which the history of mankind was opposed. Referring 
back to the analysis conducted across Chapters 1 and 2, it is clear that this initial 
experience is itself the non-identical. It is the terror Adorno asserted, in Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, that mankind incurred when it was first confronted by something 
incapable of being reduced to or controlled by its categories. This experience, as we 
saw in Chapter 1, is the experience of the non-identical which initializes the formation 
of identity thinking.  
 The import of the above extracts is that Adorno is asserting that, despite the 
artwork's complete hermeticity and autonomy, the artwork's hermetic process of 
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constitution nonetheless results in a negating of the delusive mediation with which 
aesthetic experience is imbricated, and as a consequence serves as an instantiation of 
the non-identical. This introduces a mystery of some magnitude – how can we take this 
autonomously aesthetic process to result in a critical break with epistemologically false 
mediation, resulting in access to the non-identical? In order to understand how Adorno 
is able to hold that art can be knowledge, and instantiate the non-identical in such a 
way as to be identical with philosophical truth, while simultaneously constituting itself 
exclusively aesthetically, we need to re-examine Adorno's assertion that the artwork is 
hermetically autonomous. If there is some account available which is able to put the 
hermetic constitution of the artwork in touch with that which is aesthetically 
heteronomous (epistemology, philosophical and social problematics, etc.), then we may 
begin to lend plausibility to Adorno's account. As such, the strong differentiation 
between art and philosophy will not preclude their bearing identical truth contents. 
 
4.7 Autonomy and Heteronomy 
The problem we are currently dealing with, then, is that the artwork's autonomous, 
'hermetic' process of constituting itself is, according to Adorno, sufficient to constitute 
and create a critique of the heteronomous, extra-aesthetic totality. Moreover, this 
critique, like the philosophical critique, terminates in acquainting the agent with the non-
identical. This seems so problematic just because the mediating totality within which 
the artwork takes place necessarily falsifies that which takes place within it, and 
prevents any experience of the non-identical. Philosophy was able to circumvent the 
falsifying mediation of experience by virtue of explicitly addressing and manipulating 
this mediation. However, if the artwork is wholly hermetic, the engagement, critique and 
evasion of these delusive mediators would seem impossible, as they do not come into 
consideration in the artwork's hermetic constitutive processes. In short, there is an 
apparent explanatory gap between the hermetic constitution of the artwork, and its 
allegedly socio-historically and philosophically critical, and non-identical instantiating, 
status. 
 In order to preserve the possibility of construing art as having truth content, and 
this truth-content as being concerned with the non-identical, it is imperative that this 
explanatory gap is closed. To begin closing this explanatory gap, we need to reconsider 
the relationship between aesthetic autonomy (the artwork's being exclusively formed by 
aesthetic processes and aesthetic materials) and heteronomy (anything which falls 
outside the hermetic artwork's remit). This explanatory gap is constituted by the 
omission of an explanation of how anything which takes place in the realm of aesthetic 
autonomy could be germane to, or a critique of, that which takes place in the 
141 
heteronomic sphere (e.g., philosophy, epistemological concepts, etc.). This explanatory 
gap is in fact capable of being closed in Adorno's philosophy; as so often, it will be 
Adorno's theory of mediation which serves to solve the problem. It will allow us to 
explain how, as Adorno argues we should, we can understand aesthetic autonomy as 
constituted by heteronomy - 
 
Art and artworks are perishable, not simply because by their heteronomy 
they are dependent, but because right into the smallest detail of their 
autonomy [...] they are not only art but something foreign and opposed to 
it. (AT: 5) 
 
Examining the autonomy of the artwork in Adorno's aesthetics, it is helpful to break 
down his theory of the autonomy of the artwork into its two main constituents. Adorno 
conceives the autonomous artwork to be composed of an autonomous aesthetic 
process of formation which concerns itself with wholly autonomous aesthetic materials. 
I will deal with these two elements of aesthetic autonomy in turn, and draw their 
mediated relationship to heteronomy.  
 
4.8 Aesthetic Process of Formation 
The autonomous aesthetic process of formation, as Adorno understands it, constitutes 
itself wholly without reference to the artist's intention.56 While of course the artist likely 
engages in aesthetic praxis in order to satisfy some given intention, this intention does 
not (in authentic art) show up in the process of aesthetic formation. Rather, the process 
of aesthetic formation is confined solely to  following the formal demands of the 
aesthetic materials selected. Adorno asserts that the aesthetic materials employed by 
the aesthetic process of formation have inherent formal demands; it is the role of the 
aesthetic process of formation to reconcile these competing formal demands in order to 
form a completed artwork. 
 
The real source of the risk taken by all artworks, however, is not located in 
their level of contingency but rather in the fact that each one must follow the 
whippoorwill of objectivity immanent to it, without any guarantee that the 
productive forces – the spirit of the artist and his procedures – will be equal 
to that objectivity. (AT: 48) 
                                                 
56
 'Among the sources of error in the contemporary interpretation and critique of artworks the 
most disastrous is the confusion of the intention, what the artist supposedly wants to say, 
with the content [Gehalt] of the work.' (AT: 197) 
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Adorno often likens this process of aesthetic formation to the construction of a riddle or 
Vexierbild (most often translated as 'enigma' – 'All artworks – and art altogether – are 
enigmas; since antiquity this has been an irritation to the theory of art' (AT: 160)).57 This 
analogy is informative, just in that a riddle or Vexierbild is not constructed according to 
any pre-established subjective intention, or intended emotive content, but rather is only 
possible according to the formal properties of its constituents and medium (the visual 
for the Vexierbild, the linguistic for the riddle). The finished product is the outcome of a 
dialectic between the formal properties of each of its constituents, and could not have 
been imposed onto these constituents. (Taking the Vexierbild for an example – the 
concealed image cannot be imposed on the apparent image, but rather must be 
composed from the formal properties of the constituents of the apparent image. Failing 
to do so will cause the concealed image to no longer be concealed, and the constitutive 
ambiguity of the Vexierbild will be lost). So, Adorno's thematic use of riddles and 
Vexierbilder in relation to art is informative. In these cases, the resultant meaning could 
not be pre-established, nor could it be imposed on the constitutive materials. Rather, 
the nature and formal content of these materials plays a dialectically important 
determining role in establishing what the completed artefact will be, and what it will 
'mean'. This, then, is how we should understand the process of aesthetic creation – it 
does not concern itself with propounding an ideology, nor attempt to instantiate an 
'aesthetic idea', but is instead a formal process of investigating aesthetic materials, and 
then resolving the various aesthetic and formal properties of these aesthetic materials 
such that an aesthetic whole results.58 
 We can see that the process of aesthetic formation is removed from subjective 
impulse, desire, and belief, and instead becomes a process of following and resolving 
the formal properties of its aesthetic materials.59 We can now clearly see the 
                                                 
57
 The Vexierbild, or picture puzzle, is an illustration which plays on the formal characteristics of 
its components in order to introduce a number of different possible images, often satirical in 
intent. Examples of these abound, but the most common are likely Wittgenstein's duck-
rabbit, and a great deal of Dali's work (e.g. The Great Paranoiac). 
58
 Of course, this process of attempting to form a unified aesthetic whole is not necessarily 
completable. In fact, Adorno holds that the seamless aesthetic whole has been rendered 
impossible by socio-historical developments. Therefore, any 'authentic' attempt at aesthetic 
unity will necessarily fail, and display its failure in its incapability to form a seamless whole – 
'As little as art is to be defined by any other element, it is simply identical with form. Every 
other element can be negated in the concept of form, even aesthetic unity, the idea of form 
that first made the wholeness and autonomy of the artwork possible. In highly developed 
modern works, form tends to dissociate unity, either in the interest of expression or to 
criticize art's affirmative character.' (AT: 186) 
59
 'Rather, the lyric poet's désinvolture, his dispensation from the strictures of logic – which 
enter his sphere only as shadows – grants him the possibility of following the immanent 
lawfulness of his works.' (AT: 72). 
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justification for Adorno's terming the artwork 'hermetic'. The artwork's constituting 
principle is nothing other than the treatment of the properties of aesthetic materials 
without reference to anything but their formal properties. As such, the artwork is entirely 
autonomous considered from the perspective of its constitutive processes. 
 However, considered dialectically, these constitutive processes, which operate 
autonomously, are in fact constituted by heteronomy. It is in understanding autonomy's 
constitution by heteronomy that we will be able to de-problematize the relationship 
between the blind, hermetic artwork and socio-historically sensitive, philosophical truth. 
It will do so by giving us a method of comprehending how the artwork's genuinely 
autonomous (which is to say, completely unconcerned with any extra-aesthetic 
existent) process of constitution and selection of materials entails a truth which is not 
merely aesthetic, but also socio-historically critical.  
 Adorno has frequent reference to the mutual constitution of aesthetic-process 
autonomy and heteronomy, frequently referring to this as the 'guilt' of the artwork - 
  
The monadological character of artworks would not have formed without 
the guilt of the monstrous monadological character of society, but only by 
its means do artworks achieve that objectivity that transcends solipsism. 
(AT: 389) 
 
Adorno's use of term monad is somewhat confusing here – it does not seem that 
Adorno means to signify the acausal reflective properties of Leibniz's monads we 
explored above in section 4.6. Rather, here the 'monadological character' shared by 
the artwork and society would appear to refer to the self-contained nature of Leiniz's 
monads. Leibniz's monads have no parts, and each is a complete unity (i.e., it is not 
differentiated, but bears its properties uniformly throughout itself) (Jolley 2005: 66 - 67). 
This seems to be what Adorno has in mind when he calls society 'monstrous[ly] 
monadological', as this would map onto Adorno's critique of society as a 'total society, 
which encompasses all relationships and impulses' (DE: 29). Society's monadological 
character would then be its reduction of all of its constituent elements to its own 
standard, its elimination of differentiation in favour of total unity. Similarly, art also 
dominates its elements and forces them into a single unified whole (AT: 369) . 
 The 'guilt' of art's autonomy mentioned here is best construed sociologically. 
Here the 'guilt' of art is identified with its employment of the 'means' of the 
monadological character of society; the artwork removes itself completely from its 
milieu, and makes no attempt to manipulate or engage with things as they are. While 
this withdrawal is necessary for the correct execution of the artwork's constitutive, 
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autonomous processes, it is nonetheless guilty as this withdrawal furthers the cause of 
that milieu, which is inhumane.  
 
Art becomes entangled in the guilt context of the living, not only because its 
distance allows the guilt context to prevail but even more importantly 
because it makes incisions in the living in order to help it to language and 
thus mutilates it. (AT: 190) 
 
This second extract reinforces this line of thought by identifying the guilt of the artwork 
with its 'distance'. In censuring the artwork for its 'distance', Adorno clearly supports my 
interpretation above. The economic and social realities of artistic praxis, and the 
artwork's inner autonomy, necessitate a culpable compromise with an inhumane state 
of affairs. The second half of this extract, however is less clear. Here 'guilt' appears to 
be identified with an epistemological trait – the 'mutilation' which the artwork causes in 
'bringing the living to language'. This guilty mutilation through language seems clearly 
to shift the sense of 'guilt' with which we are dealing. This second type of guilt is not 
(merely) sociological, but epistemological. The artwork would seem to incur this guilt 
through an inevitable falsification introduced by its medium of expression. This 
inevitable falsification of 'language' is a clear reference to the problematic of identity 
thinking. 
 As we saw in the analyses of the above extracts, this 'guilt' of the artwork would 
appear to be polysemic. The guilt is doubly constituted by the artwork's heteronomic 
social standing, and due to its partaking in 'identity thinking'.60 I will address these in 
turn. 
 The first form of 'guilt', that of the artwork's imbrication in a falsely constituted 
social whole, is relatively simple. Adorno claims that, although the artwork constitutes 
itself as autonomous, this 'autonomous' activity is predicated on a heteronomous state 
of affairs. This heteronomous state of affairs is nothing other than the unequal social 
distribution of funds which makes possible the artist's hermetic, blind activity. To 
sharpen the issue, the 'hermetic' nature of the artwork entails that the artist must 
construct the artwork without reference to immediate interest, ideology, or instrumental 
goal. This, however, is only possible if the artist's situation is such that he is able to 
                                                 
60
 There is a further guilt of the artwork, not strictly relevant at this juncture. This would be the 
artwork's 'feign[ing] the factual existence of reconciliation' (AT: 177). The artwork is 
unavoidably ideological, and hence guilty, as the vision of utopia afforded by its critical nature 
redounds to the good reputation of the false world which made that artwork possible. 'That is 
the melancholy of art. It achieves an unreal reconciliation at the price of real reconciliation.' 
(AT: 68). 
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withdraw himself from these concerns; and this possibility itself is determined either 
directly by the social structure (in the case of state funding), or indirectly (in the case of 
patronage or personal wealth, either of which are only possible in a society which 
unevenly distributes its funds). There is an inescapable air of the mundane about this 
line of thought. However, there is something to be said for it. Namely, that this 
represents an attempt by Adorno to demonstrate that even at the most basic aesthetic 
level (the existence of the artist, and the artist's engaging the activity of creating art) 
autonomy in fact presupposes heteronomy. Adorno's understanding is that the nature 
of autonomous aesthetic production (the hermetic working of aesthetic material) is itself 
only possible if certain heteronomous conditions obtain (the artist's social standing, 
level of funds, etc.). So, at this basic level, Adorno attempts to demonstrate the 
constitution of autonomous aesthetic activity by the heteronomous. 
 Adorno's second line of thought, that the autonomy of aesthetic processes is 
constituted by heteronomy by virtue of taking part in identity thinking, is far more 
significant. Adorno claims that heteronomy is constitutive of the autonomous aesthetic 
processes. This constitution of the autonomous by the heteronomous lies in the 
artwork's 'domination' (AT: 370) of its aesthetic materials. Adorno asserts both that the 
artwork is inherently 'dominating' and that this domination itself serves to heteronomize 
the artwork by making it dependent on the identity thinking of which this aesthetic 
domination is an offshoot. To make good sense of this, however, we need to be 
absolutely clear about what Adorno means by 'domination'. 
 It is tempting to read the artwork's domination as the artwork's attempt to force 
its aesthetic materials into a pre-established aesthetic form. On this reading, then, 
domination would arise whenever the formal properties of the aesthetic materials were 
ignored in order to subordinate them to some imposed formal project. However, this 
reading is untenable, just because Adorno also identifies this domination of the artwork 
as being present in ideal, 'authentic' artworks.61 As he identifies the artwork's optimality 
or authenticity with its refusal to impose pre-established forms, it is apparent that the 
domination referred to cannot be of this type.62 Indeed, rather than a contingent 
property of art, Adorno takes this domination to be intrinsic, and thus present in both 
authentic and inauthentic art. Adorno makes clear what he intends by 'domination' in 
the following – 
                                                 
61
 'The opposition of artworks to domination is mimesis of domination. They must assimilate 
themselves to the comportment of domination in order to produce something qualitatively 
distinct from the world of domination.' (AT: 370) 
62
 'The work is no longer to be the result of any pregiven form; flourishes, ornament, and all 
residual elements of an overarching formal character are to be renounced: The artwork is to 
be organized from below.' (AT: 142). 
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The opposition of artworks to domination is mimesis of domination. They 
must assimilate themselves to the comportment of domination in order to 
produce something qualitatively distinct from the world of domination [...] 
aesthetic rationality wants to make good on the damage done by nature-
dominating rationality. (AT: 370) 
 
What art in the broadest sense works with, it oppresses: This is the ritual of 
the domination of nature that lives on in play. (AT: 65) 
 
No matter how much spirit may exert domination in art, its objectivation 
frees it from the aims of domination. (AT: 148) 
 
Undoubtedly, the historical [aesthetic] materials and their domination – 
technique – advance; discoveries such as those of perspective in painting 
and polyphony in music are the most obvious examples. (AT: 276) 
 
We see, then, that the dominating aspect of the artwork consists in the artwork's 
submitting the sensuous, apparent properties of the aesthetic materials to the 'spiritual' 
(i.e., intellectual) design of the aesthetic whole. This sacrifice of each of the immanent 
demands of each of the aesthetic materials to the overarching, formal whole, 
unavoidably transforms, mutilates and reduces the aesthetic materials involved. 
Characteristically, then, the forming processes of the artwork reduce and ignore the full 
complexity of the materials it deals with in order to facilitate the project of creating an 
aesthetic whole. The aesthetic materials are 'oppressed' by the strictures of the 
artwork's technique in order to produce the artwork.   
 As such, the artwork constitutively recapitulates the characteristic error and 
'guilt' of identity thinking, which does violence to the topic of its thought in order to 
attain the pragmatic goal of that thought. This similarity between the forming process of 
artworks and of the epistemological processes of identity thinking is not intended to be 
merely analogical. Rather, Adorno has a developed account of the emergence of art 
from, and imbrication of art with, identity thinking. In Aesthetic Theory, Adorno 
repeatedly locates the artwork as a constituent part of the dialectic of enlightenment 
sharing, along with instrumental reason, a rejection of magic and an attempt to control 
and identify its material. There is not space to enter into this in detail, but the following 
should serve to illustrate Adorno's line of thought - 
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Art holds true to the shudder, but not by regression to it. Rather, art is its 
legacy. The spirit of the artworks produces the shudder by externalizing it in 
objects. Thus art participates in the actual movement of history in accord 
with the law of enlightenment[.]  (AT: 157) 
 
How does this constitute a violation of the artwork's autonomy? Well, firstly, you will 
note that Adorno's genealogy in the extract above of artistic practice posits that practice 
as dependent on, and an offshoot of, identity thinking. It is an element of the 
'movement of history' presently ruled by the 'law of enlightenment'. You will recall from 
Chapters 1 and 2 that this law of enlightenment ('identity thinking') is not necessary 
simpliciter, but rather necessary given the currently obtaining socio-historical 
conditions. As such, the constitution of the artwork is not autonomous simpliciter, but 
rather only autonomous so long as certain heteronomous conditions (i.e., the 
prevalence of identity thinking) obtain. 
 This however is less important than the second way in which the extract makes 
clear the relationship between autonomy and heteronomy. In the above extract, Adorno 
does not posit art as exempt from the 'enlightenment' (i.e., identity thinking) character 
of human thought hitherto, or merely critical of it, but in fact fully imbricated with it. Just 
as we saw in the case of philosophy, art is itself constitutively subject to the 
determination and character of enlightenment thought. As such, art is immanently 
constituted by identity thinking; its processes are a species of identity thinking. 
 As art is itself a species of identity thinking, it therefore constitutively comports 
itself in the same manner as other forms of identity thinking (this is shown in the 
artwork's 'dominating' its material (AT: 65), just as concepts dominate their objects). As 
such, there is a pre-established harmony between the way in which aesthetic 
processes and conceptual processes operate. Both will conduct themselves according 
to the constitutive tendencies of 'enlightenment' thinking. As such, we have the first 
example of the artwork's autonomy (following the immanent demands of its own 
constitutive processes) being reflective of (without causal interaction with) the extra-
aesthetic. 
 We have seen, then, that aesthetic processes, while behaving wholly 
autonomously, are nonetheless only possible should given heteronomous conditions 
obtain. Moreover, these autonomous aesthetic processes, by virtue of being species of 
enlightenment thought, are predetermined to be congruous with non-aesthetic cognitive 
processes, such as obtain in philosophy and conceptual thought. This determination of 
the autonomous by the heteronomous serves to begin making clear how the hermetic, 
'blind' working of the artwork, and the resultant autonomous aesthetic truth, can 
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amount to a philosophically critical, negative instantiation of the non-identical. Our 
examination of the relationship between the aesthetic processes and identity thinking 
demonstrates this, in beginning  to make apparent the continuity between the hermetic 
status of the artwork and the obtaining socio-epistemological whole. While these 
aesthetic processes do not intentionally form a critique of the obtaining epistemology of 
identity thinking, and do not in fact concern themselves with that epistemology, we can 
see that in fact the aesthetic process is constituted and determined by that epistemic 
whole. As such, the artwork's aesthetic processes recapitulate the nature of the 
processes of the epistemological whole. Both the epistemological and aesthetic 
processes are identical in terms of their constitutive treatment of the material they work 
– they are both species of identity thinking.  
 This lays the foundation for understanding the relationship between the 
artwork's hermetic status and that artwork's being (despite its hermetic status) an 
epistemological critique, a form of knowledge, and an instantiation of the non-identical. 
We should understand the aesthetic processes as an oblique reflection of the 
epistemological whole. This reflection is oblique just because the epistemological 
totality asserts itself in the aesthetic, just as it does in the conceptual mediation of 
experience and in philosophy, but does so without being itself instantiated in those 
processes (the artwork does not explicitly reflect the epistemological whole in its 
expressed themes – rather, the determination is conceptual and oblique). Rather, the 
aesthetic processes remain autonomous (i.e., do not for-themselves consider anything 
extra-aesthetic) but, due to their autonomy's being constituted by heteronomy come, 
through autonomous activity to recapitulate the heteronomous epistemological totality. 
This reconfirms the usefulness of Adorno's analogy of the 'windowless monad'; like 
Leibniz's monad, the artwork reflects what is outside itself, without bearing any explicit 
relationship to that outside. This examination, then, of the relationship between 
autonomy and heteronomy in the context of the constitutive processes of the artwork 
has already begun to make clear how we can close the gap between the autonomy of 
the artwork, the artwork's truth, and that truth's socio-critical, non-identical instantiating 
nature. Looking at the relationship between autonomy and heteronomy in the context of 
aesthetic materials will serve to finally close this gap. 
 
4.9 Aesthetic Materials and the Autonomy of Selection 
Our examination of aesthetic materials must be split into two distinct parts. We should 
understand the autonomy of aesthetic materials as having a two-fold character – 
autonomy of selection and autonomy of function. This section will briefly go over the 
autonomy of selection; the following section will be dedicated to explaining the far more 
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significant autonomy of function. 
 We turn first, then, to the autonomy of 'selection' as regards aesthetic materials. 
The autonomy of selection consists in the artwork's having complete control over those 
materials it chooses to employ.63 Moreover, this expansion of control is accompanied 
by a distaste for any 'immediate', sensuous material. This particular form of autonomy 
in the artwork is conceived by Adorno as developing over time. He often refers to this 
as the artwork's ongoing 'spiritualization' - 
 
Spiritualization [...] the continuous expansion of the mimetic taboo on art 
[...] The sensuously pleasing has come under [...] attack. On the one hand, 
through the artwork's spiritualization the external must pass by way of spirit 
and has increasingly become the appearance of the inward. (AT: 120 – 
121) 
 
As the artwork's constitutive processes develops over time, they cease to be content 
with pre-given formal material (as in, for example, pre-determined features of 'genre' 
fiction) and increasingly determine for  themselves that which is fit to be an aesthetic 
material. This tendency expresses itself in a twofold way. First, it is expressed in the 
free selection of aesthetic materials without dictation from pre-established forms. This 
amounts to an expansion of the freedom of the principle of selection. Secondly, it is 
expressed in the new tendency of the artwork to incorporate previously given formal 
elements of the artworks as content (as in modernism's play with previously constitutive 
features of given genres, and collage's recontextualization of other artworks into 
material for the creation of a new artwork). This latter expression of the spiritualization 
of the artwork amounts to an expansion of that which is there to be selected. 
 The heteronomy of this selection of aesthetic materials is closely related to the 
heteronomy of aesthetic processes identified in the previous section. The ongoing 
process of the autonomization of aesthetic material selection is understood by Adorno 
as part of the artwork's ongoing spiritualization. This spiritualization is not confined to 
the aesthetic, but in fact a part of the ongoing dialectic of enlightenment - 
 
Thus, as Hegel was the first to perceive, the spirit of artworks is integrated 
into an overarching process of spiritualization: that of the progress of 
consciousness. (AT: 120) 
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 As such, it is ambiguous between being an autonomous aesthetic process, or a form of 
autonomy better associated with the aesthetic material. 
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While spiritualization, then, is a process of the increasing autonomization of the 
artwork's control over the selection of its materials, it remains heteronomously 
determined nonetheless. As the process of spiritualization is predicated upon and 
made possible by 'the progress of consciousness' (itself determined by identity 
thinking, and the ongoing intensification of identity thinking in the dialectic of 
enlightenment), the artwork's autonomy of selection as expressed in the artwork's 
spiritualization is in fact dependent on the heteronomous. As we found in the relation of 
aesthetic processes to identity thinking, the autonomy of selection is in fact 
heteronomous as it is made possible by extra-aesthetic epistemological processes. 
The autonomy of aesthetic material selection, then, bears the same 'guilt' of the 
aesthetic processes that we saw in the previous section, and similarly reinforces the 
deep tie between the autonomous aesthetic processes and the contingent 
epistemological whole which makes them possible. As such, it also reinforces the 
artwork's status as an oblique reflection of the epistemological whole.  
 The examination of aesthetic processes, and the autonomy of selection with 
regards to aesthetic material, has served to lay the foundation for an account which 
can close the explanatory gap between autonomous art and the truth of art's being 
inherently concerned with the extra-aesthetic. We have seen that the artwork's entirely 
autonomous procedures will, due to their heteronomous constitution, entail that the 
artwork's broad nature will be akin to identity thinking, by virtue of the dominating 
nature of its treatment of its material. At this point, however, this is far from sufficient; all 
we have established is that the methodology of art and critical philosophy is similar. At 
this point, then, the artwork is still entirely hermetic in our account, without reference to 
the extra-aesthetic. We have merely established that that which takes place in the 
interior of the artwork is methodologically akin to that which takes place in identity 
thinking. However, the materials of the artwork and of epistemology remain completely 
separate, and we are left with no way of understanding the relation of the former to the 
latter. If we are to see art as bearing an epistemologically significant truth (the access 
to the non-identical), we still require an explanation of how the blind, hermetic nature of 
the artwork and aesthetic material can refer outside of itself. This will be achieved in the 
following section, in an investigation of the autonomy of function of aesthetic materials. 
This will finally close the explanatory gap between the hermetic nature and the non-
identical instantiating, critical nature of the artwork. 
 
4.10 Aesthetic Materials and Autonomy of Function 
Understanding the precise relationship between the autonomy of aesthetic material's 
function and the heteronomy of that function is the most important part of this final 
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Chapter. We have already established that aesthetic processes are obliquely reflective 
of the epistemological totality. If we can establish that aesthetic materials are 
themselves obliquely reflective of epistemological materials, then we will be able to 
show that the artwork is truly a form of knowledge directly equivalent to the 
philosophical, and thus that its form of truth should be assimilable to philosophy's. 
 I will first explain the autonomy of aesthetic function. We have established that 
the artwork is, for Adorno, a formal process of formation in which the aesthetic 
processes follow the aesthetic properties of the selected aesthetic materials. Adorno 
posits the function of these aesthetic materials as not in fact reducible to their 
sensuous or emotive properties (AT: 120 - 121). They are not employed due to a 
contingent liking for their sensuous properties (i.e., timbre, hue, or assonance), nor due 
to their conformity to a pre-established intention to instantiate a given emotional or 
political truth. Rather, these aesthetic materials present to the artist a set of demands. 
Aesthetic materials, then, are always already a form of aesthetic logic, imposing their 
own formal demands, and having their own set of aesthetico-logical possibilities (i.e., 
that which they can and cannot be combined with, and so on). I stipulate 'aesthetico-
logical' to refer to the formal properties of aesthetic materials, as they determine the 
process of aesthetic formation. An example of the aesthetico-logical property of an 
aesthetic material x would be its employment entailing the impossibility of the 
employment of y, or, more plausibly, its employment opening up a large set of 
possibilities, and simultaneously closing off some other set. Although, as will be shown, 
these aesthetico-logical properties are socio-historically determined, an informative 
analogy might be harmonic relations in music. If one is committed to avoiding 
dissonance, the employment of a given note immediately excludes a large set of notes 
from being employed after it, as it stands in a relation of dissonance with these notes. 
This is an aesthetico-logical relation. However, relationships of assonance and 
dissonance are largely 'natural' – aesthetico-logical properties for Adorno are not 
natural properties, as will be shown.   
 As aesthetic materials are possessed of their own aesthetic logic, it is the 
artist's role to follow and reconcile these formal demands - 
 
[O]pinion generally produces opinionated artworks that are, in a certain 
sense, rationalistic. Rather, the lyric poet's desinvolture, his dispensation 
from the strictures of logic – which enter his sphere only as shadows – 
grants him the possibility of following the immanent lawfulness of his 
works. (AT: 72) 
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The first 'logic' referred to in the above extract refers not to aesthetico-logic, but 
rather formal logic. It is the 'immanent lawfulness' of the work which represents 
what I call aesthetico-logical properties. 'Opinionated' artworks are not 
successful precisely because they lack the passivity, the desinvolture of the artist 
which allows him to follow the 'immanent lawfulness' of the aesthetic material. It 
is the 'consistency of [… the artwork's] elaboration' (AT: 170) of these aesthetic 
materials which entails the truth of the artwork, rather than anything over and 
above the formal / aesthetico-logical constitution of the aesthetic materials - 
 
[A]esthetic form is the objective organization within each artwork of what 
appears as bindingly eloquent. It is the nonviolent synthesis of the diffuse 
that nevertheless preserves it as what it is in its divergences and 
contradictions, and for this reason form is actually an unfolding of truth. (AT: 
189) 
 
Aesthetic materials present themselves to the aesthetic processes not as non-aesthetic 
content to be subordinated to the formal demands of aesthetic processes. (Which is to 
say, aesthetic materials are never, for Adorno, heteronomous material which must be 
forcibly aestheticized). Rather, aesthetic materials are always already sets of 
aesthetico-logical demands, which it is the artist's role to formally reconcile and 
reconfigure, in order to attain a true artwork. 
 It is difficult to comprehend what these purely aesthetico-logical properties of 
aesthetic materials could amount to for Adorno. Once introduced into the nexus of the 
artwork, the aesthetic materials appear to be re-translated out of their sensuous and 
affective properties, and to become instead purely formal, in this aesthetico-logical 
sense.64 These non-sensuous, logical properties of aesthetic materials I will refer to as 
'valencies'. In chemistry, a valency refers to a given atom's propensity to combine (or 
fail to combine) with other atoms. This valency, then, determines the atom's possible 
behaviour when taken in combination with other atoms. It would appear helpful to apply 
this concept analogously to aesthetic materials in the context of the artwork. 
 Aesthetic materials, according to Adorno, possess what I have termed 
aesthetico-logical properties, strictly separate from pre-established forms, the artist's 
liking, their affective properties, etc., which dictate the possible combinations which can 
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 I do not have time to enter into this, but I should like to note that this explains Adorno's 
assertion that form and content are not separable or unified, but rather dialectically 
interrelated (AT: 194). The formal properties of aesthetic materials, and hence the resultant 
artwork, are nothing but the content of the aesthetic materials, appearing as form in the 
aesthetic nexus. 
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result in their employment in an artwork. Moreover, Adorno asserts that optimal 
aesthetic formation consists in nothing over the artist's noting and reconciling these 
aesthetico-logical properties of the aesthetic materials. It is just the aesthetic materials' 
possession of a valency, a kind of property of aesthetic logic completely divorced from 
the material's apparent properties outside of the logic of aesthetic formation, which 
constitutes its autonomy. While it is difficult to cash out further what these aesthetico-
logical properties are, one can appeal to the phenomenology of artistic creation for 
support. Anyone who has engaged in creative activity will be familiar with the 
experience of the 'flow' of creation; the experience of each creative action 
recommending, out of itself, some further elaboration of the artwork being constructed. 
This obscure sensation of the aesthetic material's recommending certain decisions, 
and precluding others, may be taken as an experience of the aesthetico-logical 
properties of aesthetic materials. 
 By virtue of being present to the aesthetic processes merely as aesthetico-
logical valencies, the aesthetic materials retain their autonomy. The aesthetic materials 
are 'blind' in precisely the same fashion as the aesthetic processes, by virtue of 
presenting themselves merely as aesthetico-logical properties assimilable by the 
aesthetic logic of those processes. The aesthetic materials are blind, and ensure the 
blindness of the aesthetic processes, in that they present themselves to the aesthetic 
processes without any reference to or relevance to anything outside of the aesthetic 
nexus. Rather, they are present solely as aesthetic valencies which must be dominated 
by the aesthetic processes, such that they can be forced into a state of dialectical 
tension with a constellation of other aesthetic materials (AT: 189). This constitutes the 
autonomy of function of aesthetic materials – their function in the process of aesthetic 
construction is explicable purely in terms of aesthetic logic, and hence purely 
autonomous. 
 Understanding the heteronomy of the function of these aesthetic materials 
requires a new approach. The heteronomy of all of the previous forms of aesthetic 
autonomy were explicable by understanding their autonomy as being an off-shoot from 
(and contingent on) extra-aesthetic heteronomous epistemological processes. In this 
case, however, this will not work. Aesthetic materials are the subject matter of the 
aesthetic processes, with which those processes are confronted. Rather, what is 
required is a method of positing the valencies of the aesthetic materials as determined 
by the extra-aesthetic totality. That these valencies are in fact determined by extra-
aesthetic content is not in doubt - 
 
The artwork is mediated to real history by its monadological nucleus. 
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History is the content of artworks. To analyze artworks means no less than 
to become conscious of the history immanently sedimented in them. (AT: 
112)  
 
[Aesthetic m]aterials and objects are as historically and socially preformed 
as are their methods; they are definitively transformed by what transpires 
in the works. (AT: 117) 
 
While the above provides evidence that Adorno understands that which takes place in 
the interior of the artwork to be determined by that which is exterior, Adorno does not 
directly provide an explanation of how these aesthetic materials are themselves able to 
reinstate, and thus be reflective of, obtaining sociohistorical-epistemological 
contradictions. This leads to the problem which Dahlhaus identifies with Adorno's 
aesthetic theory. As the autonomy of the artwork is apparently absolute, there would 
appear to be no way to relate what takes place in the artwork to what inheres outside of 
the artwork – 
 
Adorno not infrequently displays a penchant  for aphoristic allusions to 
socio-musical parallels and analogies, allusions which are by no means 
intended to be taken playfully, but the logical status of which is difficult to 
perceive or even questionable. (Dahlhaus 1987: 243, cited in Paddison 
2002: 210) 
 
[T]he contrast between [...] the formal-analytically individualizing and the 
sociological generalizing procedure [...] returns as a flaw in the individual 
analyses, though Adorno was able at times, by dint of great effort, to 
reconcile the opposing views by force. And the verbal analogies perform the 
function of hiding a gap which the arguments could not close. (Dahlhaus 
1987: 244, cited in Paddison 2002: 223) 
 
In identifying this problem, Dahlhaus is treating the same problem which has been 
exercising us in the present Chapter. Namely, the problem of relating the autonomous 
formation and analysis of the autonomous artwork to that which is extra-aesthetic. As 
Paddison notes in the paper in which Dahlhaus' challenge is cited, this problem can 
only be closed by consideration of the dialectical nature of aesthetic material - 
 
Adorno argues that while aesthetics must immerse itself in the particularity 
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of individual works through analysis[...] it is nevertheless a different kind of 
activity to analysis. [...][The] aim of such an analysis is to establish the 
technical consistency (Stimmigkeit) of a work. [...]  [Access to the truth 
content of the artwork requires not only analysis, but second reflection] in 
terms of the relations between the work and its social and historical context 
– a context which also constitutes, if I understand Adorno correctly, the 
work's structure, as socially and historically mediated content (Gehalt) [...] 
It is the “correspondence” between the inner structural relations of the work 
and the outer social relations within which it functions which is the focus of 
Adorno's interpretative method, and which is, of course, the bone of 
contention [for writers like Dahlhaus]. (Paddison 2002: 222 – 223, 
emphasis mine) 
 
In his monograph  Adorno's Aesthetics of Music, Paddison enters into this problem at 
length, giving an extended treatment of Adorno's theory of mediation, and its operation 
in the aesthetic context. Paddison notes that the structural properties and 
contradictions of  
aesthetic materials are themselves the products of social antagonisms - 
 
At the level of the aesthetic, sublimated/repressed social antagonisms and 
internalized socio-cultural norms (including the process of rationalization 
itself) are displaced into the arena of the artistic material. The stage on 
which the conflict now plays itself out is the structure of the work of art, in 
the tension between mimesis and rationality, expression and construction, 
as the immanent dialectic of the material. (Paddison 1993: 147, emphasis 
mine) 
 
As such, Paddison is alleging that the aesthetic function of aesthetic materials is 
constituted by the extra-aesthetic; that the autonomy of function is in fact determined 
by heteronomy. This reflection which obtains between the aesthetic materials and the 
extra-aesthetic is, Paddison alleges, constituted by 'mimesis'.65 'Mimesis', in the context 
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 To be exact, it is the conflict between mimesis and rationality which Paddison introduces. 
However, as demonstrated by their respective association with expression and construction, 
it is mimesis which serves to open the artwork to the extra-aesthetic, whereas rationality (as 
expressed in construction and aesthetic technology) serves to motor the ongoing, 
autonomous development of aesthetic processes. There is a deeper sense in which the two 
poles mediate one another (that the processes of rationality are crystallized productions of 
mimesis, and that mimesis is only possible by means of these rational crystallizations, cf. 
(Paddison 1993: 146)). However, for the purposes of this analysis, I will treat mimesis and 
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of Adorno's philosophical writings, denotes the propensity of thought to try and 
assimilate itself to the world in order to comprehend it.66 It is clear that we cannot 
interpret aesthetic mimesis along these lines, just due to the hermeticity of the artwork 
already outlined.67  It is clear that Paddison himself does not understand the operation 
of aesthetic mimesis in this way. Paddison asserts that, for example - 
 
Social antagonisms exist within the art work only in 'cipher' form, as 
deviations from the handed-down formal norms, as genres, formal types 
and schemata' (Paddison 1993: 147) 
 
Here, Paddison is arguing that the artwork's mimesis is not constituted by a mimetic 
introjection of social contradictions and the extra-aesthetic as content, but in fact the 
mimesis of the artwork is a formal occurrence taking place at the level of the artwork's 
structure.68 As such, it would appear that the 'mimesis' which Paddison refers to is 
equivalent to what I have earlier referred to as 'oblique reflection'. Put into the idiom 
employed in this Chapter, Paddison holds that the valencies of the aesthetic materials 
reflect extra-aesthetic contradictions. As such, the 'mimesis' of the artwork is an oblique 
reflection, obtaining between the autonomously blind and the heteronomous. Adorno 
himself endorses this reading of mimesis - 
 
The survival of mimesis, the nonconceptual affinity of the subjectively 
produced  with its unposited other, defines art as a form of knowledge and 
to that extent as 'rational' (AT: 70) 
                                                                                                                                               
rationality as separable, with the implicit caveat that, despite being distinct, they are 
ultimately moments in a dialectical whole. 
66
 'The cave drawings are stages of a process and in no way an early one. The first images 
must have been preceded by a mimetic comportment – the assimilation of the self to its 
other.' (AT: 416). 
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 There is also a more developed defense of this position on aesthetic mimesis, which I cannot 
give here for reasons of space. In short, it would appear that interpreting mimesis as being 
the artwork's intentional, as it were, attempt to make itself like the world would result in a 
violation of the artwork's autonomy, as well as the impossibility of aesthetic construction. The 
artwork would become a melange of mimetically imported social content and autonomous 
aesthetic content – this would be in clear violation of Adorno's claim that nothing can appear 
in the artwork without first being reduced to the artwork's own categories. ('Object in art and 
object in empirical reality are entirely distinct. In art the object is the work produced by art, as 
much containing elements of empirical reality as displacing, dissolving, and reconstructing 
them according to the work's own law. Only through such transformation [...] does art give 
empirical reality its due.' (AT: 335)). This self-same reduction to the artwork's own 
autonomous categories prevents the appearance in the artwork of any mimetically imported 
content. One cannot read mimesis in this way, then, as it does not cohere with Adorno's 
theory of the artwork. 
68
 'It is the sociohistorical content of the work mediated through its form which Adorno identifies, 
as far as  one can understand him here, as the truth content of the work, and which is thus 
the telos of his hermeneutics.' (Paddison 2002: 223) 
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Adorno is here making clear that mimesis is not constituted by an intentional attempt 
by the artist to make himself, or his artwork, like the world. Rather, mimesis describes 
an unintentional 'affinity [for] its unposited other' (emphasis mine). As such, art's 
mimesis entails nothing other than its oblique reflection of its other; the artwork, without 
positing or intending any reference to the extra-aesthetic, nonetheless reflects it. But 
how do we understand this oblique reflection? Paddison puts us on the right track by 
pointing towards the operation of mediation - 
 
It means that the second reflection of sociological critique and 
philosophical interpretation, which Adorno argues is both separate from 
and, at the same time, dependent upon the first reflection of immanent 
analysis, has its model within the process of mediation which constitutes 
the technical structure of the work itself. (Paddison 2002: 224) 
 
Paddison is undoubtedly correct on this score. Mediation is the only remaining 
available method of understanding the autonomous aesthetic function of aesthetic 
materials as heteronomously constituted. As we saw in Chapter 3, one of the unique 
properties of mediation is that it influences that which is mediated without showing up 
in that which is mediated. As such, it provides a method of seeing the autonomy of 
aesthetic materials as determined, without thereby compromising the autonomous 
nature of their operation in the artwork. Mediation allows us to see them as determined, 
without this extra-aesthetic determination showing up in the course of the employment 
of the aesthetic processes and hence compromising the hermeticity of the artwork. If 
we are able to reapply our analysis of the mediation of experience to aesthetic 
materials, I believe we will be able to form an account of the heteronomy of the 
autonomy of aesthetic function.  
 We know from Chapter 3 that any experience, with the exception of the 
experience of the non-identical, is determined by the following three influences – 
reification, thin determination, and self-preservation. As aesthetic materials and 
processes are wholly hermetic and insular, these three mediating influences which 
make experience possible appear our best hope of achieving a coherent theory of the 
mediation of autonomous aesthetic material function. 
 The combination of reification and self-preservation, in enforcing the tendency 
of identity thinking to take its concepts of things to exhaust those things, is clearly at 
issue in the aesthetic. We have already seen this in our examination of the heteronomy 
of the aesthetic processes. While these mediating influences are germane in the case 
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of the aesthetic processes, however, they do not appear to be relevant when 
considering aesthetic materials. As already noted, the aesthetic materials are the 
subject of these epistemological processes. As such, these forms of mediation are 
unable to effect an oblique reflection between aesthetic materials and the extra-
aesthetic. 
 It is thin determination, then, which we should see as making possible the 
oblique reflection which obtains between aesthetic materials and the extra-aesthetic. 
We have already seen, in Chapters 2 and 3, that thin determination entails that the 
apparent properties of any subject of experience are in fact determined by the social 
totality. Moreover, this thin determination is, due to reification, not transparent to 
immediate experience. As such, the presented properties of objects in experience are 
in fact mediated productions of thin determination.  
 Having established in Chapters 2 and 3 that thin determination is a property of 
all experience simpliciter, it is in fact a short step to comprehending how it is that the 
autonomy of aesthetic function is obliquely reflective of the social totality. Aesthetic 
materials are constitutively experiential, both in the course of their employment in the 
construction of the artwork, as well as in their role in the subject's experience of the 
completed artwork. This being the case, we have a straightforward legitimation for 
Adorno's claim, and Paddison's reading of Adorno, that the artwork's structure, which it 
effects through the reconciliation of aesthetic material's valencies, comes to be 
obliquely reflective of the social totality.  
 We can see from the existence of thin determination that the autonomous 
valencies which aesthetic materials bear in the artwork must, qua an object of 
experience, be determined by thin determination. As such, these valencies must be 
obliquely reflective of the source of this thin determination – i.e., the social totality. As 
such, the formal problematic of aesthetic materials, and the resultant form of the 
completed artwork, are obliquely reflective of the extra-aesthetic. The autonomy of the 
valencies presented by the aesthetic materials to the aesthetic processes is in fact 
determined by the heteronomy of the social totality. As such, the aesthetic 
contradictions, tensions, and incompatibilities which the aesthetic processes encounter 
in the course of the autonomic process of constructing the artwork are in fact 
determined by and reflective of the totality, which mediates and makes possible these 
aesthetic materials and processes. Adorno himself confirms this --  
 
The question posed by artworks is how the truth of reality can become their 
own truth [...] Their pure existence criticizes the existence of a spirit that 
exclusively manipulates its other. What is socially untrue, flawed, and 
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ideological is communicated to the structure of artworks as flawed, 
indeterminate and inadequate. For the manner in which artworks react, 
their objective 'attitude toward objectivity', remains an attitude toward 
reality. (AT: 363, emphasis mine) 
  
4.11 Hermeticity and the Extra-Aesthetic 
The aim of the previous sections has been to erode the explanatory gap which 
appeared between the artwork as autonomous and hermetic, and the idea of this 
closed autonomous process resulting in an instantiation of a socio-critical, negative 
truth which gave rise to an instantiation of the non-identical. The remainder of the 
essay will deal with the precise way in which the artwork comes to instantiate truth. 
However, at this point it is important to note that the explanatory gap between the 
hermetic aesthetic and the extra-aesthetic has been filled. 
 Our investigation of the mutual constitution of autonomy and heteronomy in 
both aesthetic processes and aesthetic materials has resulted in a theory of oblique 
reflection. While the artwork undeniably operates autonomously, and its processes 
have no intentional reference to the extra-aesthetic whatsoever, the mediation of this 
autonomy by heteronomy entails that the artwork's processes always already involve 
not only a working of aesthetic materials, but an oblique working and critique of the 
mediating processes which gave rise to the valencies of those aesthetic materials.  
 We have yet to receive an explanation of how the artwork will employ this 
oblique reflection in such a way as to create truth – however, it is important to 
recognize that the very category of oblique reflection has served to close off the most 
serious difficulty facing Adorno's theory of art as bearing truth-content. In the remainder 
of this Chapter, we will examine how the artwork employs its oblique reflection in such 
a way as to instantiate truth. As a corollary, I will also be demonstrating the profound 
affinity of aesthetic and philosophical method, and the entailed affinity of their forms of 
truth. 
 
4.12 Aesthetic Method and Philosophical Method: Towards a Theory of Art as 
Knowledge 
The remaining desiderata of this Chapter are to establish the artwork as a form of 
knowledge, and to establish that the artwork's form of knowledge, and resultant truth, 
are isomorphic to philosophy's. I will take it that a demonstration of the latter, the affinity 
of the artwork and philosophy's processes in attaining knowledge, will entail a 
demonstration of art as a form of knowledge. As such, I will move directly to 
demonstrating the parallelism between philosophy and art as forms of knowledge. 
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 Presently, we have established that the aesthetic processes are determined by 
identity thinking, and 'dominate' their aesthetic materials in accordance with identity 
thinking. In this respect, this is identical to the epistemological faculties and processes 
operative in philosophical thought, which are also constitutively in accord with the form 
of identity thinking. Moreover, we have also established that aesthetic materials are 
determined by the same social totality which is operative in the mediation of the 
epistemological materials (concepts, objects, and so on) which philosophy makes use 
of due to the incidence of the same process of thin determination in both aesthetic and 
non-aesthetic contexts. The parallel between philosophy and art is clearly quite strong 
at this point.  
 However, what is distinctive about philosophy, as we saw in Chapter 3, is that it 
employs the delusive epistemological processes available to it in such a way as to 
break with those processes. It does so by forming a dialectical 'constellation' in the 
philosophical text, which phenomenologically demonstrates the failure of all candidate 
concepts. This textual demonstration is then inwardly performed by the agent, which 
causes the concepts which mediate his experience to fail, thereby acquainting him with 
the non-identical. It is this specific philosophical dialectical method which results in the 
knowledge of the non-identical, and thereby the knowledge that there are existents 
which are not exhaustible by one's present conceptual array.  
 While the artwork may share the same nature of its processes with philosophy, 
and its materials may be identically mediated, this does not entail that the truth of the 
artwork should be the same as the philosophical standard of truth. For this to be so, it 
would have to recapitulate the philosophical method summarized in the above 
paragraph, in order to similarly achieve a critique of the delusive mediators of 
experience, and entail the agent's acquaintance with the non-identical. 
 As I will show in the following sections, this is in fact the case. There is textual 
evidence in Aesthetic Theory that Adorno understands the artwork to recapitulate the 
philosophical text's approach to truth. This can best be shown by breaking down the 
philosophical method into three core areas – the destructively phenomenological 
employment of false epistemological materials in order to create a break with those 
materials, the employment of the dialectical constellation in order to effect this break, 
and the performative role of the agent as ultimately responsible for this break's taking 
place. I will now address each of these in turn. 
 
4.13 Creating a Break 
The unique feature of Adorno's theory of truth, as explained in the previous three 
Chapters, is its circumventing the falsifying mediators of experience by virtue of 
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engaging these false mediators, and creating a break in these mediators through this 
engagement. Adorno phrases this, in the philosophical context, as the attempt to 
instantiate truth by virtue of breaking with concepts 'in [their] own measure' (ND: 5 / 
17). In Adorno's aesthetic philosophy this feature, of creating an immanent break, is 
also present. This is most clearly demonstrated in the extract below- 
 
It is by way of concepts, however, that art sets free its mimetic, 
nonconceptual layer [...] Art militates against the concept as much as it 
does against domination, but for this opposition it, like philosophy, requires 
concepts. (AT: 126) 
 
Here, there are two things of note. First, Adorno states that art has a 'nonconceptual' 
layer, and 'militates against the concept'. This serves to closely tie together art and 
philosophy in their role as not only providing a critique of conventional conceptual 
thought, but also providing a grasp on the non-conceptual (non-identical) through this 
critique. Secondly and more importantly, the above extract states that the artwork 
constitutively sets free the artwork's 'nonconceptual layer' not by attempting to work 
outside of concepts, but in fact 'by way of concepts'.  Adorno confirms that art, like 
philosophy, 'requires concepts', and yet these concepts must be employed such that 
they give rise to access to the non-conceptual. The following quote reinforces the idea 
that the artwork must achieve a non-conceptual break by virtue of the employment of 
concepts - 
 
The truth of artworks depends on whether they succeed at absorbing into 
their immanent necessity what is not identical with the concept, what is 
according to that concept accidental. (AT: 134)   
 
As was shown in the extract higher above (AT: 126), Adorno has asserted that art 
'requires concepts'. Bearing this in mind, in the extract just cited (AT: 134) Adorno 
is saying that the artwork effects a break in these concepts by virtue of forcing 
the concepts employed in the artwork in the course of their own employment to, 
by virtue of their own ' immanent necessity', incorporate content which the 
concept took itself to exclude. This demonstrates that the artwork, like the 
philosophical text, effects a break in conceptuality by virtue of the immanent 
employment of conceptuality itself.  
 This shows that the way in which the artwork effects this break in 
conceptuality is identical in form to the philosophical employment of 
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constellations; the artwork forces the concept to call up other concepts and 
content in order to mitigate the concept's own insufficiency. If this is indeed the 
case, and the artwork effects a break in conceptuality in the same way as the 
philosophical text, this would take us further in trying to establish the uniformity of 
Adorno's theories of philosophical and aesthetic truth. I will try to demonstrate 
this in the following section. 
 
4.14 Dialectical Constellations and the Artwork  
As we have seen at length, philosophy effects its textual instantiation of the non-
identical by virtue of its employment of what Adorno calls 'constellations'. These 
constellations are constituted by Adorno's attempt to comprehend a given topic, and 
then progressively employing each eligible concept and inducing them to fail. This has 
been covered in detail in Chapter 3, section 3.14. There is in fact exegetical evidence 
that Adorno takes the artwork to constitute itself in the same way, by making use of 
dialectical constellations.  
 Adorno makes it clear that the truth content of the artwork, its epistemological 
and socio-historical critique, is not constituted through the addition of any new content, 
but rather through the dialectical employment of pre-existing content. This dialectical 
employment constitutes the artwork's truth content and 'break' with the falsifying 
mediators of experience. Adorno displays this here - 
  
Unconsciously every artwork must ask itself if and how it can exist as 
utopia: always only through the constellation of its elements. The artwork 
transcends not by the bare and abstract difference from the unvarying but 
rather by taking the unvarying into itself, taking it apart, and putting it back 
together again; such composition is what is usually called aesthetic 
creativity. Accordingly, the truth content of artworks is to be judged in terms 
of the extent to which they are unable to reconfigure the other out of the 
unvarying. (AT: 394, emphases mine) 
 
Here, then, we have Adorno's claim that the artwork's instantiation of 'utopia' and the 
'other' (both of which function as shorthands for the non-identical) is achieved through 
the '[reconfiguration of] the other out of the unvarying'. The 'aesthetic creativity' which 
brings about this appearance of the non-identical through the artwork is identified with 
nothing other than the constellation of the artwork's 'elements'. As in philosophy, then, 
there is the clear thought that the instantiation of the non-identical is achieved via the 
dialectical employment of constellations. Adorno reiterates this thought - 
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In artworks the name is, however, strictly negative. Artworks say what is 
more than the existing, and they do this exclusively by making a 
constellation of how it is, “Comment c'est”. (AT: 175) 
 
Here, Adorno uses the 'name' as shorthand for the identification of the non-identical. 
Again, as in philosophy, art says more than what is the case, but does so negatively. 
As we saw above, art (as constitutively experiential) is subject to the delusive 
mediators of experience. As such, art is subject to the same problematic as 
philosophy; the positive statement of the true is impossible, as it would be falsified by 
the mediators of experience (cf section 3.8). As such, as Adorno says, the 'name' of 
the artwork is 'strictly negative'. This negative grasp of the truth is achieved through 
what Adorno calls a 'constellation of how it is'. This reinforces the similarity of the 
situation of art and philosophy – both are necessarily negative, and both transcend this 
negativity through the employment of dialectical constellations. 
 Finally, Adorno gives an endorsement of the artwork's mimicking of philosophy's 
dialectical employment of concepts here - 
  
That universal elements are irrevocably part of art at the same time that art 
opposes them, is to be understood in terms of art's likeness to language. For 
language is hostile to the particular and nevertheless seeks its rescue. 
Language mediates the particular through universality and in the 
constellation of the universal, but it does justice to its own universals only 
when they are not used rigidly in accord with the semblance of their 
autonomy but are rather concentrated to the extreme on what is specifically 
to be expressed. (AT: 268) 
 
Here Adorno draws a direct parallel between art and language, the constitutive 
medium of philosophy. Language, Adorno asserts, is problematized by its innate 
'[hostility] to the particular' (this hostility deriving from the conceptual mediation of 
experience) and yet 'nevertheless seeks its rescue' through 'universality and the 
constellation of the universal'. This suffices as a summary of the philosophical method 
which we examined in Chapters 2 and 3, and posited as the constitutive element in the 
philosophical text which allows for an instantiation of the non-identical. Adorno then 
asserts that art's own relationship to concepts ('universal elements') are likewise to be 
construed in this manner. As such, art, like philosophy, is problematized by the 
falsifying role of universals, and also resolves this problematic through the dialectical 
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employment of constellations. However, of course, art, unlike philosophy, does not 
construct these constellations explicitly with reference to concepts, but instead 
conducts itself autonomously.  
 So, we have seen that for Adorno the artwork is constructed by dialectical 
procedures which, like philosophy, result in what Adorno terms 'constellations'. These 
constellations are constructed (in the artwork) by interrogating and attempting to 
reconcile the valencies of aesthetic materials. The key consequence to be drawn from 
this is that the artwork bears the same textual performativity as the philosophical text. 
Just as in the case of the philosophical text, the artwork employs problematic concepts 
and, in the course of their employment, causes the concept to display its insufficiency. 
As in the context of philosophy, the displayed insufficiency of the concept thereby calls 
up other concepts and causes a dialectical constellation.  
 We need to briefly add our account of oblique reflection, as expounded above, 
to this account of the affinity of the artwork and the philosophical text. We are presently 
asserting that the artwork and philosophical text both instantiate a textually 
performative critique of concepts. However, we need to outline how art's hermetic 
procedure amounts to this conceptual critique. 
 First, we must note that both the artwork and the philosophical text present, in 
their respective media, the same dialectical complex of concepts. Which is to say, that 
which is present in each is determined by the same conceptual totality, with the same 
obtaining conceptual aporias.69  This is so just due to the influence of a single process, 
thin determination, on both philosophical and aesthetic materials. The aesthetic 
materials, and their valencies, are obliquely determined by both concepts and the 
social totality. As such, the artwork's dialectical working of those aesthetic valencies 
serves as an oblique mirror of the philosophical dialectical method. The hermetic 
procedure of following the aesthetico-logical demands of aesthetic materials amounts 
to a conceptual constellation, just because these valencies are nothing other than the 
oblique reflection of the conceptual mediation which governs them. Valencies are 
themselves determined by conceptual content. As such, the dialectical working and 
development of these valencies will result in the artwork presenting, in the completed 
artwork, a formal whole which will engage the agent's concepts and induce them to 
fail. The contradictions latent in concepts are translated into aesthetic logic – the 
working of the aesthetic processes on this aesthetic logic results in a completed 
artwork. 
 As has been said, the aesthetico-logical properties of the aesthetic contents are 
                                                 
69
 Presuming the artwork and philosophical text are contemporaneous. 
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not merely passively received, but are in fact worked on by the artist. This working 
takes these aesthetico-logical demands and tendencies and extrapolates and develops 
them. As a consequence, these aesthetico-logical tendencies often result in the 
aesthetic equivalent of philosophical contradiction. Authentic artworks encounter 
aporias and irresolvable formal problematics, just as authentic philosophy terminates 
in the display of contradictions, aporias, etc. 
 These purely aesthetic formal developments become conceptually critical just 
due to the conceptual mediation of perception. On the agent perceiving the completed 
artwork, the concepts which obliquely determined the formal demands of the aesthetic 
content reappear and are re-engaged by the agent viewing the completed artwork. As 
such, if the completed artwork engages the concepts and leads them, during the 
agent's performative engagement with the artwork, into contradiction, then the 
conceptual mediation of experience will be lead to break down just as in the case of 
philosophical performativity. 
 The conceptual structure of experience has certain latent contradictions. This 
same conceptual structure lends aesthetico-logical form to the contents worked by the 
aesthetic. The logical demands of these aesthetic contents, then, are determined by 
and reflective of these contradictions. However, these contradictions have been 
translated out of a conceptual medium and into the medium of aesthetic form. In 
constructing the artwork, the aesthetic processes work these formal demands and 
develop them. Just as in the philosophical case, development of these formal 
tendencies reveals these latent contradictions. Once completed, the artwork displays 
these contradictions, translated back into a conceptual medium (viz., experience). As 
such, the artwork presents to the agent a dialectically constructed 'text' wherein the 
aesthetic contents, and their attendant conceptual mediation, is isomorphic with the 
agent's own conceptual array. As such, the artwork's autonomous, dialectical form is 
also always already a latent critique of the conceptual array which determined it. It only 
stands in need of the agent's own performative engagement to vitalize this conceptual 
critique and create the desired conceptual break, as in philosophy. This will be 
demonstrated in the following section. 
 To conclude this section, then, the artwork's dialectical treatment of its aesthetic 
materials, due to these materials being constituted by conceptual and socio-historical 
mediation, amounts to the same as the philosophical text's dialectical treatment of its 
explicitly conceptual material. By 'the same' I mean that, in either case, the finished 
product (the artwork or philosophical text) bears in itself a dialectical construct which 
engages the concepts of the agent's conceptual array and induces them to fail. The 
philosophical text does so explicitly; the artwork does so obliquely, by virtue of the thin 
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determination of the aesthetic materials, and the conceptual mediation of experience. 
This amounts to their textual performativity. For the artwork, like the philosophical text , 
bears on its face a destructively phenomenological treatment of concepts. Adorno 
makes this textual performativity explicit - 
  
The truth content of artworks, as the negation of their existence, is 
mediated by them though they do not in any way communicate it. That by 
which truth content is more than what is posited by artworks is their 
methexis in history and the determinate critique that they exercise through 
their form. (AT: 175, emphases mine) 
 
Adorno asserts that the critical function of the artwork allows it to instantiate a 
truth-content which exceeds the artwork itself. As we saw in section 4.3. (and will 
see in section 4.15) this truth which lies beyond the artwork itself is the non-
identical. Adorno identifies the critique in the artwork which constitutes this 
access to the non-identical with the artwork's form. It is through its formal 
properties that the artwork exercizes its critique.  
 
4.15 The Performative Role of the Agent 
Now that we have established that the artwork bears a textual performativity in the 
same sense as the philosophical text bears a textual performativity, and moreover that 
it is formed in the same dialectical fashion, we now only need to demonstrate that 
Adorno holds that the artwork needs to be conjoined to the agent's own internal 
performance to finally demonstrate the affinity between Adorno's philosophical and 
aesthetic theories of truth. 
 Once again, there is exegetical evidence that Adorno does, just as for 
philosophy, claim that the truth of art is constituted by both the artwork and the agent's 
performative engagement with the artwork in equal measure. For example, here –  
 
That artworks say something and in the same breath conceal it expresses 
this enigmaticalness from the perspective of language. This characteristic 
cavorts clownishly; if one is within the artwork, if one participates in its 
immanent completion, this enigmaticalness makes itself invisible; if one 
steps outside the work, breaking the contract with its immanent context, 
this enigmaticalness returns like a spirit [...] Whoever refuses to reenact the 
work under the discipline it imposes falls under the empty gaze [of the 
artwork, which reveals nothing]. (AT: 160) 
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What is most important in the above is that the artwork's 'enigmaticalness', its failure to 
divest a determinate, subsumable content, is only overcome by an active participation 
in the artwork. This participation is termed by Adorno a re-enactment of the work 'under 
the discipline it imposes'. Adorno posits this role of the agent as necessary in order to 
avoid falling under the 'empty gaze' of the artwork (i.e., to not become like those 
Adorno terms the 'art-alien' (AT: 160), who are incapable of a genuine relationship to 
and interpretation of the artwork). Just as in the case of philosophy, art is held to have a 
content which is not reducible merely to its apparent phenomena, but in fact also 
requires the agent's own engagement. This strongly suggests that art, like philosophy, 
is held by Adorno to require a performative engagement from the agent in order to fully 
disclose its content. 
 This is reinforced in this final extract, in which Adorno explicitly draws this 
comparison - 
 
By reading the spirit of artworks out of their configurations and confronting 
the elements with each other and with the spirit that appears in them, 
critique passes over into the truth of the spirit, which is located beyond the 
aesthetic configuration. This is why critique is necessary to the works. In 
the spirit of the works critique recognizes their truth content or distinguishes 
truth content from spirit. Only in this act, and not through any philosophy of 
art that would dictate to art what its spirit must be, do art and philosophy 
converge. (AT: 116) 
 
What is most striking about this, of course, is that Adorno is here asserting that 'art and 
philosophy converge'. However, what is most important is Adorno's assertion that the 
'truth of the spirit' (the intellectual component of the artwork) is 'located beyond the 
aesthetic configuration' (i.e., is not equivalent merely to the presented properties of the 
artwork). He simultaneously asserts that in 'the act' of critique the truth is revealed – 
and this act is constituted by 'reading the spirit of artworks out of their configurations 
and confronting the elements with each other'. The artwork, then, holds a truth of spirit 
which is 'beyond  the aesthetic configuration' – i.e., not equivalent to the immediate 
properties of the artwork. However, Adorno denies that it is some intellective content 
which can be extracted from the artwork (à la Hegel). While Adorno holds this truth to 
be 'beyond the aesthetic configuration' it nonetheless can only be comprehended 
through this configuration. In the act of critique enacted by the agent,  the truth is 'read 
out' of the aesthetic configuration, and bound up with it. This sounds identical in nature 
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to the problematic encountered in Chapter 3. Namely, that the philosophical content 
was located beyond the conceptual content of the philosophical text, and yet was 
nonetheless posited as being accessed by the agent's interaction with that 
philosophical text. 
 As in the case of philosophy, then, the truth content of the artwork is 
incompatible with the nature of the medium in question (as the truth content is non-
identical, and the medium is in accord with identity thinking), and yet nonetheless must 
be 'read out' of that medium, by virtue of the agent's own performative engagement 
with that medium. As such, Adorno is claiming that the artwork sets up a truth which is 
not identical to the artwork's actual constitution.70 In the philosophical context, this 
opposition of the truth to the discursive constitution of the philosophical text was solved 
by the performative engagement of the agent. From the evidence already adduced, and 
Adorno's statement that the aesthetic problematic 'converges' with the philosophical, 
we may take this as legitimation for reading art as demanding the same kind of 
performative engagement of the agent as philosophy.  
 However, we do not need to rest content just with this, as Adorno in fact 
provides proof – 
  
Pure immediacy does not suffice for aesthetic experience. Along with the 
involuntary it requires volition, concentrating consciousness; the 
contradiction is ineluctable. All beauty reveals itself to persistent analysis, 
which in turn enriches the element of involuntariness; indeed, analysis 
would be in vain if the involuntary did not reside hidden within it. In the face 
of beauty, analytical reflection reconstitutes the temps durée through its 
antithesis. Analysis terminates in beauty just as it ought to appear to 
complete and self-forgetting unconscious perception. Thus analysis 
subjectively redescribes the course that the artwork objectively describes 
within itself: Adequate knowledge of the aesthetic is the spontaneous 
completion of the objective processes that, by virtue of the tensions of this 
completion, transpire within it. (AT: 91) 
 
Here, Adorno is tracing a relationship between analysis and the artwork itself which is 
                                                 
70
 'By reading  the spirit of artworks out of their configurations and confronting the elements 
with each other and with the spirit that appears in them, critique passes over into the truth of 
the spirit, which is located beyond the aesthetic configuration [...] If the spirit of artworks were 
literally identical with their sensual elements and their organization, spirit would be nothing 
but the quintessence of the appearance [… rather], [i]f the spirit of artworks flashes up in 
their sensual appearance, it does so only as their negation.' (AT: 116 – 117, emphasis mine). 
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identical to the problematic of the relationship between the 'philosophical 
demonstration' and 'discursively true' Adorno discovered in Chapter 4. The artwork in 
aesthetic experience constitutes itself through the 'involuntariness' of 'pure immediacy'. 
However, this 'involuntary', immediate experience is necessarily accompanied by 
'volition, concentrating consciousness'. As such, 'aesthetic experience' is constituted by 
a dialectic between an immediate truth of the work, and the conceptually mediated 
element which makes this immediacy viable. As Adorno puts it, analysis 'enriches the 
element of involuntariness'. A complicated dialectical relation is being drawn between 
the immediate truth of aesthetic experience, and the intellectually mediated grounds of 
that experience. 
 The extract above also subtly transitions from consideration of the constitution 
of optimal aesthetic experience, to the related issue of the optimal relationship between 
aesthetic analysis and aesthetic experience.  Adorno asserts that the 'pure immediacy' 
of aesthetic experience must be accompanied by, and translated into, 'analysis', which 
'reconstitutes' this experience 'through its antithesis'. As such, Adorno is introducing a 
dialectical opposition between an immediate, non-discursive truth-content of the 
artwork which demands to be reconstituted by 'its antithesis' – i.e., a conceptually 
mediated, complex analysis. This analysis, Adorno claims, 'redescribes the course that 
the artwork objectively describes within itself'. As such, then, the truth of the artwork is 
the 'antithesis' of the language of analysis (i.e., conceptual discourse), but nonetheless 
must be re-translated into this language of analysis. Compare this to Adorno's analysis 
of the relationship between philosophical demonstration and discursive knowledge - 
 
[I]n philosophy the authentic question will somehow almost always include 
its answer. Unlike science, philosophy knows no fixed sequence of question 
and answer [...] This distinguishes the relation of understanding and 
judgment from the usual order of time [...] What is transmitted here is the 
fiber of the so-called philosophical demonstration, a mode of proof that 
contrasts with the mathematical model. And yet that model does not simply 
disappear, for the stringency of a philosophical thought requires its mode of 
proceeding to be measured by the forms of inference. Philosophical proof is 
the effort to give statements a binding quality by making them 
commensurable with the means of discursive thinking. But it does not purely 
follow from that thinking: the critical reflection of such cogitative productivity 
is itself a philosophical content. (ND: 63 – 64 / 71 - 72) 
 
A detailed analysis of this extract from Negative Dialectics was given in Chapter 3, 
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section 3.11. Here, Adorno claims that philosophy is caught between the immediacy of 
'philosophical demonstration' and the 'mathematical model'. The former is non-
discursive but, due to the 'stringency' of thought, 'requires' a retranslation into the 
rational discourse of the mathematical model. As in the aesthetic case, then, the 
immediate content, the access to the non-identical, entails and requires a discursive, 
rational instantiation. Just as art has the opposition between 'immediacy' and 'analysis', 
philosophy has the opposition between 'philosophical demonstration' and 'discursive 
thinking'. 
 Here we can see that Adorno is drawing a strikingly direct correspondence 
between the aesthetic and philosophical modes of comprehension. In either case the 
medium of expression (the philosophical text; the artwork) is by itself insufficient. The 
conventional mode of understanding the medium (conventional philosophical 
discourse; aesthetic analysis) is found to be insufficient. True comprehension is 
achieved in an immediate experience of truth, which is derived from the agent's 
internalized performance of that contained in the medium of expression. This 
immediate experience is opposed to the conventional, discursive mode of 
comprehension, but nonetheless entails and requires it. As Adorno puts it in the 
aesthetic context, the 'pure immediacy' of the artwork must be re-expressed 'through its 
antithesis', namely conceptual analysis. As such, the 'spontaneous completion' of the 
artwork's 'objective processes' which takes place in the observer's experience is 
necessary for '[a]dequate knowledge of the aesthetic'. However, this 'pure immediacy', 
Adorno asserts, is insufficient, and must be accompanied by discursive analysis.  
 Adorno, then, is reinstating here the dichotomy which was characteristic of 
philosophical truth. Namely, that there is a complex relationship between a discursive 
expression of the truth, which accords with pre-established conditions of validity and a 
form of experiential, immediate truth which is opposed to the former but must be 
retranslated into it. Adorno is clearly setting up the same problematic in the case of the 
aesthetic.  
 You will recall that the solution to this problematic, in the case of philosophy, 
was the addition of the performative engagement of the agent. This performative 
engagement of the agent vitalized, as it were, the concrete truth of the philosophical 
text through performatively internalizing it. This performative internalization established 
a break-down in the mediators of experience, and hence an experiential acquaintance 
with the non-identical. It is my claim that Adorno also extends this solution to the 
aesthetic problematic. As such, then, aesthetics and philosophy are also united in their 
solution to their shared problematic. In each case, the discursive standard of 
understanding (philosophical discursive thinking; standards of aesthetic analysis) are 
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insufficient and falsifying by virtue of their employment of conceptual discourse, and in 
each case the proposed answer is the agent's own immediate cognitive performance of 
the philosophical text or artwork. Adorno makes this clear in the aesthetic context - 
 
Adequate knowledge of the aesthetic is the spontaneous completion of the 
objective processes that, by virtue of the tensions of this completion, 
transpire within it. (AT: 91) 
 
This serves as a very concise assertion by Adorno that the correct comprehension of 
the aesthetic entails a performative element. In the philosophical case, the role of 
performativity was to liberate the philosophical content, by means of the concept, from 
conceptuality itself. Intriguingly, Adorno here asserts the same, obliquely, for art. 
Adequate knowledge of the aesthetic requires the agent to performatively engage with 
the constitutive processes within the artwork and to complete them. In other words, 
Adorno notes that the processes transpiring in the artwork are presently incomplete – it 
falls to the agent to add his performative element, and complete the artwork, and 
thereby attain adequate knowledge of the artwork. Performativity for the aesthetic, as 
for philosophy, is a condition on the true completion of the artwork as a mode of 
knowledge - 
 
[U]nderstanding specific artworks [...] requires an objective experiential 
reenactment from within in the same sense in which the interpretation of a 
musical work means its faithful performance. (AT: 161) 
 
As for philosophy, then, performativity is required to solve the dilemma of the the 
rational / non-rational modes of knowledge, and finally attain the non-identical. 
 
4.16 Performative Engagement and Access to the Non-Identical 
Now we have seen that aesthetics, like philosophy, requires the performative 
engagement of the agent, we need to make clear how this performative engagement 
gives rise to access to the non-identical. You will recall that in the case of philosophy, 
this was reasonably clear. The philosophical text with which the agent performatively 
engages employs the self-same concepts which mediate experience – as such, 
understanding how an engagement with a discursive critique of theoretical concepts 
could result in the breakdown of the concept's mediating function was quite 
transparent. 
 However, as we have seen, the artwork does not take concepts as its aesthetic 
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materials, nor does it transparently employ concepts in the process of aesthetic 
formation. This being so, we are presently without an understanding of how the 
subject's performative engagement with the artwork is intended to give rise to the 
required break in the conceptual mediation of his experience. 
 As it happens, this is in fact reasonably easy to explain, as soon as we make 
use of the idea of oblique reflection which we began examining above. 
 We established above (in section 4.10), that the aesthetic materials which are 
worked on by the aesthetic processes are obliquely determined by the conceptual 
array. As such, their behaviour when being worked by the aesthetic processes (which 
are themselves determined by and a form of conceptual practice), and the artwork 
which results from their being worked, is reflective of the conceptual array. As such, the 
problematic of the artwork (its dilemmas, its formal development, etc.) is in fact an 
instantiation of the problematic of concepts (cf. section 4.10).  
 The conceptual structure of the agent's experience is identical to that 
conceptual array which determines the aesthetic problematic.71 With this comes the 
caveat that concepts are obliquely at work in the artwork, rather than directly, as in the 
case of philosophy. This obliquity, however, does not change the fact that the artwork is 
conceptually constituted and, when encountered by the agent, engages the agent's 
conceptual array - 
 
Although artworks are neither conceptual nor judgmental, they are logical. 
In them nothing would be enigmatic if their immanent logicality did not 
accommodate discursive thought, whose criteria they nevertheless 
regularly disappoint [...] The unity that artworks [...] achieve makes them 
analogous to the logic of experience. (AT: 180) 
 
Adorno correctly maintains that the artwork cannot be consistently seen as either 
conceptual or judgmental. Our examination of the artwork's autonomy served to 
demonstrate why this is; the artwork constitutes itself wholly with reference to aesthetic 
properties, and in no way attempts to capture, describe or conceptually subsume 
anything extra-aesthetic. However, and this returns to the artwork's status as dialectical 
critique, the artwork nonetheless 'accommodate[s] discursive thought' while 
'disappoint[ing]' its 'criteria'. While the artwork may be formed aconceptually, it 
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 This equivalence, between the determining structures of experience and a given medium, 
was demonstrated at length in the case of philosophy (cf. section 3.15). As both philosophy 
and art are subject to the same determining influences, there is no need to fashion a new 
argument for the case of art; the argument concerning philosophy can be taken as applying 
in this case also. 
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nonetheless (once completed) presents a conceptually germane unity which engages, 
and is 'analogous' to, the 'logic of experience' (AT: 180). The artwork accommodates 
and engages, then, the agent's conceptual faculties as he performatively engages with 
the artwork, while simultaneously frustrating these concepts.  
 This combination of the engagement of concepts and frustration of the self-
same concepts according to their criteria (by which they are being engaged) which 
Adorno here describes is nothing other than dialectical method, and does not differ 
from the manner in which philosophy performatively effects its critique. As such, the 
agent's performative engagement with the artwork engages his concepts just as a 
philosophical text does, the only difference being that it is not immediately apparent to 
the agent that the artwork is conceptually constituted. As the artwork effects a 
dialectical critique of concepts just as philosophy does, this engagement likewise 
results in a break being effected in the conceptual structure of experience, and an 
experience of the non-identical. 
 We can see from the above, then, that the aesthetic not only shares in the 
problematic of philosophy, but also breaks out of this problematic, like philosophy, in 
order to access the non-identical in the same manner. Moreover, this entails a 
unification of the theory of truth for each; both dialectically work their respective 
materials, which bear the determination of the social totality. The dialectical working of 
these materials results in the display of the contradictory and insufficient nature of the 
epistemological whole which determined these materials. This static critique, however, 
then has added to it the agent's own performative engagement with that critique which, 
by virtue of the direct use of concepts in the case of philosophy, and by virtue of the 
oblique determination of aesthetic materials by concepts in the case of aesthetics, 
results in the breaking of the conceptual mediation of experience. This breaking of the 
conceptual mediation of experience, results in the acquaintance of the agent with the 
non-identical.  
 We have seen, then, that the theory of truth content which Adorno holds for 
philosophy and aesthetics is unified. Although there is a degree of differentiation in the 
philosophical and aesthetic modes (due to aesthetics making use of oblique, as 
opposed to direct, second reflection), nonetheless both take place in an identically 
constituted problematic, and employ an identical solution to this solution, namely the 
performative engagement of the agent. While, as was said at the introduction of this 
thesis, this Chapter is by necessity more than speculative than the first two, I take it 
that this suffices to establish the claim that Adorno's aesthetics and philosophy share a 
unified theory of truth as, at the very least, plausible. 
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4.17 Oblique Second Reflection 
In closing, I should like to return to a desideratum that was laid out at the outset of  this 
Chapter. Namely, that the specificity of the artwork should be respected. As much as 
Adorno posits art and philosophy as interlinked (AT: 116), and understands art as 
requiring philosophical interpretation (AT: 120) it is still the case that Adorno 
acknowledges that the artwork should be understood as constituting itself solely along 
aesthetic lines. Which is to say, that regardless of its relationship to the truth and 
philosophy, the artwork does not concern itself with either of these; rather it is solely 
formed according to aesthetic criteria. While I hope to have made clear throughout my 
commitment to this understanding of the artwork, I am conscious that the claim that the 
artwork has the same mode of truth as philosophy may have gone some way to 
obscuring this commitment on my part. I would like to just re-affirm, and demonstrate, 
that the theory of the artwork's truth here expounded does not reduce art to philosophy. 
 What philosophy and art share, according to Adorno, is their ability to 
dialectically employ falsifying and delusive processes such that this delusiveness is 
made to display itself, through the emergence of contradiction, antinomy, etc., and the 
addition of the agent's internal performance. As we saw in Chapters 1 to 3, philosophy 
achieves this by virtue of intentionally engaging epistemological materials, and 
inducing them to fail through dialectical method. This dialectical method was then 
combined with a rhetorical style which displayed the destructive phenomenology of 
these epistemological materials in the course of their employment. This in turn was 
combined with the agent's own performance of this destructive phenomenology, which 
engaged his concepts and induced them to fail. This philosophical process was 
explicitly concerned with achieving the truth, and engaged directly with the concepts 
which mediated experience. Adorno termed this 'second reflection' (ND: 44 / 54) – it is 
a meta-critical investigation of those epistemological processes and materials which 
make experience and thought possible. This explicit second reflection engages the 
reified nature of concepts and the epistemological whole directly.  
 Now, art itself, as we have seen, effects the critique which Adorno identifies as a 
product of second reflection. Adorno himself makes explicit art's instantiation of a 
second reflection – 
  
Second reflection lays hold of the technical procedures, the language of the 
artwork in the broadest sense, but it aims at blindness [...] Unexpectedly 
confirming Hegel's thesis of the transformation of mediation into immediacy, 
second reflection restores naïveté in the relation of [aesthetic] content to 
first reflection. (AT: 34)  
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However, while art is constituted by an ongoing process of second reflection, which 
produces 'the critique of the omnipotence of reason' (AT: 35) via the artwork, art cannot 
be directly assimilated to the second reflection of philosophy. Where art differs 
significantly from philosophy is that, while it recapitulates philosophy's critique of the 
obtaining totality, and moreover also instantiates this critique in a medium which 
requires the agent's performative engagement in order to effect an acquaintance with 
the non-identical, this procedure is entirely non-intentional. The artwork, for itself, has 
no reference to anything other than the artwork and its constituent aesthetic materials. 
As such, the artwork cannot be understood as identical to philosophy's second 
reflection, just because the artwork does not explicitly reflect on thought, or the 
categories of thought, at all. Rather, art should be understood as an oblique second 
reflection – it effects the same critique as philosophy, in showing the insufficiency of 
concepts, but does so inadvertently, by virtue of the mediation of its material. Adorno 
himself confirms this, in outlining the most significant difference between art and 
philosophy –  
 
The affinity of [aesthetic] construction with cognitive processes, or perhaps 
rather with their interpretation by the theory of knowledge, is no less evident 
than is their difference, which is that art does not make judgments and 
when it does, is shatters its own concept. (AT: 74) 
 
Here Adorno is referring to and confirming the oblique nature of art's second reflection. 
Art achieves this second reflection wholly without judgment. Any attempt on art's part to 
intentionally bring about its critical function would, as Adorno points out, '[shatter] its 
own concept', by betraying the artwork's hermetic nature.  
 As such, while philosophy and art both effect a critique of their mediation, and 
thereby instantiate the non-identical, the second reflection of art is differentiated from 
that of philosophy, due to its oblique nature. This obliquity constitutes the essence of 
the aesthetic, as we have seen; it is only through its sacrifice of any explicit attempt to 
comprehend or know the extra-aesthetic that it is capable of attaining the condition of 
being knowledge of the non-identical.  
 With this conclusion, gesturing towards the unified yet differentiated theory of 
truth which applies both to philosophy and art, this dissertation comes to a close. I have 
attempted to argue that Adorno's aesthetics and philosophy are deeply imbricated; and 
to demonstrate that Adorno's work represents not merely a materialist refinement of 
Hegel and dialectical refinement of Marx, but in fact a unique and valuable species of 
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materialist-transcendental philosophy. In his unification of a 'logic of disintegration' and 
a strong commitment to determinate truth, Adorno represents a theoretic position which 
has been scarcely recognized, let alone explored - and perhaps purposely buried in the 
headlong rush into post-modernism, deconstruction, and 'play'. Fittingly, then, Adorno's 
own work is now a discarded ruin, simultaneously neglected by 'progress' and 
promising an alternative to it. 
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Appendix – Concrete Applications of My Interpretation of 
Adorno's Aesthetic Theory 
 
Chapter 4 covered my interpretation of Adorno's aesthetic theory, and its relationship to 
truth. I set out my reading of Adorno by providing exegesis of Adorno's methodological 
remarks, as well as comparing much of Adorno's writing in Aesthetic Theory with 
programmatic assertions made in non-aesthetic contexts. An obvious downside of this 
approach is that little space was given to demonstrating how Adorno actually applies 
this theory of aesthetic truth to actual artworks.  
 It is notable, on reading Adorno's writings on artworks, as opposed to his 
writings on aesthetic theory, that his analyses of artworks diverge strongly from what 
the account of Adorno's aesthetic theory in Chapter 4 might lead one to expect. They 
are far more diverse in approach, tone and selected subject matter. Adorno does not 
reduce an artwork merely to its aesthetico-logical constitution and proceed to trace the 
grounds of this aesthetico-logical complex in heteronomous influences. Nor does he 
frequently devote considerable space to tracing the interaction of these aesthetico-
logical complexes with the conceptual structure of experience, and the resultant 
instantiation of the non-identical. 
 This stands in need of explanation. Has the explanation given in Chapter 4 
simply failed to map onto Adorno's work? I do not think so. While I will provide in this 
Appendix an example of Adorno's analyses of artworks matching up with my account, it 
is important to first of all note that there is an important difference between aesthetic 
theory and the practice of aesthetic analysis.  
 As Adorno himself stated explicitly, the goal of the analysis of an artwork is not 
to  pretend to 'discover' in the artwork support for the conclusions of some theoretical 
position, but rather to 'contemplatively immerse'  oneself in the artwork's specificity (AT: 
232). This should not be taken as license to have one's theoretical position diverge 
from the nature of specific artworks. Rather, it is a difference in hermeneutic procedure 
– the artwork is investigated in its specific nature, and it is this nature which is unfolded, 
without pre-established theoretic conclusions determining one's analysis (AT: 232).  
 The upshot of this is that Adorno is not, in analyzing artworks, in the business of 
taking care to visibly instantiate his theoretical position. Rather, he intends to unfold the 
artwork in its full specificity. The extent to which this achieved through theoretical 
statements or concrete analysis of the artwork, and the extent to which either is 
informed by the other, is a matter of dialectical tension. And the precise make-up and 
resolution of this tension is not decidable in advance for any artwork (AT: 237 - 238). 
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The failure to find in every concrete analysis a set of assertions visibly reiterating 
Adorno's theoretical position, then, should not be surprising, nor should it be a matter 
of concern. 
 There is a second reason that Adorno's analyses (as well as, in fact, his 
explicitly methodological work, like Aesthetic Theory) often diverges, or is not wholly 
reducible to, the account I have given in Chapter 4. This is simply that, as I noted at the 
outset, my account is intended to cover one facet of Adorno's aesthetic theory. It is not 
the case that Adorno feels that the only feature of the artwork worthy of consideration is 
its instantiation of the non-identical; nor is it  the case that Adorno takes it that the 
artwork is solely constituted by its relationship to the non-identical and conceptual 
contradictions. (For example, Adorno takes it that the formal make-up of the artwork is 
also determined by what he calls 'aesthetic technology' (AT: 76 - 77), which is the 
autonomous development of aesthetic techniques, such as advances in the depiction 
of perspective). My account is focused on an aspect of Adorno's aesthetic theory. I 
certainly do take this aspect to be the most significant and valuable aspect of Adorno's 
aesthetic theory. However, it is from Adorno's point of view only one aspect among a 
very large number.  
 It is important to bear in mind, then, that the account given in Chapter 4 is an 
attempt to elucidate a central aspect of Adorno's aesthetic theory which intentionally 
does not give an account of the countless other strands in Adorno's work. As such, we 
should not expect Adorno's concrete analyses to devote themselves wholly to putting 
my account into action – Adorno's account is far more rich than that. Even if Adorno 
were devoting himself wholly to tracing aesthetic truth content, we saw in Chapter 3 
that Adorno allows for multiple layers of truth, slotting in 'below', as it were, the 
unqualified truth of the non-identical. We should expect Adorno to investigate all of 
these various layers, not merely the non-identical itself. And this is in fact what we find. 
 All of this being said, I would like to turn to demonstrating that, although the 
account given in Chapter 4 should not be seen as necessarily central to concrete 
analysis, and although the relationship of Adorno's analyses to his theoretical work is 
difficult, there are nonetheless examples of Adorno's analyses employing the account I 
have set-up. Further, there is a clear relationship between this account and specific 
artworks set up by Adorno.  
 This relationship is most clearly visible in Adorno's work on Beethoven. Adorno's 
Nachlass contains a great deal of preparatory work for an uncompleted monograph on 
Beethoven. These notes provide an excellent example of how the theoretical position 
outlined in Chapter 4 might be married to specific artworks. 
 In writing on Beethoven, Adorno insists, without analogy or intended hyperbole, 
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that the composer's work is Hegelian in substance (Adorno 1998 : 11). Adorno grounds 
and explains the successes and failures of Beethoven's work in the argot of 
Hegelianism -  
 
The special relationship between the systems of Beethoven and Hegel lies 
in the fact that the unity of the whole is to be understood merely as 
something mediated. Not only is the individual element insignificant, but the 
individual moments are estranged from each other [...] Beethoven's music 
is Hegelian philosophy: but at the same time it is truer than that philosophy 
[...] Logical identity as immanent to form – as an entity at the same time 
fabricates and aesthetic – is both constituted and criticized by Beethoven. 
(Adorno 1998: 13 -14) 
 
As Adorno points out, however, this parallelism is assuredly not intended by 
Beethoven, who was not plausibly influenced by Hegel's philosophy (Adorno 1998 : 
44). The parallel between Hegel and Beethoven is created not by the intention of the 
composer, then, but by the same social whole expressing itself through the two men - 
 
The history of ideas, and thus the history of music, is an autarchic 
motivational context insofar as the social law, on the one hand, produces 
the formation of spheres screened off against each other, and on the other 
hand, as the law of totality, still comes to light in each sphere as the same 
law [...] It is in fitting together under their own law, as becoming, negating, 
confirming themselves and the whole without looking outward, that 
[Beethoven's] movements come to resemble the world whose forces move 
them; they do not do it by imitating that world. In this respect Beethoven's 
attitude on social objectivity is more that of philosophy – the Kantian, in 
some points, and the Hegelian in the decisive ones [.] (Adorno 1998: 43) 
 
This is all perfectly in keeping with the account we arrived at in Chapter 4; the 
problematic of aesthetic and philosophical material is identically constituted by the 
social totality. 'Social law' produces the 'spheres' of philosophy and music (among 
others, of course) and expresses itself ('comes to light in') each, despite their being 
'screened off against each other'. Philosophy and music are united, despite their 
separation, as the same social law transpires in each. Adorno goes on, however, to 
begin filling in the picture of how philosophical problematics are instantiated in the 
context of Beethoven's music. We already see, in the above extract, that Adorno begins 
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to fill in the picture of how Beethoven's music, in particular, comes to recapitulate the 
problematic of the social law. Adorno claims that it is at the level of movements that the 
social whole comes to be instantiated and critiqued - 
 
At this point a precise analysis of the D major passage from the slow 
movement of the great String Quartet in F major [op. 59,1: third movement, 
bars 70ff] must be given. In the formal sense this passage appears 
superfluous, since it comes after a quasi-retransition, after which the 
recapitulation is expected to follow immediately. But when the recapitulation 
fails to appear it is made clear that formal identity is insufficient, manifesting 
itself as true only at the moment when it, as the real, is opposed by the 
possible which lies outside identity. The D♭ major theme is new: it is not 
reducible to the economy of motivic unity. (Adorno 1998: 14) 
  
Here Adorno begins to trace a critique of the 'self-reproduction of society as a self-
identical entity' by frustrating the principle of 'logical identity' (Adorno 1998: 14). In the 
above extract, this critique of logical identity is found in the frustration of the 
relationship between 'retransition' and 'recapitulation'. These two terms refer to 
structural features of sonatas; the retransition serves to complete the middle triad of a 
sonata ('development'), which develops the themes and figures from the opening 
section ('exposition'). On the completion of the development, represented by the close 
of the retransition, the recapitulation should follow, which serves to restate the thematic 
content of the exposition.  
 The specific interest of the 'D major passage' which Adorno points to, then, is 
that it inserts into the interstices between the completion of the retransition and the 
beginning of the recapitulation a new theme which is not found in the exposition, nor 
derived from the development of that found in the exposition (as he puts it – it is not 
'reducible to the economy of motivic unity'). The governing structure of the sonata form, 
then, is negated by virtue of a frustration of the immediate relationship between the 
development and recapitulation through Beethoven's insertion of an unanticipated new 
theme.  
 This serves an example of how, at level of thematic development in the sonata 
form, Adorno locates Beethoven's truth content which is both akin to and 'truer than' 
(Adorno 1998: 14) Hegel's philosophy. Beethoven begins a critique of the immediacy of 
the formal whole demanded by the sonata. As Adorno puts it - 
 
The developmental tendency in those works of Beethoven which precede 
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the late style itself is opposed to the principle of transition. The transition is 
felt to be banal, “inessential”; that is, the relation of disparate moments to a 
whole which holds them together is seen as no more than a prescribed 
convention, no longer tenable. (Adorno 1998: 14) 
 
Beethoven begins to criticize the principle of logical identity by dissolving the 
immediately apparent necessary formal relationships (such as the transition between 
development and recapitulation) into in fact mediated 'prescribed convention' which is 
'no longer tenable' (Adorno 1998: 14). As Adorno puts it  
 
[T]he recapitulation in Beethoven remains aesthetically dubious in the same 
fundamental way as does the thesis of identity in Hegel [...] Out of the 
recapitulation Beethoven produced the identity of the non-identical (Adorno 
1998: 17).  
 
This presence of a critique of logical identity is not isolated to this specific work of 
Beethoven's – for example, Adorno also locates a similar example in Beethoven's 
Piano Sonata No. 29 (Adorno 1998: 19 – 20). 
 Adorno also associates the critique of this social whole with Beethoven's 
employment of motives. Motivic composition conducts itself by means of short note 
patterns which are repeatedly subjected to variation and, less commonly, wholesale 
repetition. These motive patterns can be constituted by patterns in melody, rhythmic 
cadence, or harmonic relationships. In Beethoven's employment of these motives, we 
once again see traced Beethoven's astringent relationship to logical identity and the 
totality - 
  
The motive kernels, the particulars to which each movement is tied, are 
themselves identical with the universal; they are formulas of tonality, 
reduced to nothingness as things of their own and preshaped by the totality 
as much as the individual is in individualistic society. The developing 
variation, an image of social labour, is definite negation: from what has 
once been posited it ceaselessly brings forth the new and enhanced by 
destroying it in its immediacy, its quasi-natural form. (Adorno 1998: 43 -44) 
 
The motives, then, are taken by Adorno to be immediate elements of the totality. When 
mediated by Beethoven's compositional practice, however, they begin to bring 'forth 
the new' and destroy their immediate, apparent identity with the totality (that 'quasi-
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natural form'). Just as in the case of sonata form, then, we see that Beethoven's 
compositional form causes a deterioration in the apparent seamless identity of the 
aesthetic materials and pre-given form. The immediacy of the aesthetic materials is 
destroyed by his work, and their consequent mediated form reveals the whole to be 'no 
longer tenable' (Adorno 1998: 14).  
 Just as Adorno traces the contradictions in the elements of the social totality, 
then, Beethoven displays this totality in the formal qualities of his music: 
 
All these implications of Beethoven result from musical analysis without 
any daring analogies, but to social knowledge they prove as true as the 
inferences about society itself. Society recurs in great music: transfigured, 
criticized and reconciled[.] (Adorno 1998: 44) 
 
As a final note, an explanation of how Adorno feels society is 'reconciled' in great 
music. The analysis of Beethoven given above implies that Adorno takes 
Beethoven's music to be entirely critical of society. However, Adorno notes that 
Beethoven, in fact imports an ideological reconciliation into his analysis. This 
'affirmative' (Adorno 1998: 44) moment in Beethoven's music is identified with the 
music's reliance on the reprise (Adorno 1998: 44). The reprise, the return in the 
composition of the original themes of the piece, represents to Adorno: 
 
the force of crushing repression, of an authoritarian “That's how it is” [...] 
The self-exaggerating assurance that the return of the first is the meaning, 
the self-revelation of immanence as transcendence – this is the cryptogram 
for the senselessness of a merely self-reproducing reality that has been 
welded together into a system. (Adorno 1998: 44) 
 
The reprise becomes ideological by means of its apparent privileging of some original 
content which stands over and above the dialectical elaboration of the aesthetic 
material.72 To Adorno, this represents a 'formalistic residue' (Adorno 1998: 44). It 
presents Beethoven's compositional practice at its least mediated and dialectically 
considered, and most conventional. It represents a failure of Beethoven to completely 
integrate the formal and content-led demands of his art. This failure, however, is not 
contingent but socio-historically enforced. The reprise is: 
 
                                                 
72
 There are interesting, if distant, resonances of Adorno's declamation of 
Heidegger's privileging putatively 'primitive' contents in his philosophy here. 
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the tribute Beethoven was forced to pay to the ideological character whose 
spell extends even to the most sublime music ever to aim at freedom under 
continued unfreedom [...] A composer is always a zoon politikon as well, the 
more so the more emphatic his purely musical claim [...] The fact that 
Beethoven's music is structured like the society to which […] we give the 
name of “rising bourgeoisie”, or at least like its self-consciousness and its 
conflicts, is premised on another fact: that the primary-musical form of his 
own views was inherently mediated by the spirit of his social class in the 
period around 1800. He was not the spokesman or advocate of this 
class[...] he was its inborn son. (Adorno 1998: 44 – 45) 
 
Once again, then, the formal nature of Beethoven's music is determined by the socio-
historical complex external to his 'purely musical' activity. The appearance of the 
reprise in Beethoven's work, then, is not simply a contingent choice made by 
Beethoven alone. It in fact represents the limit of Beethoven's dialectical musical 
activity, this limit being imposed by the same socio-historical determination which also 
lends the successful elements of Beethoven's work its socially critical dimension and 
truth.  
 This brings to a close this brief examination of Adorno's work on Beethoven. I 
hope it has served to illustrate how the general methodological remarks made in 
Chapter 4 can be made to match up with the analysis of a specific artist or artwork. 
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List Of Abbreviations 
 
ND - Negative Dialectics. Translated by E. B. Ashton. Routledge: Abingdon. Theodor 
Adorno, 2006b. 
 
DE - Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments. Translated by Edmund 
Jephcott. Edited by Gunzelin Schmid Noerr. Stanford University Press: Stanford, 
California. Theodor W. Adorno,  & Max Horkheimer, 2002. 
 
AT -  Aesthetic Theory. Translated by Robert Hullot-Kentor. Continuum: London, New 
York. Theodor W. Adorno,  2004. 
 
MM -  Minima Moralia: Reflections on a Damaged Life. Translated by E. F. N. Jephcott. 
Verso: London, New York. Theodor Adorno, 2005. 
 
All quotations from Negative Dialectics are adapted from both Ashton's original 
translation and the original German text. All quotations from ND will provide two page 
references -  for the relevant pages in Ashton, and the original German text (Adorno 
1997b) , respectively.  
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